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SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to show that within the context of
Nigeria's development effort, financial development with respect to
the banking system has aided investment and economic development to a
greater extent than is generally recognised. This study, therefore,
sets itself the task of a detailed examination of the structure of the
Nigerian banking system as a service producing industry, the analysis
of the economic performance of the banking system arid the prescribing
of policies and regulations to improve the banking system's structure
and performance.
The structure of the Nigerian banking system is reflected in its
historical pattern of growth, ownership, the network branch expansion,
assets and liabilities composition and the legal and regulatory
framework. The economic performance is reflected in output,
profitability and the efficiency with which the banks have met some
requirements indeispensable for economic development such as the
contribution to saving-investment process and the provision of
adequate finance to various sectors of the economy. A banking system,
as a service industry, suffers from output measurement problem.
Surrogates were used to measure the output of the Nigerian banking
systems. The profitability of the banking system was measured by the
ratios of profit after tax/capital and profit after tax/assets.
The determinants of the Nigerian banking system's lending and
profitability performance are based on the hypothesis: the demand,
policy and structure variables significantly affect the performance of
the Nigerian banking system. The evidence from the analysis indicates
xii
that policy and demand factors were more important in influencing the
performance of the banking system. The bank market structure as
measured by the bank offices rather than the deposits concentration
ratio was significant in influencing the Nigerian banking system's
performance.
The study i rounded up by prescribing policies and regulations
to improve the structure and performance of the Nigerian banking
system.
xiii
SECTION
DITBODUCTION AND OBJECTIvE OF THE STUDY
CHAPTER ONE
OBJECTIVE AND METhODOLOGY OF THE SIUDY
1-1	 INTRODUCTION
Financial resources have long been considered a very important
factor, if not the most important factor in economic development.
Consequently the mobilization of resources have been identified as
crucial in achieving rapid economic "take—off" in the developing
countries. A first step to resource mobilization for development
purposes, is the mobilization of financial resources. The
mobilization of financial resources leads to capital formation.
Capital formation requires the release of domestic goods and services
for real investment or the importation of resources from outside or as
is usually the case, a combination of the two.
For an economy that wants to increase its real capital formation,
the objective must be to provide a climate receptive to the
importation of resources from abroad and the encouragement of domestic
savings. The latter approach requires an institutional arrangement
which encourages and mobilizes savings on one hand, and which channels
savings so mobilized into productive investment, on the other.
It is noteworthy that national governments in most developing
countries have at various periods made conscious efforts to speed up
the pace of economic development. They have invested huge sums of
money in both infrastructural and directly productive projects because
of the lethargy of the private sector in investing in these areas.
But in most cases, the available investable fund is hardly adequate
for sustained economic development programmes.
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The financial mobilization problem is very closely tied up with
the savings problem, and developing countries are generally
characterised by a low ra•te of domestic savings. However, the
inadequacy of the domestic savings rate seems rather exaggerated.
With few exceptions, namely the very poor countries, the gross
domestic savings rate has been found to be fairly high in a large
number of developing countries. What is really lacking is the
efficiency in the process by which savings being accumulated in the
economy are translated into savings useable for productive investment
(Khatkhate and Riechel, 1980). In developing countries, savings tend
to remain idle or to be dissipated owing to the inherent inadequacy
and inefficiency of institutional channels.
Many developing countries have, over the years, relied very much
on the inflow of financial resources from outside in various forms:
official and private portfolio capital flows as well as direct foreign
investment, as a means of speeding up their economic development. In
general, however, these countries have shown preference for direct
foreign investment because they regard direct foreign investment as a
means of counteracting the sluggish trend in official and private
portfolio capital flows. Besides, direct foreign investment embodies
the power to exercise control by the investor, a knowledge ingredient
which may be managerial, technical or of some other kind, and
production technology all of which do not accompany portfolio capital
and very much needed in the developing countries (Onah, 1979).
Generally, capital from outside can be very helpful in speeding
the pace of economic development and can act as a catalytic agent in
making it possible to harness domestic resources particularly in a
developing country. But foreign capital, no matter how large the
3
inflow, cannot absolve a recipient country from the task of mobilizing
domestic resources. In the developing countries, experience has shown
that foreign capital alone cannot create any permanent basis for a
higher standard of living in future and that greater dependence on
internal sources of finance facilitates more the successful
implementation of any planned economic development.
The recent events in the developing countries have pointed out
the stark realities of the importance of domestic savings and have
reinforced the need for greater emphasis on mobilization of domestic
financial resources for development purposes. 	 The developing
countries have started the 1980s in an atmosphere of crisis and
disappointment. They have generally incurred enormous deficits
because of the costs of the oil bills which have trebled since 1978 in
the non-oil producing countries and because of the difficulties of
increasing their exports as the recession in the OECD countries
deepens. To finance these deficits, the developing countries have
been forced to take up loans in the international markets.
Consequently, interest and amortization charges are becoming an
unreasonably heavy burden. The conditions of international credits
are becoming more and more difficult.
In an effort to mobilize domestic savings, some national
governments of the developing countries have concentrated on tax
efforts (Chellia, Bass and Kelly, 1975; Rosenberg, 1977). But
taxation in developing countries meets with serious problems which
make its performance as a source of revenue for development purposes
unsatisfactory. Bangs (1968) for instance, asserts that income taxes
typically belong to a fairly advanced stage of economic development.
Taxes do not play a major part in the finances of many developing
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countries 'because these countries are not generally capable of
administering effectively even the normal tax revenues' (Awadalla,
1980, p.22) and because of the high cost of administration due to
insufficient infrastructural facilities and shortage of personnel.
These handicaps make taxation a secondary tool of domestic resource
mobilization.
Greater dependence on domestic sources of finance therefore,
require a wide range of independent, well organised and adapted
financial institutions which have to mobilize internal resources for
the purpose of capital formation and allow the capital to be invested
conveniently and freely into desired development projects. Commercial
banks are thus the major relevant important financial institutions in
most developing countries which encourage and mobilize savings and
also channel savings into productive investment, first because of
their network of offices, second because commercial banks through
normal credit operations often activate savings lying idle elsewhere,
and third because the banks' are highly liquid and thus attract savers
(Khatkhate and Riechel, 1980).
Unfortunately, the importance of the financial sector for growth
and development has only recently been fully appreciated. Because of
the importance of the commercial banks in mobilizing savings in the
developing countries, governments of a wide range of these countries
have assumed direct control of financial institutions. 	 Other
governments, such as Nigeria, have elected to participate in the
management and ownership of financial institutions with private
interests, while still others are satisfied to direct and regulate
institutions that are exclusively in private hands. In all cases, as
Abdi (1977, p.1) observed, 'financial intermediation has taken an
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added importance in the search for ways to improve the growth
prospects of these economies'.
Many writers, Schumpeter (1934); Gurley and Shaw (1955); Patrick
(1966); Goldsmith (1969); Gurley (1969); Cameron (1972); and McKinnon
(1974), to name but a few, have shown that the financial sector plays
an important role in economic development, and the banking system, the
basic component of the sector, must undertake new activities in order
to help realise the development potential and to alleviate the
financial constraints and distortions that exist in the capital
market. Although the relative magnitude of the impact attributed to
banks and other financial institutions in development differ among
authors, their studies have aroused such great interest among students
that the role of financial institutions in economic growth of
developing countries has come under increasing scrutiny by student,
economic planners as well as other policy makers in other countries.
The studies done by Ojo (1974); Abdi (1977); Abu—Koash (1978); Rietti
(1979) on Nigeria, East Africa, Jordan and Latin America respectively
are examples.
In Nigeria the study of financial institutions has proceeded in
two phases with varying emphasis on the different groups of financial
institutions. In the 1950s and 1960s, most of the studies were
concerned with the operations of the commercial banks. This is
understandable, since non—bank financial institutions were relatively
unimportant in the financial system during the periods. There were
such studies as tizoaga (1961); Brown (1966); and Perham (1947). The
main objective of these authors was the description of the monetary
and banking system in Nigeria. It is certain that in the process of
description and analysis they made relevant contributions on the
6
impact of banking system on the economic development of Nigeria.
however, notwithstanding this, they were not very concerned with the
role of banking system per se in the economic development of Nigeria.
Another observation is that since the publication of their works
profound changes have occurred in the economy generally and in the
financial system in particular. Some specialised financial
institutions have been established with the objective of filling the
gap of meeting the long- and medium-term financial needs of
industrial, commercial and agricultural sectors of the economy. Other
important changes include the increase in the number of commercial
bank offices in the country from 160 in 1959 to 917 in 1982 and the
change in the ownership of financial institutions. Indeed in any
economy, as Gurley and Shaw (1967, p.7) observed, the financial
structure is continually reshaped by the efforts of economic units to
break Out of the confines of existing financial arrangements,
particularly when gaps in the financial system exist. The same has
been true of the Nigerian financial structure since the 1960g.
The second phase of the study of the Nigerian financial system
started in the 1970s with the greater attention focused on the role of
the financial system as a whole in fostering economic development.
The best known serious work in this area is that of Ojo (1974).
Apparently such general studies with one chapter devoted to the
commercial banks cannot deal adequately with the role of the
commercial banking system in the development of Nigeria.
The present study takes account of the changes that have taken
place in the banking system since 1960 which in no small measure have
affected the structure and performance of the Nigerian banking system
7
and also try to make up for the inevitable shortfall in the treatment
of commercial banks in the general study of the financial system.
1-2	 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The fundamental purpose of this study is to show that within the
context of Nigeria's development effort, financial development with
respect to the banking system has aided investment and economic
development to a greater extent than is generally recognised. In
other words, the study strives to explore and analyse critically the
structure of the Nigerian banking system and to see to what extent it
has helped in the process of general economic development of the
country.
Analysis of the structure and performance of a banking system can
be approached from two distinct yet related viewpoints:
1. as a service producing industry, or
2. as an instrument of monetary policy.
This study is therefore concerned with a detailed examination of
the historical pattern of growth, structure and operations of the
Nigerian banking system during the period 1960-80 as a service
producing industry; the analysis of the determinants of the economic
performance of the banking system; the investigation of the banking
system's specific contribution to the process of economic development
in Nigeria; and the prescribing of policies and regulations to
improve the banking system's performance.
The study concentrates on the operations of the banking system in
Nigeria with a view to resolving a few key questions about its
development and performance. Among these questions is to what extent
the commercial banks have contributed to the saving-investment process
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in Nigeria. Other questions include, how efficiently the bank have
met some requirements indispensable for economic development such as
the provision of adequate finance to the preferred sectors, and the
monetization of the subsistence sector of the economy.
As far as information and data availability permits, the economic
performanceof the banking system will be reflected in its output,
profitability and growth. This aspect will further be analysed by
empirical investigation using simple correlation analysis. This, to
some degree, distinguishes the present study from a few previous
studies on the Nigerian banking system and complements at the same
time the few but undoubtedly significant and useful pioneering efforts
in this area.
It is pertinent at this juncture to define the term "banking
system" as used in the present study. The term banking system refers
specifically to the commercial banks.
1-3	 HYPOTHIS OF THE STUDY
The pertinent attributes of a useful hypothesis are:
1	 its variables are operational,
2	 its relationships have empirical content and are reasonably
stable, and
3	 it has policy implications.
The above attributes weighed heavily in postulating the
hypothesis of this study. The broad hypothesis of this study
therefore is:
That within the context of Nigeria's development effort,
financial development with respect to the banking system has
quickened in recent years, and that the banking system has
aided investment and economic development to a greater
extent than is generally recognised.
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The above broad hypothesis is examined under the following manageable
hypotheses:
1 that the Nigerian banking system has significantly improved
its performance in using resources over the years as a
service-producing industry;
2	 that there is an upward trend in the mobilization of
financial resource by the Nigerian banking system;
3 that the Nigerian banking system has performed creditably
efficient in its financial intermediation as reflected in
the loans and advances provided to the economy;
14 that the economic performance of a banking system is a
function of its structure demand and policy variables;
5 that in implementing the suecesive five-year development
plans, and thereby financing the private and the public
sectors of the economy, the Nigerian banking system has
performed an important role in allocating financial
resources efficiently.
114	 THE RATIONALE FOR THE STUD!
One major justification why the study concentrates on commercial
banking system is the dominant role of the commercial banks in the
Nigerian financial system. Commercial banks, merchant banks, savings
banks, mortgage banks, insurance companies, pension funds and other
non-bank financial institutions, the security markets, apart from the
Central Bank of Nigeria, constitute the major institutions of the
Nigerian financial sector. Of these institutions, commercial banks
are the most significant ftnancial intermediaries measured in terms of
assets size and GD?. Between 1970 and 1980, for example, the total
assets of the commercial banks represented 55 per cent of the total
assets of the financial system. In relation to the GD?, their assets
amounted to 20.5 per cent in 1970 and 27.1 per cent in 1980. It is
thus almost superfluous to try to rationalise the pivotal role and
pride of place that should be accorded to commercial banks. By sheer
10
size in relation to the economy as a whole, and to the financial
system, commercial banks in Nigeria deserve special consideration.
Since commercial banks are dominant institutions in the Nigerian
financial system, a unique role is expected of them and it is worth
investigating how they have performed the role and justified their
overwhelming position.
With the recent changes in the structure and ownership of the
Nigerian banking system as a result of the CBN rural banking scheme
and the Federal Government's indigenisation programme, it is necessary
to conduct a detailed analysis of the performance of the commercial
banks. Such a study would contribute to resolving the question
of whether the structure and ownership of the banks matter for
economic development or not.
The fourth subset hypothesis above is related to the "Structure-
Performance-Hypothesis" argument which has been variously tested by
many writers (Kaufman, 1966; Ware, 1972; Fraser, Phillips and Rose,
1974; Yeats, 1974; Mingo, 1976 and Rhoades, 1977), to mention but a
few, with data and information on the US banks. The need for further
testing of the structure-performance hypothesis remains. As Kaufman
(1966, p.429) pointed out 'the experiment should be replicated for
other states and other types of banking organisation before the result
may be considered sufficiently persuasive for determining policy'.
The economy-wide branch banking system in Nigeria provides a
different kind of setting from the unit and limited banking
organisation of the US for testing the hypothesis, and permits the
scope of an inquiry into the performance of banks to encompass the
entire banking system.
11
The banking system in a mixed economy like Nigeria has a heavy
responsibility of financial stewardship because of its pervasive
influence on financial markets. The ability to discharge this
responsibility depends upon the efficiency with which the banking
system operates. The ideally operating banking system would provide
low-cost bank output with positive effects on investment and would
lead the economy toward efficient allocation of resources.
The banking system should be reviewed and surveyed frequently in
order to make certain that it is meeting all the productive credit
needs of the economy at the lowest cost and that there are no credit
gaps (Beckhart, 1965). Besides there is the continuing need to
increase the current empirical and theoretical knowledge about the
performance of the Nigerian banking system in order to develop
effective regulation and to improve its operations and allocative
efficiency. A highly performing banking system helps to promote a
more specialised exchange economy with favourable repercussions on the
rate of economic development.
A detailed analysis of the structure and performance of the
Nigerian banking system will be concerned with the whole set of
factors affecting the economic performance of the Nigerian banking
system so that those factors which are determined to be important
determinants may be optimally regulated. For instance, if the
analysis prove that structure variables have insignificant effect on
the performance of the banking system, the authorities should shift
their regulatory emphasis from structure variables to policy
variables.
Some writers on the role of commercial banks in the economic
development of the developing countries have come to the conclusion
12
that commercial banks have not contributed much to the growth of these
economies. For example, Abdi (1977, p.96) concluded that 'the poor
performance of post-independence banking system of East Africa ... is
consistent with the experiences of most developing countries'. The
question which arises is whether this generalisation could be true of
the Nigerian experience. On the other hand, following a more recent
study by Rietti (1979), it seems that the recent experiences of some
developing countries have established complementary effects of modern
financial institutions and markets on economic development efforts in
a mixed economy. It is also necessary to investigate this assertion
in the Nigerian situation. The conflicting conclusions make the
investigation necessary.
Finally, as observed by Mathur (1971), and Bhatia (1978), the
limited appreciation of the influence of financial technology embodied
in the quality and variety of financial instruments developed by
financial institutions on savings and capital formation in developing
countries such as Nigeria is due to the dominant influence of
Keynesian macro-economic models and the structural approach to
economic development. According to the standard Keynesian macro-
economic theory:
S = f(l,i,W)
where
S = Rate of savings
I Income
i = Rate of interest
W = Wealth
(1.1)
Financial technology is not among the explicit arguments of
equation 1.1. The reason for this omission can be traced to the
13
Keynesian "Portfolio Balance" theory which divides wealth accumulation
into sets of sequential decisions. The decision to save and then the
decision to hold the savings in some form of wealth, which involves
asset choice, form this sequence. It is assumed in the portfolio
balance theory, that the former decision precedes the latter, and
therefore the availability of the different kinds of financial assets
which provide a degree of choice in the portfolio balancing process,
will not influence the level and rate of savings. Because the
synchronization of receipts and disbursement of income is an important
objective of saving entities, the kind of financial instruments made
available by financial intermediaries will affect the magnitude of
savings. Savings, therefore cannot be regarded as a given datum
available for portfolio choice. The quantity of savings is influenced
by financial technology and consequently equation 1.1 may be restated
thus:
S = f(I,i,W,t)
	
(1.2)
where
t =t.EAjn and
jn
j and n are subscripts
Ajn = are the monetary value of the nth asset of the
jth institution of the financial system
The technology (t), however depends on a number of factors: the
extent to which the business units depend on external sources for
their finance and how much on internal financing; the degree of
reliance on the financial technique for promoting economic growth; the
degree of monetization of the economy; and, how far intermediation by
financial institutions satisfies the portfolio preferences of both
1L
lenders and borrowers by transforming the obligations of the borrowers
into a more attractive set for lenders by reducing the level of risk
associated with it.
1-5	 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
The focus of the study is on what exists, and therefore, the
research procedure is descriptive-empirical. The analysis of the main
issues is critical, theoretical and statistical.
The growth and the changes in the structure of the banking system
will be examined from both an historical and analytical standpoint.
Generally, the study will endeavour to abstract from various
statistical evidence, and/or statistical relationships to reach
conclusions. This implies that effort should be made to marshal
enough quantitative and qualitative data and information in the
critical analysis to validate or invalidate the hypothesis outlined
above. Statistical evidence is used descriptively and analytically to
give support to our arguments and conclusions.
1-6	 DATA AND INFORMATION PROBLEMS
In a study of this nature in a developing country like Nigeria
where data and information are not available, and, where available,
are not very well documented in a systematic way, it is not unusual to
encounter some data and statistical problems.
The present study was, therefore, confronted with a number of
data and information problems. Firstly, one of the major difficulties
is the non-existence of suitable time series data on certain areas of
the study which could be subjected to rigorous analysis. In some
cases where the data and information are available, they are so
15
scattered that some necessary problems are involved in lumping them
together for the purpose of comparative analysis. Secondly, there was
the non co-operative attitude of some officials of some of the
commercial banks and the CBN. "The information you require is
classified secret" is a common reply to requests for data and
information in some of the banks. The mentioning of these
difficulties helps to explain why some part of the study is based on
data and information for the years 1970-80 only. Effort is made,
where possible, to supplement any dearth of data.
Most of the data needed for the study are obtained chiefly from
the CBN publications such as Annual Reports, Economic and Financial
Review, Bullion, Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial
Indicators. Other sources include the Federal Government of Nigeria
official publications such as the National Development Plan documents,
official gazettes, Banking Ordinances, Acts, Decrees as well as budget
speeches; and the Federal Office of Statistics publications.
Effective use is made of annual reports of the various commercial
banks in Nigeria, and also the annual reports of International
Monetary Fund - International Financial Statistics which provide
information and data not only about Nigeria but also about other
countries which may be necessary for any comparative analysis.
1-7	 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The period of interest of the present study is 1960-80. However,
since economic conditions at any point in time very much depend on
past developments, the analysis will as far as necessary be extended
albeit cursorily to earlier periods. The period of this study is
chosen for a number of reasons:
16
The period marks the end of the pre-independence movement,
the attainment of political independence which culminated
in governmentfocusing attention ondevelopment and
maintenance of economic stability.
2 Conscious effort was made by the federal government at
developing the economy during this period. The first
Nigeria's development plan, the 1962-68 Plan was carried out
within this period. Since then two successive five year
National Development Plans, 1970-7I and 1975-80 have been
formulated and implemented. To implement these plans, there
was a great need for increased government expenditure. Such
expenditure requires huge inflows of funds into the coffers
of the government. Since other sources of finance were
inadequate to meet the needed development programmes, and
foreign aid was not forthcoming as expected, the government
had relied very much on the banking system for the provision
of funds to make up for the deficits at various plan
periods.
3 The CBN was established in 1958, just before the start of
the period covered by the present study. The CBN in
pursuance of the statutory objectives made conscious effort
at building a sound financial system. Money and capital
markets' foundations were laid and nurtured during this
period. Subsequently the financial system became well
regulated and directed to serve the needs of the economy.
1-8	 PLAN OF THE STUDY
The present study is divided broadly into three sections: A, B
and C. Section A, which is further divided into two main chapters,
deals with the introduction and objective of the study. Chapter Two
gives a survey of' the economic and political developments of Nigeria
by outlining trends in production, political structure and development
and the structure of the Nigerian financial system.
Section B deals specifically with the structure of the Nigerian
banking system. This section is again divided into two chapters
Chapters Three and Four. Chapter Three examines the evolution and
development of the Nigerian banking system. The operations of the
Nigerian banking system is critically analysed in Chapter Four.
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Section C is concerned with the performance analysis of the
Nigerian banking system. It is divided into six chapters: chapters
five to ten. Chapter Five investigates the relationship between
economic development and financial structure development and examines
the role of financial institutions in the saving-investment process.
It is mainly a theoretical analysis which is examined in relation to
the Nigerian situation. Chapter Six attempts to measure the economic
performance of the banking system in terms of output, profits and
profitability and intermediation activity. The allocational
efficiency of the Nigerian banking system is discussed in Chapter
Seven. This is examined in terms of the role of the banks in
financing the priority sectors of the economy while Chapter Eight
discusses the public sector borrowing from the banking system. This
will reveal the role of the banking system in financing the public
sector investment expenditures. Chapter Nine deals with the
determinants of the profitability and lending performance of the
Nigerian banking system. The last chapter outlines the summary,
conclusions and suggestions for improvement in the structure and
performance of the Nigerian banking system.
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ICRAPTER TWO
THE NIGERLAN ECONOMY : A GENERAL SURVEY
2-1	 INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the institutional background of the study
and the trends in the development of' the economy. It is intended to
provide background information relevant to the appreciation of the
rest of the study. The objective of the survey, therefore is to
furnish the reader, particularly one unfamiliar with the Nigerian
economy, with the information necessary for the appreciation of the
study.
As noted earlier, the changes that have occurred in the Nigerian
economy in the last twenty years can be described as profound. Many
of them are now irreversible. The changes have made the conclusions
reached in earlier studies unacceptable any longer. It is against
this understanding that this chapter intends to consider the trends in
the development of' the economy.
The chapter is divided into five parts. The second part deals
with the size of the country in terms of geographical area and
population. It will also highlight the changes in the political
structure of the economy. Section three examines briefly the
development in the four main sectors of the economy : Agriculture,
Mining, Manufacturing and Foreign Trade. The fourth section briefly
accounts for the financial infrastructure of the Nigerian economy. It
examines, first, the size and structure of the financial system and
then the relative importance of the main institutions. The last
section is the conclusions.
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2-2	 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY
2-2.1 The size and population of Nigeria
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is located at the bottom of the
western bulge of Africa and lies South of the great Sahara Desert,
between 3 and 15 degrees E longitude and and 1 degrees N latitude.
It extends from the coastline northwards for over 650 miles and from
east to west, it covers a distance of about 700 miles. It is bounded
on the south by the Gulf of Guinea, on the west by the Peoples
Republic of Benin, on the east by the Cameroun Republic and on the
north by the Niger and Chad Republics. The country comprises an area
of 923,773 square kilometres. It is about four times the size of
Great Britain, and it is larger than all Germany, France, Belgium and
Holland put together.
The population of Nigeria by the 1963 Nigerian census was
55,670,052. Since 1963 attempts to have an acceptable census fIgure
for Nigeria have been unsuccessful. Provisional estimate based on the
projection of the 1963 census figure at 2.5 per cent increase per
annum places the population of Nigeria by 1982 at 89.1 million.
Nigeria has the highest number of population not only in black Africa,
but on the whole of African continent. Twice as many people are
living in Nigeria as in the United Arab Republic, the second largest
populated country in Africa.
Nigeria is in the process of demographic transition - that of a
rising birth rate and a declining mortality rate resulting in a
potentially high population growth rate estimated at 2.5 per cent per
annum. This is going to be one of' the most pressing social problems
of the country which will be made all the more difficult by the need
20
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to provide the burgeoning population with education, social services,
food, vocational training and adequate sources of employment. The
high growth rate is also linked to a dynamic process of urbanization
which poses a challenge for the allocation of resources to alleviate
congestion.
Table 2.1	 Nigeria : Rural and urban population 1963
(Millions)
Urban	 Rural
1963	 Urban'	 Rural	 population population
States	 population population population as % of
	 as % of
total	 total
population population
Benue	 4.009
	
0.356	 3.653
	
8.88	 91.12
East	 7.228	 0.879	 6.3149
	
12.16	 87.814
Central
Kano
Kwara
Lagos
Midwest
North
Central
North East
North West
Rivers
South East
West
Total
	
7.793	 0.883	 6.910	 11.33	 88.67
	
5.734	 0.580	 5.1514	 10.12	 89.88
	
1.5145	 0.249	 1.296	 16.12	 83.88
	
3.623
	
0.283
	
3.3140	 7.814	 92.12
	
9.1488	 14.8143
	
14.6145	 51.014	 148.96
	
55.670	 10.702	 1414.968	 19.22	 80.9
Source : 0 Olayide (1982) Nigerian Rural Development Study. Rural
development paper No. 1, University of Ibadon, June 1982,
p.23
Note * : Urban areas refer to towns with population of 20,000 or more.
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Table 2.1 shows the distribution of Nigeria's population by
states and by rural and urban towns. It shows a marked concentration
of population of Nigeria in the rural areas. The urban population of
the country ranges from 6 per cent to 51 per cent among the states
with a national average of 19 per cent. Apart from Lagos and Western
States with rural population of only 27.8k per cent and '8.96 per cent
respectively, the rural population in the other states varies from
80.28 per cent to 9 1LO 1 per cent with a national average of 80.8 per
cent.
2-2.2 The political developffient and production structure
Nigeria became a British colony in 1886 and remained so until
1 October 1960 when she achieved independent political status. The
British colonial administration in Nigeria introduced the Federal
system of Government in 195k, and the country was structured into
three regions : the Northern, the Eastern and the Western Regions.
There was also the Federal Territory and southern Camerouns which
later opted out to join the other Camerouns. A fourth region was
added in 1963, when the Mid-West Region was carved out of the former
Western Region. The Federation of Nigeria thus functioned under four
Regional Governments and a central Government from 1963 to 1967.
The initial objective of splitting Nigeri.a into three regions
was, first, to make for easy administration. The size and population
of Nigeria made regionalisation an administrative necessity. On this
point Stapleton (1958) has contended, 'the splitting of Nigeria into
three Regions may have been a political necessity, but there is little
doubt that it is economically a backward step. To divide the country
22
still further would only lead towards economic chaos'. The second
reason was to 'meet the ethnic and communal diversities in Nigeria' -
tJzoaga (1981, p.1). It is estimated that there are about 250 ethnic
groups in Nigeria, each having a separate language and culture of its
own. Three or four regions could not in any way meet adequately the
communal diversities and in fact it is doubtful whether any manageable
number of regions or states will ever take adequate care of' these
ethnic differences. The problem of ethnicity in Nigeria is clearly
brought out by President Shagari who observed, 'the first six years of
post independence rule, and even more so, the last six years of pre-
independence rule were characterised by ignorance and unfamiliarity
and therefore fear and mistrust among the various ethnic groups or -
to be more accurate - the nationalities that inhabit Nigeria'.
(Emphasis is mine)
The Government of Nigeria was disrupted twice in 1966. by military
coup d'etats. The distrust and fear among the various ethnic groups
generated by the two events led to the attempted secession of the
Eastern Region under the name of the Republic of Biafra. In an
attempt to arrest the ensuring crisis, the Federal Government further
split the country into 12 states in 1967. Unfortunately this was not
enough and adequate action to stop the crisis which culminated in a
civil war that lasted from May 1967 to January 1970. The Federal
Government was again disorganised in another military coup d'etat
which overthrew it in July 1975, and, in 1976, the new Federal
Government, by decree, restructured the country into the present 19
states. (See map)
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The country was thus under the military rule for the period of 13
years (1966-1979). The Civilian Government was elected into office on
1 October 1979 and Nigeria adopted a presidential democratic system of
Government 'freely elected by all of us' - Shagari 1981.
2-3	 PRODUCTION TRENDS IN THE ECONOMY
'One of the objectives of monetary and fiscal policy is to
provide the economy with a financial system that is flexible enough to
respond promptly to changes in the flow of output and prices' - Okigbo
(1981,p.5). The discussion of production trends in the country is
very important for two main reasons. First, the structure of
production will indicate the structure of final demand in the economy
which will in turn determine the character of demand for money and
other financial assets. Second, the trend of the economy's output
will indicate differential pressures on the financial institutions
exerted by the different units of the economy.
2-3.1 Agriculture
The structure of production in the economy is shown in Table 2.2.
Certain key sectors are revealed as the important determinants of
production and hence of demand in the economy. These sectors are
agriculture, mining and quarrying, distribution, general Government,
manufacturing and building and construction. These six sectors among
them accounted for 88.8 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP)
in 1960 with agriculture alone accounting for 63 per cent. The share
of agriculture has declined tremendously over the years. Its share of
GD? declined from 63 per cent in 1960 to 23.5 per cent in 1975. By
1977 it was 19.2 per cent and reached a low of 17.2 per cent in 1981.
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In terms of exports agriculture was until recently the principal
foreign exchange earner for the country. In 1962 agriculture
accounted for 82 per cent of total export value of the country.
Inspite of the war, its contribution to foreign exchange earnings in
1967 and 1968 were 62 and 73 per cent respectively.
However, with the spectacular developments in the petroleum
sector accompanied by windfall earnings from the crude oil exports,
the proportionate contribution of agriculture to foreign exchange
earnings deteriorated significantly. Its earnings fell from 25 per
cent in 1970 to as low as 3.9 per cent in 1976; it increased to 6.8
per cent in 1978 and declined to an alarming proportion of 2. per
cent in 1980. (See Table 2.3)
Apart from export products the main staple food crops comprise
roots, tubers, pulse and cereals. The level of food production has
not expanded fast enough to keep pace with the population growth.
Consequently the Government has been spending huge amounts in recent
periods on food imports. Food imports have risen from 57.8 million
naira in 1970 to 439.I million in 1976 and further to 790.3 million
naira in 1977. It is thus clear that the deterioration of the
agricultural sector in Nigeria has reached a very disturbing level
considering the sector's past and present potentials in terms of
arable area, food supply, foreign exchange earnings and raw material
supply.
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However, it should be realised that the sector has only lost its
prime position in the economy to mining particularly petroleum. It
remains next to petroleum, the largest contributor to output. Its
importance is more than the figures can depict. It provides
employment for some 70 per cent of the Nigerian population and it is
an important source of raw materials for the economy's nascent
industrial sector. It is the view of the Government that:
agriculture and its related activities will continue to
be the mainstay of Nigeria's economy in the foreseeable
future. In the first place, the sector will continue to
furnish the bulk of the nation's employment opportunities.
Secondly, with a population growth rate of about 2.5 per
cent annually, urbanization and real incomes projected to
rise sharply, the demand for more and better staple food as
well as animal products is expected to grow at a rate of
about 5 per cent and 7 per cent per annum respectively.
Finally, agriculture will have to meet most of the country's
raw material requirements for local industry and for export
which will continue to be an important earner of foreign
exchange - (Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, p.8).
2-3.2 Manufacturing
A look at Table 2.2 shows that the contribution of manufacturing
to GDP was about 5 per cent in 1960. It rose to 8 per cent in 1969 as
a consequence of war period restrictions on some imported manufactures
which 'led to a spurt of domestic investment in manufacturing, partly
as a pure import substitution and partly just to satisfy domestic
demand and meet keen shortages' Okigbo (1981, p.1k). The sector's
share of GDP declined to 3.9 per cent in 197k, which is also a
consequence of the sudden increase in the relative contribution of
petroleum to GDP.
In terms of value added, the growth of the manufacturing sector
over the past two decades has been rapid and sustained. It has been
described as one of the fastest growing sectors of the Nigerian
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economy being second only to the mining sector. Value added in the
manufacturing and crafts, for example, grew at a compound annual rate
of 10 per cent between 1963 and 1973 with the manufacturing alone
growing at 12.2 per cent. At 1973/7I constant prices the
manufacturing sector grew at annual compound rate of 15.6 per cent
between 1975 and 1978. This is however, a question of growth from a
small base. If one, for instance, relates value added in the
manufacturing to non-oil GD?, the ratios will only range between 4 per
cent and 9 per cent, which is a rather low rate compared with the
potential in the country.
A disturbing aspect of the industrial growth in Nigeria is that
the impressive growth rate is not matched by the favourable changes in
the content of the growth. The import content of the manufacturing
sector is very high. On the average, about 60 percent of the total
raw materials consumed in the manufacturing sector is imported. It
was estimated that 'for every naira of value added, the country spent
60k on imports of raw materials' (Fourth National Development Plan,
1981-85, p .139). This refers only to imports of non-factor inputs and
this exists inspite of the fact that the manufacturing output is
dominated by commodities which are local resource based. If account
is taken of engineering skill, there can be little doubt that the
extent of the national value added has been microscopic.
Another feature of the manufacturing sector in Nigeria is that it
is dominated by low technology light industries such as food and
beverages, tobacco, wearing apparels, which between them accounted for
over 51 per cent of value added in the manufacturing in 1972.
Engineering industries are virtually non-existent. The real
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engineering subsectors such as agriculture and industrial machinery
and equipment contribute very little to the sector's output. It is
also observed that the sector is dominated by assembly activities.
2-3.3
	
Mining
Nigeria is endowed with a variety of mineral resources. These
include coal, petroleum, tin ore, limestone, columbite, cassiterite,
iron ore, lead, zinc, gold and others. (See map). This sector is a
major contributor to the nation's output. Its importance in the
economy is, however, of a recent origin. The share of the sector in
GDP in 1960 was only 0.58 per cent, but in 197 its share reached a
pak of 32.9 per cent (See Table 2.2). The increased contribution of'
this sector to the nation's output is largely a result of the
increased share of' petroleum subsector which accounted for about 89
per cent of all activities in the mining sector.
The production of petroleum rose steadily between 1975 and 1981
except for a decline in 1978, 1980 and 1981. Production increased
from 651.3 million barrels in 1975 to .765.3 million barrels in 1977,
declining to 692.3 barrels in 1978. In 1980 and 1981 the production
stood at 756.1 million barrels and 522.1 million barrels respectively.
The importance of this sector to the growth of the economy is
shown by its being the major contributor to the GDP and also the most
important source of Government revenue and foreign exchange for he
country. During the Third National Development Plan, 1975-80, for
instance, the expected revenue from the petroleum subsector was about
85 per cent of the total Government revenue for each year of the plan.
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Table 2.3 also indicates that since 1971 the dependence of Nigeria's
export on petroleum has been total rising from 73.7 per cent in 1971
to 93.6 per cent in 1975 and to 96.1 per cent in 1980. Production of
solid minerals, on the other hand, was generally on the decline.
2_3.1L	 Foreign Trade and Balance of Paymenta
Nigeria is an agricultural country and as would be expected, her
export trade is predominantly primary products. There are a few
relatively insignificant manufactures made up mainly of processed
agricultural products. The major primary export products are cocoa,
palm kernel, rubber and until recently palm oil. Prominent among the
mineral are petroleum and columbite. A cursory look at Table 2.14
shows that Nigeria is tending toward a monoproduct export economy.
The trend showed clearly since 1971. Between 1971 and 1980 the crude
oil exports constituted about 89 per cent of total exports. This is,
however, not in the interest of the economy. 'The danger of excessive
reliance on oil has been illustrated by the adverse effects on our
economy that untoward development in the oil market has had. This is
why the Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-85 with a target growth
rate of 7.2 per cent focuses on agriculture and manufacturing sector
in order to reduce the damaging dependence on oil' - Shagari (1981).
Nigerian imports have increased in recent years in value and
volume. In value terms, it increased from about 141 million naira in
19146 to 1,737.3 million naira in 19714 and in 1980 it stood at 9,658.1
million naira. Table 2.5 shows the share of each major group of
imports. The share of machinery and transport equipment has been
increasing over the years. The share of this group rose from 214 per
cent in 1960 to 51 per cent in 1979, though it declined to an
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estimated share of 147 per cent in 1980. The next major group is
manufactured goods, which although still important has been declining
from 37.6 per cent in 1960 to 20.4 per cent in 1979; it rose slightly
to 21.5 per cent in 1980.
The most disturbing aspect of the structure of import bills is
the increasing share of food imports. Its share rose from 7.6 per
cent in 1970 to 12.14 per cent in 1978. By 1980 it was 11.3 per cent,
Fajana (1979) gave the reason for this trend as the growth in
population and income and the liberal trade policy on importation of
food. The poor performance of' the agricultural sector is, however, an
important contributory factor.
The increase in the volume of imports coupled with the
unfavourable world market prices of primary exports caused an adverse
balance of trade in 1955-65 period. (See Table 2.6). The increased
production of petroleum and the favourable world market price for
crude oil helped to restore surplus trade balance in 1966 and since
then Nigeria has enjoyed balance of trade surplus until 1978 when a
deficit reappeared. Balance on current account has shown deficit over
the years except in 1973-1975 and 1979-80; while balance on capital
account has been positive over the years except in 19714 and 1976.
2_It	 THE FINANCIAL STSTEM
The committee on the Nigerian Financial System defined financial
system as 'the congeries of financial institutions and arrangements
which serve the needs of' an economy. The service is rendered through:
1 the provision of financial resources to meet the
borrowing needs of' individuals and households,
enterprises and governments;
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2 the provision of facilities to collect and invest
savings fund; and
3 the provision of a sound payment mechanism'
- (Report of CNFS 1976, p.6)
It is clear from the above that the study of the financial system
embraces more than that of the institutions that operate in the
financial sector. Financial system includes 'the environment of rules
and regulations governing the interaction of the different categories
of' the institutions among themselves and with others' (Okigbo, 1981,
p.29). Revell (1973, p.1) also pointed out that the various
institutions and markets 'are not the whole of the financial system,
and they are not even an essential part of it'. He further contended
that the 'essential feature of any financial system consists of a
number of interrelationships between the persons and bodies that make
up the economy'. These interrelationships reflect the structure of
the financial system. However, due to the dearth of data and
information, these interrelationships cannot be shown through one of
the most appropriate means - the national balance sheet. We therefore
proceed by classifying the different groups of the financial
institutions and then try to show the extent of financial
interrelationships by their relative impact on the economy.
2_11. 1
	 The Structure of the Nigerian Financial System
There are various ways of classifying the financial institutions
operating in a financial sector. They can be grouped as monetary and
non-monetary financial institutions or in terms of uses of funds and
sources of funds. Whichever method, the classification will come out
more or less the same. We can now classify the institutions in the
Nigerian financial system as follows:
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The Banking System : This comprises the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) and the commercial banks.
Specialized or Development Banks : These are the Nigerian
Industrial Development Bank (NIDB), the Nigerian
Agricultural and Co-operative Bank (NACB), the Nigerian Bank
for Commerce and Industry (NBCI) and various state owned
investment companies.
Savings Institutions : These are the Federal Savings Bank,
Mortgage Banks and Merchant Banks.
Insurance and Provident fund : These are the insurance
companies and the national provident fund (NPF).
Security Markets : They comprise the money market and the
Nigerian Stock Exchange.
A brief comment on each of these institutions is necessary.
2-4.1:1	 The Banking System
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
At the apex of the Nigerian financial system is the Central Bank
of Nigeria. The chain of financial developments in Nigeria started
with the establishment of the CBN in 1958. Since then the CEN has
become a dynamic agent and a cataI of investment and economic
growth in the economy. The expansion of the financial assets of the
CBN attests to its dynamic role in the economy.
Table 2.7 shows that with the exception of the war years 1967-70,
when the assets of the CBN declined and of 197k when the oil revenue
rose dramatically thereby leading to an equally dramatic increase in
the financial assets of the CBN, the CBN has maintained a fairly
stable expansion in its assets.
The Act establishing the CBN equipped it with various powers
including the responsibility for the issue of national currency,
maintenance of external reserves, promotion of monetary stability and
a sound financial structure, serving as bankers' bank and banker to
the Government and as a financial adviser to the Government.
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Besides performing the traditional function of issuing means of
payment and controlling the money supply, the CBN has been able to
implement monetary and exchange measures aimed at strengthening the
institutional infrastructure of the financial system and expanding
domestic financial markets with a view to making investment resources
available to the priority productive sectors of the economy.
Commercial banks
Modern commercial banking in Nigeria dates back to the early
colonial period when the African Banking Corporation opened office in
Lagos in 1892. Being the oldest unit of the Nigerian financial
system, it has been one of the most advanced of the financial
institutions. The other financial intermediaries are restricted both
in their capital resources and their scope of activity. Most of them
are new developments. This gives the commercial banks an edge over
the others particularly the other similar institutions such as the
federal savings banks, merchant banks and mortgage banks in collecting
deposits and extending credit to the economy.
Table 2.8 shows that between 1970 and 1980 about 97 per cent, on
the average, of all deposits of the financial system came from the
commercial banks. Commercial banks also accounted for over 80 per
cent of all the institutional savings in Nigeria.
Since 1973/7 1L when the oil revenue surged portentously, the
banking system has been experiencing a period of rapid expansion. The
volume of the assets and liabilities has increased prodigiously. This
is shown in Table 2.7. Commercial banks accounted for over 60 per
cent of the resources of the financial system between 1970 and 1973
and for the period 1974 to 1980 the ratio was over 52 per cent.
0)
C..
ci
a)
0
C..	 U)
ci C..
Cd
ci)
I
U)	 U)
4)
0
o	 C..
C)	 Ci
C)
4-'
o
a)
4.)	 -
a) a)
E
a)
4.)	 ,-I
ci	 Ci
4)	 ..-
Cl)
Cd
C C
ci	 •'-1
cz4
.1.)
C..	 '0
o C
ci
a)
C)
'.-1
r4	 E
ci	 0
C
C 0
C	 C)
•:	 Cx:I
'-	 ('4
z
C.)
U)
a)
C)
C..
0
Cl)
Cd
C..
Cd
C
C
0
'-I
"-I
C
"-I
'-I
cd
.4.)
0
4.)
a)
C..
Cd
U)
.4.)
a)
C)
ci
C..
.0
C
-1
U)
a)
C..
.-1
U,
a)
4.)
0
z
a
C'
1
C'
C.'
I-
C.'
I-
C'
1
C'
U)
c1	 a)
0.'
a)	 4.)
4.)	 a)
C)
4	 L
o a)
C\J0 C'
4.)
"-I
.1.)
0)
..l
	 a
0 C'
4.)
0)
a
a)
a)
Cd
.-	 a .-	 0
'.0	 Cfl 0 0	 0C'	 0 '.0
,-•	 ._
C'
	
..	 0	 ('.1
c'J 0 0	 0 LCC'	 0 t-I-	 t-
C\j	 I_n	 -	 •	 0 a'
C%J 0 0
	
0 CC.'	 0	 Lti
.-
U.'
a'	 '.0 .- I_fl	 0 0.'
- 0 0	 0 It.'C'	 0 .
.-	 Cn
o	 u.'	 c'J	 .=•	 a	 c'J
0 0 0 C'
C'	 0
'-	 c'J
o	 rn I_fl	 Q a
C.'	 0	 (.'.J
—
I-
'-I
.	 It.'	 1—	 0	 '.0
'- 0 0	 0 '.0
C'	 0 C'
.-.	 I-
1%
C'	 t— cC	 0
ooc
0.'	 0 I_fl
,-	 '.0
'-I
0)
.	 0)
Cd
.0	 Cd
Cd	 .0
4.)	 a)	 Cd
C)	 0)	 t)	 •,.-1
cd	 bO	 Cd
a)U)	 .	 bOa)	 ,-1a)
C)	 .,-I	 4).	 (dCd4-)
E	 C..
Ocd	 a)	 Cd	 0(d	 0.,-4
0.0 Z C/) Z.0 E--iU)
Table 2.9 Relative share of coimnercial banks' credit to the
private sector 1963-81
(Percentages)
1963
	
1966	 1970	 1974	 1976	 1978	 1980	 1081
34.8	 92.6	 73.0	 85.9
	
88.0	 88.8	 89.5	 90.6
.$ource : CBN Annual Report and Statement of Acrounts -various years
The share of commercial banks' credit to the private sector of
the economy is shown in Table 2.9. Between 1963 and 1967 commercial
banks accounted for over 90 per cent of all the credits to the private
ector and between 1970 and 1975 they were responsible for over 82 per
ent of the private sector credit and between 1976 and 1981 this share
stood at 88.3 per cent. When compared with the developed industrial
countries the participation of commercial banks in supplying credit to
the economy in Nigeria as in most developing countries is much
greater.
2 14.1:2
	 Savings Institutions
Merchant Banks
Among the savings type institutions, merchant banks are steadily
becoming significant in the financial system. Merchant banking is a
relatively new aspect of the financial development in Nigeria.
Phillip Hill and Nigerian Acceptances Limited (NAL) were the only two
merchant banks operating in the 1960s. Both merged under the name
Nigerian Acceptances Ltd in 1969. Prior to that date their impact on
the economy was not much felt. There are, at present, only five
merchant banks operating in Nigeria. Most of them were established
in 1974-75 period. It has been argued that the growth in the number
of merchant banks during this period was a consequence of the rapid
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growth of the petroleum sector - depen e e irely on external trade
and finance - in order to 'take adva t ge o the offshore banking
service requirements of the petroleum ector and, indeed, of the
offshore financial requirements of the e onomy arising from the
petroleum boom'	 Okigbo (1981, p.121).
As Table 2.7 indicates the merchant banks' share of the assets of
the financial system has been fluctuating between 0.8 per cent in 1966
and 0.8 per cent in 19714. Since 19714, however, there has been a
marked rising trend in their share of assets of the financial system.
Their share increased from 1.5 per cent in 1976 to about 14 per cent in
1980. Their share in the national savings rose from 1.6 per cent in
1971 to 14 percent in 1980.
The criticism against the merchant banks' operations in Nigeria
has been that they operate on the short end of the market and
therefore operate more or less like commercial banks instead of
concentrating on terms loans in which they are supposed to specialize.
While this criticism is to a certain degree cogent, it should be
understood that it is an essential part of merchant banking function
to engage in some measure of short-term business such as acceptances
and discounting of bills and exchange.
The Federal Savings Bank
The federal savings bank started as the post-office savings bank.
It was changed to federal savings bank by the Decree Mo 38 of 19714
with the objective to 'provide a ready means for the deposit of
savings and so to encourage thrift. The savings bank is not to be
used for the purpose of keeping a current account ...' - (Post
Office Savings Bank Regulation - The Law of the Federation of Nigeria
and Lagos 1958 vx).
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The declining role of the federal savings bank can be seen from
Table 2.7. Its role as a saving mobilizing institution has declined
substantially and steadily. Its share of total assets of the
nanclal system is negligible. It declined from 1)4 per cent in 1962
o almost nothing in 1980. This poor performance has been attributed
o the rigid rules of operations which stem from the bank's connection
ith the civil service regulations and the consequent inherent
dministrative redtapesm, the non-competitive services and the static
nterest rate.
The Federal Mortgage Bank
The federal mortgage bank, formerly the Nigerian Building Society
as established in 1957 with the primary objective to finance house
uilding, not necessarily home ownership. The various state
Governments have their own housing corporations which make funds
available to builders and developers and at times, they build on their
own and lease or sell to individuals. Mortgage institutions are still
at an early stage of development and this accounts for their
role in the economy. In more developed countries like
the UK the building societies constitute important saving mobilizing
institutions and important competitors to the clearing banks in saving
mobilization. The proportion of savings from the federal mortgage
bank has remained below 1.0 per cent of the total institutional
savings between 1962 and 1980.
2-.1:3 Insurance and Provident Fund
Insurance Companies
Insurance companies as financial institutions have grown very
slowly inspite of their early start. The first insurance company to
open office in Lagos was the Royal Exchange Assurance, a leading
1114
British insurance company. It started in Lagos in 1921. Prior to
that date, insurance was transacted by agencies of European offices.
Insurance business, particularly with some saving element has not been
of significant importance until recently. The income of all insurance
business in Nigeria by 1960 amounted only to 7 million naira. By
19714, the aggregate premium income from all forms of insurance
business stood at 511.8 million naira, it rose to 1314 million naira in
1976 and by 1977 it went up to 195 million naira. This is not very
encouraging when compared to the growth of deposits with the
commercial banks. Besides, there is a concentration of insurance
business in the field of motor vehicle and other property to the
neglect of life insurance business. For instance, of the 7 million
naira income of all the insurance companies operating in 1960 only 0.6
million naira was in respect of the life insurance business; and out
of the 195 million naira income of these companies in 1977, only 146
million riaira was collected on the life insurance business.
National Provident Fund
National provident fund is a similar institution to the insurance
institutions in that the principle of national provident fund is
insurance but it aims at making saving compulsory. The difference
between the national provident fund and the insurance company is that
while insurance involves voluntary contractual arrangements, the
national provident fund is compulsory contribution to social security
fund.
The national provident fund was initially established by the
National Provident Act 1961. It has since been reconstituted by
Decree No 39 of 19711.
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The fund has invested substantial amount of its resources in
gilt-edged securities and Government development stocks. Its
investment in 1970 was 82.7 million naira, and 200 million naira in
1975 and by 1978 it stood at 310 million naira. The fund's
contribution to institutional savings has declined in recent years
particularly between 1968 and 1980 when its share declined from 21 per
cent in 1968 to 11 per cent in 197k and from 8.8 per cent in 1975 to
5.6 per cent in 1980. The period 1962-67 indicated an increasing
trend in the fund's share of the institutional savings. Its share in
1962 was only 2.1 per cent but by 1967 it was 24 per cent.
2.1:t Development Banks
Development banks are financial institutions purposely created to
provide long-,
 and medium-term credit needs of the public and the
private enterprises. There are a number of these banks; the principal
ones are the Federal Government owned Nigerian Industrial Development
Bank (NIDB), the Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank (NACB),
and the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI).
As their names indicate, the overall objective of these
institutions is to accelerate the growth and development of industry,
agriculture and commerce and all other economic growth inducing
activities. They are expected, for example, to play promotional,
advisory and supervisory roles in aiding the private indigeneous
enterprises and entrepreneurs.
The NIDB was established in January 196 14 through the acquisition
and re.-organisation of the Investment Company of Nigeria, a private
investment company incorporated in Nigeria in 1959 as an industrial
development finance company. To be able to provide development
finance to the industrial establishments its minimum loan investment
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is 50,000 naira and the maximum is 15 million naira and the maturity
of its loan is fixed at 5-15 years with a moratorium of 2 years.
The NACB was established in March 1973. The main objective is to
finance agricultural production and development. Unlike the NIDB, the
bank can sponsor medium and large scale agricultural projects. The
NBIC was established by Decree No 22 of May 1973 to ensure the success
of the Federal Government indigenisation programme through making
funds available to the Nigerians interested in the purchase of equity
shares of businesses marked only for the Nigerians. Its principal
function was therefore, to 'provide equity capital and funds by way of
loans to indigenous persons, institutions and organisations for
medium- and long-term investment in industry and commerce...' Decree
No 22 2 April 1973).
From Table 2.7 it is observed that although the development
banks and other investment companies are large in numbers, they do not
have the resources to really make a significant impact on the
financial system.
2_11.1:5
	
The Security Marketa
Money Market
The Nigerian money market caine into existence with the
establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria. Prior to that there
existed no domestic investment outlet for financial institutions
operating in Nigeria. Such institutions with temporary surplus funds
had either to hold them as idle balances with the consequent
opportunity cost in terms of interest income lost or place them in the
London money market with the attendant inconvenience of distance,
except that most of these banks were outposts of the British banks
with head offices in London.
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To deal with this problem the CBN launched the Nigerian money
market in 1960 with the issue of the first Government Treasure bills
of 90 days maturity designed purposely to raise funds for the
Government. Generally there are about six money market instruments in
circulation including Treasury bills.
	
These are Treasury
certificates, commercial bills, certificate of deposits, and Bankers'
unit fund and Eligible development stocks.
The money market has expanded significantly in recent years as
shown by the value of the market instruments. It has grown from 20
million naira in 1960 to over 2,000 million naira in 1977. (See Table
2.10). Treasury bills constituted the major outstanding instruments
up till 1975. As from 1976, Treasury certificates became equally
important accounting from over 61 per cent and 56 per cent of the
total instruments outstanding in 1978 and 1980 respectively.
The Capital Market
The capital market in Nigeria is the Nigerian Stock Exchange
which was established on 15 September 1960 as the Lagos Stock
Exchange. It was established on the initiative of the private
business community, the NIDB and the CBN and the Federal Government.
Its memorandum of association inclides as its objective to provide
facilities for trading in securities, supervise activities in this
regard, facilitate the flow of' long-term funds into commerce and
industry and maintain their fair prices for securities. The Lagos
Stock Exchange now operates as the Nigerian Stock Exchange with three
branches in Lagos, Kaduna and Port Harcourt.
The size of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), in terms of its
primary role is shown in Table 2.11. The nominal value of public
sector issue has grown from around 60 million naira in 1970/71 to 415
LIg
'-4
	 000 000 000
4.)	 00	 00
0	 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0V.1	 e r T-	 F l
"-4
C,
a)
U)
U)
•1-4
a,
I,
I
N
a)
'-4
.0
a)
'-U)	 c0
bO	 .,-4C)
.i.)	 4U)
a)
C)
a)	 4.)0..	 .00)
'-..	 a)0.. U)
4.)
0
U) •.-I
,-4 Z ) ..
cO
o-1 C)
a)
U)
cr-I
,-4 -4EZ
'- C)
z r1 .1.)
.0 C)
0..U)
r4(0
4.)
0
ci)
U)	 ci)U)
'-4	 cOO
.,-4 C)
1	 a)
o Q..U)
a)	 C)L
.0	
-Q
r-14-)
-	 .00)
a)
0..U)
(0
a)
	00 	 O CO c-fl	 c-n Ln
oLn
	
v- C'fl I-	 — N	 i- t-
D 00	 N N- '.0 N- 0
N0L	 cflCOO. 0'.00O
aD N- a CO N- o 0. CO CO
9'.0 cn '.oLn CflN-0
N- 0	 '.0	 — CO 0
cON- (fiN-In
—	
-
co	 flN-Ln (fl.N-0
a, N- 0 = '0	 .- 0N'	 -r
000 000 000
000	 0 ou-.c
'.0 '.0 N '.0 In 0 . N
i 0) N- a, aD 000
.- '-	 Ci .
U In	 N - N CO N- '.0
r
cncn %o(n%.0	 C\JCfl.U)
0w-N cfl'In '.0N-CO
N- N- N- N- N- N- N- N- N-
cco ooc
-
U)
CO
a)
U)
0
"-4
CO
0 U)
0 -)
N
0.	 0
C)
-	 C)
a)
.1.)	 ii
0)	 0
Cl)	 4.)
r4	 ci)
c0	 E
r1	 a)C)	 4.)
ccl
CO	 4)
C')
-4
cs..	 •C)
CO
CO
.-4	 .$)L	 ..
a) 00.
-H	 a)
z
o	 i
.0	 cO
0
C.)
z
0-i	 C.)
•- N
U)
a)
C)
0
C/)
million naira in 1977. Public issue of bonds as well as shares
predominates. In 1978 for instance, the issues of Government stocks
represented 88 per cent of the new issues of all securities.
In terms of' its secondary role, as Table 2.12 indicates,
Government stocks still constitute the major dealing instrument in the
market. In 1973, the number of transactions in Government stocks was
282 representing 99 per cent of the total dealings. In 1980 the
number and value amounted to 7,138 and 388.8 million naira
respectively. In terms of mere numbers transactions in private
securities continue to dominate the market, but in terms of value of
transactions, Government securities retained their dominance over
private securities.
On the whole, the Nigerian capital market is narrow. Apart from
Government stocks and limited number of industrial shares, bonds and
convertible stocks are in the present state of' the market relatively
unknown. The market is shallow because a single large order will
immediately affect the prices.
2 14.2 The Size of the Financial System
The pioneering work carried out by Goldsmith (1969) showed that
there is a statistical relationship between the financial sector and
the rest of the economy, between what he called the financial super
structure and the financial infrastructure. More recent work by
Revell (1973, p.9) emphasized that 'the financial system is a
superstructure erected on the basis of the real wealth of the
community'. On the above understanding the size of the financial
sector can be measured by what both authors independently called the
financial inter-relations ratio (FIR) relating the superstructure
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nieasured by a number of indices to the national wealth or income. The
idea is that the higher the ratio, the more the importance of
financial institutions and instruments.
The value of FIR is determined by a number of factors: first, the
extent to which economic units depend on external source of funds to
finance their capital formation. Second, the degree of monetization
of the economy. Third, 'sinoe financial institutions have a multi-
plier effect on the volume of claims issued, the larger the proportion
of financial activity which involves financial institutions the larger
the volume of claims issued and conversely' (Revell 1973, p.23).
In this study the size of the financial system is measured in
relation to the GDP at current market prices. This is shown in Table
2 . 13. Financial system accounted for 20.7 per cent and 1 1.7 per cent
of GDP in 1960 and 197'4 respectively. The ratio stood at 58 per cent
in 1978 before declining to 50.8 per cent in 1980. This compares
favourably with figures given by Goldsmith (1966, p.9) for 1960 in the
case of India (0.35), Ethiopia (0.15), Japan (1. 1 O) and for 1961 in
the case of the UK (1.70). The figures for Nigeria indicate that the
financial sector is assuming greater and greater importance in the
economy as the economy develops.
As shown in Table 2.14, the annual growth rate of assets of the
financial institutions was 13.2 per cent during 1960-65, 17.6 per cent
during 1966-70 and 114.L per cent and 23. per cent in the periods
1971-75 and 1976-80 respectively. For the entire period 1960-80, the
annual average growth rate was not equally shared by the groups of
institutions. Consequently there was a change in the relative size of
the various types and groups of financial institutions during the
period 1960-80.
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Table 2.13 Money supply and asseta of the financial system as
percentage of gross domestic product 1960-80
(Percentages)
	
1960	 1966	 1970	 1972	 197k	 1977	 1979	 1980
A Money supply	 12.3
	
1 )4.2	 17.2	 15.1	 13.3	 25.6	 2 3.1	 27.1
(1+2)
1 Money	 10.0	 9.7	 11.2	 9.1	 7.5	 17.6	 13.9	 17.0
(1 .1+1 .2)
1.1 Currency	 6.6	 6.0	 6.1	 5.0	 3.k	 6.9	 5.8	 9.6
1.2 Demand	 3.)4	 3.7	 5.1	 k.1	 )4.2	 10.6	 8.1	 7.k
deposits
2 Time and	 2.3
	
)4.5	 6.0	 6.0	 5.7	 8.0	 9.2	 10.1
savings
deposits
B Assets of the 20.7	 26.5	 32.8	 30.3	 k1.7	 52.9	 k8.8	 50.8
financial
system
Sources : 1 Table 2.7
2 CBN Economic and Financial Review - various years
The relative growth rate of the monetary sector - CBN and the
commercial banks - are expected to show a declining trend while the
relative growth rate of other banks and non-bank financial
institutions are expected to increase as the country develops. But
that was not clearly depicted in Table 2.14. This is explanable by
two factors : first, the 1967-70 war in the country distorted the
trend and rather enhanced the relative importance of the CBN and
commercial banks during the period 1966-70. Second, the windfall in
the oil revenue in 1973/74 increased the resources of the Government
and thus the resources of the CBN and to a less extent than of the
commercial banks, hence the phenomenal increase in the growth rate of
the assets of the two institutions in 1971-75 period. The CBN's asset
5)4
31.5
33.6
2.8
28.0 21.9
II Other Banks (1+2)
1 Merchant Banks
2 Federal Savings
Banks
III Nonbank Financial
Ins titutioris
	
1.1	 81.7	 43.2
	
8.3
	
98.1	 414•14
	
0.0	 13.14	 2.1
	
10.1	 17.3	 32.3
growth rate averaged over 100 per cent during the period. The
expected trend in the growth rate of the assets of these institutions
showed up clearly in the period 1976-80.
Table 2.1k Growth rate of assets of the financial system annual averages
(Percentages)
	
1960-65
	
1966-70	 1971-75	 1976-80	 1960-80
Monetary Sector	 10.1	 20.2	 148.1	 22.5	 25.3
(1+2)
1 Central Bank	 7.8	 114.1	 100.5	 18.8	 35.3
2 Commercial Banks	 13.14	 23.2	 31.8	 26.8	 23.8
Total	 13.2	 17.6	 1414•14	 23.14	 214.6
Source : Derived from Table 2.7
As noted above one of the factors that affects the importance of
the financial sector and determines the size is the degree of
monetization of the economy. Although the degree of monetization of
the Nigerian economy cannot be measured accurately, the attempt gives
an idea of the role and changing size of the financial system in the
development of the economy. Table 2.13 shows that the relative level
of money Supiy rose from 12.3 per cent of the GDP in 1960 to 21.7 per
cent in 1976. In 1980, it increased to 27.1 per cent of the GDP.
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The Table points up another basic characteristic of the monetary
and financial development in the economy. The expansion in money was
accompanied by a significant change in its composition. Deposits in
the form of chequing accounts in the banking system rapidly increased
in relative terms becoming a basic instrument of money economy. By
1960 currency was the main basic asset recording 6.6 per cent of the
GDP as against 3.14 per cent for demand deposits. By 1974 their
relative importance changed with demand deposits recording 14.2 per
cent of the GDP as against 3.14 per cent for currency.
The increase in quasi money-time and savings deposits-with res-
pect to the GDP attests not only to the tremendous expansion of time
and savings deposits during the last 20 years but also to the volatile
behaviour of such deposits. Time and savings deposits as a ratio of
the GDP rose from 2.3 per cent in 1960 to 6.0 per cent in 1972; this
trend was not followed in 1973 when it rose to only 6.5 per cent,
thereafter declining to 5.7 per cent in 19714 before rising again.
2-5 CONCLUSIONS
The development of the Nigerian financial system and in
particular the banking system has been significantly influenced by the
political, industrial, foreign trade, agricultural, mining
developments as well as the size and population of the country. For
example the substantial drop in the share of the agriculture in the
GDP in recent years is bound to have tremendous repercussions on the
banking system. This is because the decline represents a big shift in
demand pressures in the . economy which has influenced to a large extent
the operations of the financial system. As an illustration, in the
1950s and 60s the source of growth of the economy was primary product
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exports. This source was endogenous to the economy in the sense that
the output represented the efforts of a large section of the Nigerian
population. In the 1970s and 80s the momentum of growth derives from
the mining sector, particularly the crude petroleum exports whose
direct impact on the population is small. Consequently, while the
monetization of the export proceeds in the 1950s and 60s could not
lead to heavy pressures on prices, the monetization of crude oil
receipts has had its impact on price level and brought as well
increased national wealth with the consequent impact on the volume of
banking business in the economy. In addition, as Okigbo (1981)
remarked, mining industry being an enclave economy, the investment
requirements of the sector are not met from the aggregate financial
resources of the domestic economy. Consequently, the adjustment of
the financial system to the rapid changes in this sector tends to be
slow and sluggish.
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SECTION
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING SYSmI
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EVOLUTION OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING SYSTEM : A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
3-i	 INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts to offer a concise history of the evolution
of the foreign and indigenous commercial banking in Nigeria. The
historical evolution of the Nigerian banking system relates very much
to its structure and hence to its performance.
The chapter is divided into six sections. The second and third
sections examine the emergence of the foreign and indigenous banks in
Nigeria respectively. In section four the legal and regulatory
framework will be analysed. The ownership structure of the Nigerian
banking system is discussed in section five. The last section is the
conclusions.
3-2	 THE EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN BANKS
The lucrative and fast expanding Nigerian market attracted many
extra-territorial merchants from various nations in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. As a consequence there was a wide variety of
currencies in circulation in Nigeria by the nineteenth century. Apart
from such commodity currencies as cotton, gin and rum, there were in
circulation various metal currencies such as Spanish doubloon,
American half-eagle, eagle and double eagle, Mexican dollar,
Australian Maria Theresa dollar, French Napoleon and British
sovereign. The Portuguese introduced brass and copper wires and brass
bracelets called manillas. The introduction of these currencies was
very helpful in diminishing the barter exchange system. This is
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important because the need for banks cannot arise in an environment of
trade by barter or of predominantly commodity currencies.
The wide variety of currencies in circulation led the British
government to seek to harmonize the currencies of the British empire
by introducing the shilling at the end of the nineteenth century. An
important development which may be regarded as the proximate cause of
the need for a bank in Nigeria was the establishment of a settled
territorial government which made it imperative to harmonize the
different and competing media of exchange which in no small measure
confused several transactors. Thus the activities of the
ransnational corporations, the establishment of a settled territorial
government and its consequent financial transactions, the decline of
barter exchange system, and the introduction of the British silver
currency - all these 'required an institution in the form of a
"ommercial bank for safety and transmission of funds, the importation
and distribution of British silver coins and the provision of credit
to the government and the trading companies'1 (Uzoaga, 1981, p.65).
For an example, the annexation of the Northern Provinces led to
greater demand for coins for the payment of troops, public officials,
and local labour. Consequently, silver coins imported into Nigeria
increased from £2,26 in 1886 to £87 1 ,85O in 1911 - a thirty-five-
fold increase. This made it favourable for the need for a bank to be
felt for the growth of hand-to-hand currency. Furthermore, between
1886 and 1890 the transportation and care of the coins shipped to West
Africa on order by local trading companies created nightmares for the
resident representative of the shipping company. As Okigbo (1981,
p.78) puts it:
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The last bit of the transportation through the Lagos bar may
be romantic to the occasional voyagers it was scarifying to
the shipper who had valuable cargo to deliver to the
consignee on land. Besides the cargo had to be warehoused
in the shipping offices, and guarded until delivery. It
would be so much wiser to transfer this function from a
shipping expert to another type of expert, one used to
dealing exclusively with money, a banker.
The Chairman of Elder Dempster and Company, Mr Alfred Jones saw
the advantage that would accrue to his shipping company if it could
sponsor the establishment of a bank in Lagos. He approached the
African Banking Corporation, which was then operating in South Africa,
in 1891 and had no difficulty in persuading it to open a branch office
in Lagos. The bank was opened in August 1891. Thus the African
Banking Corporation was the first modern commercial bank to open a
branch in Nigeria. Unfortunately within a year of its establishment,
Lagos was hit by trade recession caused by local uprising between the
ijebus and the Egbas in March 1892. The uprising and the consequent
trade recession put the bank into serious distress and made its
existence precarious. Elder Dempster came to the rescue by taking
over the bank in March 1893, after paying £1,000 to the African
Banking Corporation. Elder Dempster ran the bank as a private bank
until December 1 893. By December 1893, at the request of the
government in Lagos through the Crown Agents, a new joint-stock bank
was registered as Bank of British West Africa (BBWA). The new bank
opened office in Lagos in 189k with an authorised share capital of
£100,000 of which £30,000 was called up and £12,000 paid up. The
bank made tremendous progress, attested by the fact that between 189k
and 1910 it had opened three branches and in the following nine years
by 1919 it opened five more branches.
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The bank was given the monopoly to ship, transport and deliver
all silver coins for cash transactions in West African trade. T is
gave Elder Dempster an extra-ordinary advantage in West African trade
over the other traders. Elder Dempster already had tremendous trcde
influence and advantage in West Africa being the main shipping un
that operated regularly from Britain to West Africa, and combiri d
shipping with inland trade. The ships served as warehouses and h
officers sold out of the ships' warehouses. To add banking mt e
to this enormous power was to compound the advantage the company nd
over the other traders.
The other British merchants of course, were not satisfied with
the undue advantage enjoyed by Elder Dempster and decided to challenge
it. First, they organised themselves into an association - the
African Association under the leadership of Mr John Holt in 1889.
Second, they decided to establish another shipping company and a
second bank in order to directly and effectively compete with the
Elder Dempster and Company in ail aspects of the trade. Thus in 1896
John Holt and Company ordered its own ships and steamers and in 1899
the new bank - the Anglo-African Bank - was incorporated with a
nominal capital of £150,000 and subscribed sharesof £32,000 of which
z2k,000 was called up and £18,000 paid up by 1903.
The bank opened in Old Calabar instead of Lagos to avoid
unfavourable competition with BBWA which had built-in advantages in
Lagos. It was successful and opened more offices soon after in
Calabar, Brutu, Lokoja, Jebba, Onitsha, Warn, Zungeru and later
Lagos. It had in addition agencies in Bonny, Brass, Degema, Buguma
and Egwanga. The bank had its support and backing from the major
trading companies in West Africa such as the Royal Niger Company, the
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African Association led by the Chairman of John Holt and Company, and
Alexander Miller Brothers and Company and this very much contributed
to its success. By 1905, it changed its name to the Bank of Nigeria,
a sign of growth and confidence, and became an important competitor to
the BBWA for thirteen years before a merger proposal was completed and
the Anglo-African Bank was absorbed by the BBWA on 20 June 1912. With
the merger, the bitter rivalry between the two banks ended, so ended
too was the early attempt to introduce competition in the Nigerian
banking system. The BBWA remained a monopolist in the banking scene
till 1916. The monopoly granted the bank to supply, ship and deliver
silver coins in Nigeria was abolished in 1912; the abolition came too
late to hurt the BBWA or benefit the Bank of Nigeria because BBWA had
by then absorbed the rival - the Bank of Nigeria. Furthermore, after
the establishment of the West African Currency Board in the same year,
1912, the BBWA was granted another monopoly. It was appointed the
sole agent for the custody and distribution of British silver currency
issued by the West African Currency Board.
In 1916, a new bank, the Colonial Bank, was established. The
bank which hitherto had operated only in West Indies was authorised
by the Parliament in 1916 to operate anywhere in. the British Empire.
In the same year the bank opened office in Lagos. The coming into the
Nigerian banking scene of the Colonial Bank constituted a big threat
to the monopoly power of the BBWA. It was more aggressive in its
competition because it had the resources and was as strong as the
BBWA. This is shown by the big and striking similarities in the
balance sheet of the two banks:
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Nominal capital
Paid up capital
Reserves
Colonial Bank
(pounds sterling)
2,000,000
600, 000
150,000
BBWA
(pounds sterling)
2,000,000
560,000
220,000
The Colonial Bank was in fact so successful that within four years
of its founding it established 15 branches in Nigeria. By 1925,
however, it was taken over by the Barclays Bank into an integrated
international bank with several entities controlling its geographical
sphere: Colonial Bank, Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and National Bank of South
Africa. The Bank became known as Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and
Overseas (DCO).
It has been argued that both banks - the Colonial Bank later the
Barclays Bank (DCO) and the BBWA which in 1957 changed its name to
Bank of West Africa, behaved as monopolists even though structurally
one could talk of oligopoly in banking. Instead of competing they
agreed to co-ordinate their activities and respect each others sphere
of influence (Teriba, 1968). For instance, as an illustration to
support this assertion, the United African Company (UAC), was in habit
of offering facilities outside the banking system to customers in the
form of trade credits, to government in the form of payment for
customs and other duties in London and Liverpool instead of in Nigeria
thus saving in transport of currency. Both banks had to offer some
accommodation to the UAC in the face of new threat of competition
created by the emergence of indigenous banks in the period 1925_ 1t5, to
the detriment of indigenous traders and of Nigerian government
Treasury. This understanding or accommodation continued until 1957
(See Okigbo 1981, p.83).
6'
The next foreign bank that entered the scene was the United Bank
for Africa (UBA). It has a French origin. The French had longed to
participate in the growing trade and commercial activities in Nigeria
but could not do that until some fifty years after the British banks
had firmly established their control of the market. To come
therefore, it had to do it indirectly through London and not directly
through Paris. The Banque National pour le Commerce et l'Industrie
had a London company which was riationalised in 19k5 and it became
known as the British and French Bank for Commerce and Industry. It
was this bank that decided in 1948 after a successful trade mission in
19147 to Nigeria to establish a branch office in Nigeria. Thus the UBA
started as a British and French bank for Commerce and Industry. It
received its support from French enterprises and nationals and Indian
traders who came to Nigeria through Hong Kong.
Its growth was rapid and in 1956 it changed its name to the
British and French Bank. In 1961 it took up Nigerian incorporation as
United Bank for Africa (UBA) with an authorised capital of £1.5
million. This was later raised to 	 million by shares subscribed by
five other international banks: British and French Bank, Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro, Monte del Pasohi de Siena, Bankers Trust Co NY,
and Rotterdam Bank. UBA has grown to be one of the three biggest
banks in Nigeria at present.
The International Bank for West Africa was registered in Nigeria
in 1959. It was a subsidiary of Banque Internationale pour L'Afrique
Occidentale which is a member of a consortium of banks including
citibank, Banque Nationale de Paris, Banque de Sueze et d'Indo Chine
and some other French banks. Its first office was opened in Kano, and
this was because its aim was to finance the movement of groundnuts
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from Niger where the bank had strong foundations through Kano to
Apapa. The 1969 Banking Decree compelled it to take out a wider
Nigerian base.
The other newcomers of foreign banks to the Nigerian banking
scene include Arab Bank now Arab-Nigerian Bank, which was jointly
owned by Jordan and Lebanon, the Bank of America, now the Savannah
Bank which started as an American enterprise in Nigeria, the Bank of
India now Allied Bank of Nigeria which was an Indian possession.
Socit Gnrale Bank is another foreign bank and it was established
in Nigeria in 1977. By April 1982 it had opened up nine branches in
Nigeria.
Before the indigenisation programme in Nigeria each of these
banks was a subsidiary of an international banking organisation with a
head office in one of the large money market centres such as London,
New York and Paris. The branches of the foreign banks in Nigeria were
therefore an integral part of the commercial banking system in the
native land of the international bank and the policy adopted were
transmitted from the head offices in the light of the prevailing
monetary conditions at home (Nevin, 1961).
Their being a subsidiary of the multinational banking firms had
some implications in their mode of operation with respect to the
economic development of Nigeria. From the onset they were in no doubt
of what their mission was. In the words of Loxley (1971), expatriate
banks 'never pretended that their raison d'etre was to cater for the
needs of the African community. They were primarily established to
finance credit needs of expatriate ... traders and businessmen'. (See
Mensah, 1976). The expatriate banks believed that only few Nigerians
were creditworthy and even those few were dealt with caution.
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Furthermore, the strong link with the world money market centres means
automatic dependence on these markets for liquid assets and investment
of excess reserves which in effect rendered monetary policy measures
ineffective, and retarded the emergence of local money and capital
markets.
Table 3.1 Selected indices : indigenous and foreign banks in Nigeria
1973-75
(Percentages)
As at 31	 1973
	
19714
	 1975
December Indigenous Foreign Indigenous Foreign Indigenous Foreign
Number of	 143.3
	
56.7	 1414•14	 55.6	 1414.5	 555
branches
Paid up
	
149.0	 51.0	 148.7	 51.3	 145.7	 514.3
capital
Deposits	 25.3
	
714.7	 214.8	 75.2	 30.5	 69.5
Loans and	 38.2	 61.8	 35.6	 614.14	 27.5	 72.5
advances
Acceptances 22.7
	 77.3	 114.9	 85.1	 12.8	 87.2
(L/credits
etc)
Source : Derived from Table 2.14 of Report of the Committee on the Nigerian
Banking System, p.26.
While refusing in general to finance indigenous businesses, even
when as Bauer (19514) found out, their integrity were impeccable and
Nigerians were prepared to pay higher interest rates, the expatriate
banks brought the least risky and most lucrative export-import
businesses which itself was dominated by foreign firms, and the
banking business under their control. For example as Table 3.1 shows
expatriate banks controlled, on the average, 56 per cent of total
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branch networks, 52 per cent of paid up capital, 73 per cent of total
deposits, 67 per cent of loans and advances of the commercial banks in
the period 1973-75. Despite this overwhelming bank power, the
expatriate banks gave only a small proportion of their loans and
advances to Nigerian enterprises. (See Table 3.2). As Uzoaga (1981,
p.72)observed, 'the monopolistic and oligopolistic stance of foreign
banks has made it urineccesary for them to show any interest in the
development of African businesses'.
3-3	 THE ERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS BANKS
The reaction of Nigerians to the obvious discriminatory attitude
of the foreign commercial banks manifested itself in various attempts
to found their own banks. The first of such an attempt was the
establishment of Industrial and Commercial Bank in 1929 by a group of
Nigerians. The bank soon failed because of poor management and
inadequate capital. Besides, the period was clearly not auspicious
for business particularly for banks and new bank for that matter. In
1931 the Mercantile Bank was founded under the headship of the same
managing director who had headed the failed Industrial and Commercial
Bank. Consequently it had difficulty in attracting capital or
deposits from the public. Its paid up capital never exceeded 3,1400
naira and its deposits only once exceeded 14,000 naira. It steadily
suffered losses until 1936 when It went into voluntary liquidatIon.
As noted above, the period 1929-36 was a wrong time because of the
collapse of the world economy, to plunge Into the establishment of
financial institutions and in particular it was more difficult for
fledgeling indigenous commercial banks with very limited capital and
untried management. Even the existing foreign banks faced hard times
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during this period and BBWA, for instance, had to close its branches
at Opobo, Abonema, Lokoja and Gusau between 1929 and 1932 and reduce
its staff from 874 to 652.
The first successful indigenous bank was the National Bnk
established on 11 February 1933 with the following objectives :
1 to see that every Nigerian likely to benefit from loans d
advances and overdraft is encouraged by the bank;
2 to help small time as well as big time businessmen t ri
their own in commercial field;
3	 to help Nigerians establish industries and own property;
!	 to operate in such a way as to give Nigerians confidene
effectively in commercial and industrial fields.
The National Bank survived the depression because of the superior
quality of management compared to the previous indigenous efforts. It
however, had its difficult times. It had to face the weight of
competition almost of a monopoly nature from the powerful expatriate
banks with higher and better quality management drawn from the parent
organisation arid the close connection between the expatriate banks and
the foreign businesses in Nigeria whose banking needs were more often
than not arranged for them overseas. The National Bank is at present
one of the biggest indigenous commercial banks.
The second successful indigenous commercial bank is the Agbomagbe
Bank now known as Wema Bank. It had a very difficult start. It
started as a family business in 1945 with an authorised capital of
£10,000 fully paid up by its owners. The bank faced serious liquidity
problem almost from its establishment which was worsened by the 1952
Banking Ordinance requirements. The Ordinance required the commercial
banks to have a minimum nominal capital of 50,000 naira and minimum
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paid up capital of 25,000 naira. The bank was saved from liquidation
by the Western State government. As at 1977, the capital of this bank
was k million naira with 2.8 million naira paid up capital.
The success of National Bank encouraged other Nigerians to
establish more indigenous banks. Thus in 19k? the Nigerian Farmers
and Commercial Bank was incorporated. Its growth was very rapid and
in 1951, it reported deposits of 656,576 naira and advances of 335,576
naira. Within four years of its operation it had established 30
branches in Nigeria and had a London office. But by 1952 it
liquidated. The failure was of course a consequence of the risk of
unguided over expansion of branch network.
The African Continental Bank (ACB) was also established in 19k7.
It began as a private property known as Tinubu Properties Limited,
with a nominal capital of £250 of £5 fifty shares, all bought by Dr
Nnamdi Azikiwe in lgkk. In 19146 it changed its name to Tinubu Bank
with the nominal capital raised to £5,000 and in October 19147 the name
was changed again and it became known as the African Continental Bank
(ACB). The capital of the bank was then raised to £250,000.
The involvement of the ACE in the politics of the Region led to
the Regional government's formulation of a policy of intervention in
commercial banking. The policy as stated in the Foster Sutton report
was based on discouraging monetary transactions by any one bank,
liberalizing credit facilities for Nigerian entrepreneurs, encouraging
the development of indigenous banking, and planning for the eventual
establishment of a state bank. The ACE is at present one of the big
three indigenous commercial banks.
The success of the few indigenous banks: the National Bank, the
ACB and the Weina Bank spurred Nigerians to venture into commercial and
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industrial fields. As Okigbo (1981,p.87) put it, 'To give Nigerians
confidence, which was lacking from the expatriate banks is, in our
view, perhaps the greatest achievement of indigenous banking in
Nigeria'.
It is noteworthy that Nigeria experienced a rapid expansion in
the indigenous banks during the period 19k7-52. The rapid expansion
was also accompanied by high rate of failure which by 195k claimed 21
out of 25 indigenous banks with 16 of them collapsing in 1954 alone.
The Pan Nigerian Bank and the Standard Bank, both incorporated in 1951
were among those that failed in 195 g. The high failure rate during
this period was attributed to poor management, inadequate capital,
depressive economic conditions and the impact of Banking Ordinance of
1952.
Th Merchant Bank was founded in January 1952, met the 1952
Banking Ordinance requirements and survived the bank failure period;
but in 1961 it liquidated. It failed because of poor lending
practices such as unsecured loans, major advances to the directors of
the bank. Its failure and demise in 1961 ended the era of private
indigenous banking history in Nigeria.
3-3.1	 The State CoI!unercial Banks
The	 Regional/State	 government's participation in the
financial sector dates back to 19514 when the Federal Constitution
which granted autonomy to the former regions was introduced (Nwankwo,
1979). The resulting stringent requirements of the 1952 Banking
Ordinance had been, to a great extent, responsible for the collapse of
the banking boom of the late 19140s and early 1950s. Consequently by
19514, the few surviving indigenous banks faced immediate liquidation
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because the three years' grace period allowed the banks to be licensed
under 1952 Banking Ordinance was fast expiring. To save the banks
from this predicament, the Regional governments had to pump in money
into these banks. In addition, poor resource management, inadequate
capital and unsecured loans had also forced the surviving banks to
continue to depend on the state governments even after complying with
the 1952 Banking Ordinance requirements.
The implication has been the demise of private indigenous banks
and the emergence of state-owned banks. The then Eastern Region
government took over the ACB. With the splitting of the Eastern
Region into Anambra, Imo, Rivers and Cross River states, the ACB is at
present owned jointly by the new states except the Cross River state
government. Similarly, the Western Region government acquired the
National Bank of Nigeria and the Agbomagbe bank now Wema Bank. The
two banks are now owned jointly by the new states of Oyo, Ogun and
Ondo. Later in the 1950s the Northern Nigeria government participated
in and eventually took over the Bank of the North. The Bank of the
North belongs to the six constituent states of the former Northern
Region government.
With the creation of the new states and the end of the civil war,
there was a renewed interest by the state governments to participate
in commercial banking. Thus the other states without banks of their
own felt that it was only a state bank that would meet the aspirations
and financial requirements of the indigenes of the state.
Accordingly, they strove to have their own banks. Bendel state
established the New Nigeria Bank in 1970. Cross River state founded
the Mercantile Bank, and River State, in addition to part ownership of
the ACB established the Pan Nigerian Bank.
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An observation with the state governments' participation in
commercial banking is that the dependence of the banks on the state
governments involved the banks, inevitably in the politics of the
state. Of course, the involvement made good politics but bad banking
because, by their' ethnic and tribal alliances, they unconsciously or
consciously stratified sources of private capital and sacrificed
efficient and independent management. These banks are also plagued by
frequent interferences by their' owner governments in their management
and operations. They tended to depend very heavily on government
deposits which are subject to fluctuations in governments' revenue
sources, thereby creating considerable instability in their
operations.
However, while as Ekukinam (1976) observed, the motivation for
establishing state banks may be described as parochial, it is to the
credit of the state governments that the early indigenous banks
survived the 1952 Banking Ordinance requirements and other financial
crisis. Nevertheless, the banks should be free of the various
government's interferences and permitted to be truly "national" and
"continental" in their operations, in their equity investment and
their recruitment of efficient management. It is only in this way
that the banking system can improve its performance and contribute
effectively to the development of the economy.
3-3 . 2 	 Co-operatIve Banks in Nigeria
A co-operative bank can be defined as a financial institution
especially set up to offer greater access to saving and borrowing
facilities for co-operative societies and their members at relatively
cheaper costs than those provided by traditional commercial banking
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institutions. Thus the motto of co-operative bank in Britain is
"Consumers' Bank" and in some countries like Canada, France and
Germany, it is known as the "People's Bank" (Ojo and Adewunmi, 1979).
It is therefore clear that co-operative banks should in ordinary
circumstances be distinguished from commercial banks. They are,
unlike commercial banks, known as co-operators' banks and are expected
to derive their strength from co-operative movements. The questic
then is; to what extent are co-operative banks in Nigeria the bank for
the co-operators. Nigerian experience has shown that co-opera lye
banks have tended and operated like commercial banks. For instance,
Ojo and Adewunmi (1979) found in their study that co-operative banks
in Nigeria had no data and information in respect of the extent to
which the banks have assisted co-operative societies. The explanation
was that the 'banks (co-operative banks) function in the same way as
the other commercial banks, placing little or no emphasis on financing
the co-operative societies and their members as such. Loans were
given to all customers on more or less the same basis, with little
preferential treatment for and no special attention paid to the needs
of co-operatives' (p.l5).
The reasons why they operated as commercial banks are obvious.
First their dependence on the co-operative societies for sources of
funds means a restricted and unreliable source of strength. Second,
co-operative banks are subject to all commercial banking regulations
in the same way as commercial banks.
There are at present four independent co-operative banks in the
country. The first to be established is the Co-operative Bank
Limited. It was established in 1953 as a Co-operative Bank of Western
Nigeria by the Government of Western Nigeria to function as a central
7k
financing agency for the Co-operative Movements in the Region. The
intentions of the government were clearly set out in its Policy Paper
on Co-operative Societies of June 1952 as follows:
Since most of the developments envisaged for the Movement
will benefit the overall economy of the Region and concern
persons of low income who are scarcely touched by the
operations of the Commercial Banks and for whom it is the
responsibility of Government to provide some form of aid, it
is expected that Government will use the bank as an
instrument of rural finance and pay for the services
rendered in this regard:
(a) by helping to create an atmosphere whereby the Ban
can obtain funds to this extent from statutory bodies
operating in the Region for the benefit of the producers; or
(b) by guaranteeing borrowings that may be made by the
Bank from other sources until adequate working capital for
proposed development is acquired (Government of Western
Nigeria, Policy Paper on Co-operative Societies, (June 1952
para 64).
In executing this policy the government founded the bank with an
outright grant of £2 million through the Region's Cocoa Marketing
Board to functionally complement the activities of five other apex co-
operative institutions in the Region; namely, the Co-operative Press
Ltd, Co-operative Transport Ltd, Co-operative Union of Western
Nigeria, Association of Nigeria Co-operative Exporters, and Co-
operative Supply Association Limited. With the promulgation of the
1958 Banking Ordinance, the bank was obliged to re-apply for
registration as a bank. Accordingly it was incorporated on 14 June
1961 to perform all functions of a commercial bank. The name was
later changed to Co-operative Bank Limited.
The next was the Co-operative Bank of Eastern Nigeria Limited
which was founded in 195 g. Unlike the Co-operative Bank Limited, the
bank was established on the initiative of the co-operators in the
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Region, but like the former bank was supported financially by the
Regional Government. The bank started off with a paid up capital of
1,180 naira plus a Regional Government grant of 20,000 naira.
In an address presented to the Honourable Dr Okpara, Premier of
Eastern Nigeria by the Board of Directors of the Co-operative Bark of
Eastern Nigeria Limited on 12 May 1962, the objective of the bank
stated thus:
The aim and objective of the Bank is to spread all over
Eastern Nigeria and to encourage and finance all registered
co-operative organisations. The Bank will also encourage
members of the public who operate accounts with it and will
offer financial assistance when this is possible.
The objective was therefore clear. The bank should operae a
strictly a co-operative bank drawing its resources from the societie3
and granting bulk of its loans to the members. Private individuals
and the public were not allowed to operate accounts at the bank due to
restrictions imposed by the Banking Ordinance. It remained strictly
the Co-operators' bank until 1962, when with the promulgation of the
Banking Act, it became necessary for the bank to take out an
incorporation under the Companies Act and to get licensed as a
commercial bank with a paid up capital of 25,000 naira. To adequately
reflect its commercial role, the bank's name was changed in 1982 to
the Co-operative and Commerce Bank Limited.
The two co-operative banks were the only such banks in operation
until 197k when the Kaduna Co-operative Bank was established. At the
opening ceremony in November 197k the then Commission for Trade,
Industry and Co-operatives said that 'it is intended that the bank
should operate fully as a commercial bank, establishing branches and
correspondents, and as it develops carrying out all and every type of
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banking business'. It is thus clear that right from its inception,
although co-operative in mane, the bank was expected to be commercial
in its operations.
The next such bank was the Kano Co-operative bank which was
founded in 1976. It was established with an authorised capital of 3
million naira of which the Kano state government paid 2 million na ra
and the Co-operative Movements in the state paid the balance of 1
million naira. It is, to all intent and purpose, a commercial bank.
3—k	 LEGAL AND REGULATOR! FRAMEWORK
Much of the contribution that the financial sector can make to
growth and development depends upon the legislative and regulatory
arrangements devised to guide the activities of the financial
institutions. Commercial banks by their operations touch on the
welfare of the economy. They are not only responsible for the main
part of the payment mechanism but also are the 'frontline troops when
it comes to implementing monetary policy' (Eastburn and Hoskins,
1978, p.3). Since they are at the same time profit-oriented business
organisations, there is the need to ensure that banks' operations
comply with the objectives the authorities have set for the welfare of
the society.
The formulation for the financial sector of appropriate laws that
will promote development through innovation and competition is not an
easy task since legislation has to reckon with balancing three
considerations: cost of intermediation, allocative efficiency and
safety. As Revell (1980) noted, increased safety as expressed in
higher capital ratios and more provision for losses under specific
headings raises the cost of intermediation. 'Neglect of' safety would
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certainly impair al].ocative efficiency because it would mean that not
all costs were being brought into the calculations of marginal
costs. ... Safety and robust balance sheet structures are also
essential for successful use of monetary policy weapons; v'igo ens
measures of monetary policy are impossible unless institutions ar
strong enough to sustain pressures for a considerable period, alth
it is equally true that extra-strong balance sheet may mean that b
io not respond immediately to pressures from the authoriti
(Revell, 1980, p.146).
Essentially, the form of control can be reduced to two main
types. First there are those designed to ensure that the bankin,
system as a whole is economically sound. These are essentially ti e
prudential controls which are devised to control the risk of banks
becoming insolvent or losing the confidence of their depositors.
Second, there are those controls designed to ensure that banks behave
in what is deeiped to be an economically responsible way, that is in a
way conducive to the furtherance of the government's overall economic
objectives. These are essentially the monetary, and credit controls
(Morison, 1979).
The Nigerian banking history has shown that the period 1892-1952
was a period of unregulated banking activity, and this accounted in no
small measure, for the high rate of bank failure of the late 1940s and
early 1950s. The alarming rate of failure necessitated the
appointmentof the G.D. Paton to 'enquire generally into the business
of banking in Nigeria and make recommendations to the government on
the form and extent of control which should be introduced' (Paton,
1919). His findings led to the Banking Ordinance of 1952. The
Ordinance stipulated minimum capital requirements, defined a system of
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licensing, liquidity requirements and maintenance of reserves and
provided for bank supervision. With the establishment of the CBN in
1958, the Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1958 and the Banking Ordinance
1958 were enacted. The Banking Act 1969 was decreed, repealing the
1958 Banking Ordinance. The 1969 Act with its various amendments is
at present the most comprehensive regulatory measures governing the
operations of banks in Nigeria. The major stipulations of the Act are
based on a system of regulation of capital accounts, maintenance of
reserves and liquidity ratios.
3—U. 1	 Regulation of Capital Accounts
The regulation of capital accounts of the banks takes the form of
prescribing the Ci) Minimum required capital and (ii) Minimum
capital reserve requirements. Regulations in the form of prescribed
minimum requirements of paid up share capital and the capital reserves
are summarized in Table 3.3.
The objective of regulating capital accounts of the banking
system is to protect the depositors and minimise the chances of banks
becoming insolvent. The requirements of 1969 Act, as those of the
previous ones maintained discriminatory policy in the paid up capital
in favour of the indigenous banks. In 1952 and 1958, the minimum was
25,000 naira. In 1962, the minimum was raised to 500,000 naira for
the indigenous banks. For the foreign banks no minimum was stipulated
before 1969. What was required of them was an evidence or an
undertaking of having certain minimum paid up capital. This was
probably because the expatriate banks were branches of the
international banks and it was not necessary to specify different
capital requirements for the branches. However, in 1969, the minimum
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paid up capital was specified for the expatriate banks which by the
companies decree of 1968 were required to be incorporated in Nigeria,
and for incorporation they were required to have a minimum paid up
capital of 1.5 million naira. Indigenous banks paid up capital Wà3
also raised to 600,000 naira in 1969. In addition applications for a
licence were to be made to the Colonial Financial Secretary by 1952
the Federal Minister of Finance in consultation with the CBN by 198,
and the Commissioner of Finance through the CBN by 1969.
The lower minimum capital requirements for the indigenous bank
may be explained by three factors. First, it could be an attempt to
minimize the cost of the initial capital required to start a bani<ing
business by interested Nigerians. However as Teriba (1969) argued,
this was not so because the provisions were still beyond the resource
capability of Nigerians. Second, it could be that since the
indigenous banks carry out smaller volume of business than the
expatriate banks, therefore assuming the insolvency of banks is
positively correlated with the volume of business, the expatriate
banks would be liable to higher risk than the indigenous banks and
consequently should require higher capital. It should, however, be
known that in Nigeria, as in most developing countries, the indigenous
banks often, at the behest of the government, take on business of
higher social priority that exposes them to higher ratio of risk
assets, defined as total assets less government securities and cash,
than the expatriate banks. The third factor is the indigenous banks
close connection with the government.
The capital reserve requirements before 1969 applied only to the
indigenous banks. Expatriate banks' requirements were conditional, on
the Minister of Finance being satisfied with the reserve position of
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the banks. The policy was based on the fact that these banks relied
on their head offices outside Nigeria for any reserve requirements.
The reserve requirements f or the indigenous banks were in respect of
minimum retention ratio i.e the ratio of bank's net profits
transferred each year to a reserve fund. In 1952 the ratio was 20 per
cent. This was raised to 25 per cent in 1958 and 1962. The transfer
was to be made each time the reserve fund was less than the paid up
capital in order to bring the reserve equal to the amount or greater
than the paid up capital.
In 1969, the capital reserve requirements were changed in three
ways. First, there was a harmonization between banks so that the
requirements would apply to both the indigenous and the expatriate
banks. Second, the retention ratio of 25 per cent of net profit was
maintained and banks whose reserve fund level was equal to or greater
than paid up share capital were required to transfer only 12.5 per
cent of their net profits. Third, a capital fund to deposit ratio of
1:10 was set up for banks. Where a bank has a ratio less, the CBN has
the power to direct the banks to increase the ratio to a maximum of 30
per cent. It is however, difficult to justify the 1:10 ratio. There
is always the extreme difficulty, really the impossibility of
objectively deciding what is an adequate amount of capital or what is
the appropriate ratio of capital to assets, liabilities, deposits or
risk assets - whichever denominator is eventually chosen. This does
not, however, diminish the importance of the capital ratio as an
operational norm for assuring bank solvency. The ratio was later
changed in 1977 to relate capital requirements to loans and advances
instead of deposits in order to approximate the risk-asset ratio.
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In addition to the capital requirements, banks were required to
satisfy the current liquidity ratio, cash ratio and special deposit
requirements as specified by the CBN. While these are necessary to
ensure that the banks are always capable of meeting the normal deposit
withdrawals of their customers, it must be pointed out that high
liquidity does not assure a bank's solvency, and that liquidity is
irrelevant once a bank is insolvent. A bank's solvency depends on its
cash flows or liquidity; both of these are in turn affected by the
supply-demand relationships of bank's services to its customers. (See
Revell, 1973, P99-110, 1975; Hodgman, 1963).
Table 3.2	 Loans to indigenous borrowers by Expatriate banks and
all coercial banks 1970-72
(Percentages)
1970	 1971	 1972
All Banks Foreign All Banks Foreign All Banks Foreign
Individual	 26.8	 28.3
	
26.6	 26.7	 26.2	 214.5
Sole	 18.1
	
15.8
	
17.5	 16.2
	
17.0	 114.2
Proprietor
Partnerships	 12.3
	
8.8
	
12.5	 9.3
	 12.3
	
8.6
Companies	 142.8
	
147.1
	
143.14	 147.8
	 1414•5	 52.7
Total	 148.8	 43.3	 56.2	 146.9	 66.6	 145.6
Source : E 0 Ebiefie : The performance, scope and problems of
commercial banks in Nigeria as a source of financing
indigenous businesses in Financial Institutions and the
Business Community, E D I University of Nigeria Enugu
Campus.
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3-'I.2	 Credit Policy and Guidelines
Since 196 24, credit guidelines have become far the most effective
technique of control of the banking industry. The traditional
instruments are unemployable because of the narrowness and ill-
integrated nature of the capital and money markets. The CBN has
consistently issued guidelines to the banking industry particularly in
the area of loans and advances to various sections of the economy, and
the share of bank loans that should be granted to indigenous
borrowers. The idea has been to control the aggregate volume and
expansion of credit for the effective development of the economy. The
1969 Act stipulates that unsecured loans exceeding 1,000 naira cannot
be granted either the bank's directors or any firm or private company
especially one in which the directors are interested (Oloyede, 1975).
Bank Supervision and Examination
An attempt at enforcing high standards and practices of banking
in Nigeria was made possible by the 1962 bank law amendment. A
banking examiner was then appointed and attached to the Ministry of
Finance with the objective to examine periodically the books and
affairs àf all the banks in Nigeria. The Commissioner for Finance has
the power under certain conditions to order for special examination
and if a bank is found to be doing bad banking business, the
commissioner may take steps to ensure proper management by appointing
an experienced person to advise the particular bank on the conduct of
its business; and/or recommending that the licence of the affected
bank be revoked.
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The 1969 Act formalised the supervision by creating the Bank
Examination Department as one of the Departments of the CBN. The CBM
thus had a wide range of powers under this provision which embrace:
1	 the appraisal of the system of operation, procedures and
control;
2 the appraisal of the management with special attention to
competence and general effectiveness; and
3 assessment of the adequacy or otherwise of the capital
structure in relation to the size of the business, paying
some attention to the changes in the capital funds over
time.
3-5	 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE - INDIGENISATION OF TEE BANKING SYSTEM
As is clear from the discussions so far, the origin of the
Nigerian banking system lies in the promotion of trade between the
metropole and the periphery of the colonial empire. This early
association with external trade created on "outward looking" policy
within the banks. Unlike banking system developed through the
indigenous entrepreneurship, the foreign banks maintained this myopic
view of the country's economy as export-import sector.(Abdi, 1977).
Consequently the foreign banks contributed very little to the
development of the economy. As Gerschenberg (1972) observed, despite
political independence, the continuing financial dependence has
resulted in a banking system with "poor" record in assisting economic
development and emancipation.
These limitations of the foreign banks had continued to attract
attention of the government, hence the use of the various regulatory
measures to try to improve the involvement of the foreign banks in
Nigeria's economic development. Although these measures have tended
to moderate the cost to the government and the economy of the movement
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of bank funds into foreign markets, they were deficient both in
improving ownership structure of the banking system and the
participation of the foreign banks in the financing of the priority
sectors of the economy such as agriculture and rural development.
As shown in Table 3.2 the proportion of total loans and ad an e
granted to the indigenous borrowers by all the banks increased from
8.8 per cent at the end of December 1970 to 66.6 per cent at the end
of December 1972. The proportion granted by the foreign banks,	 1 h
was less than 20 per cent in the 1960s, increased marginally from
per cent in 1970 to	 per cent in 1971, declining to 15.6 per 1ent
in 1972. In fact the largest component of bank loans and advan e'..
granted by the banking system (dominated by expatriate banks) had b en
in favour of general commerce which is associated with external trade
and internal distribution of imports, manufacturing and construoion
which underscores the foreign banks' support for enterprises in which
expatriate interest is dominant.
In 1972, the Federal Government in a bid to remedy this
disturbing situation took a decissive step and acquired 140 per cent
equity interest in the three biggest foreign banks - Barclays Bank
(now Union Bank), Standard Bank (now First Bank), and United Bank for
Africa (UBA). These three banks controlled the bulk of the banking
activity in Nigeria. In April 1973, for instance, the three banks
accounted for 67 per cent of the total assets of the banking system.
They held about 70 per cent of aggregate deposits, more than 50 per
cent of' loans and advances, about 52 per cent of the total number of
bank offices and their combined liquidity ratio averaged over 79 per
cent compared with 67 per cent for the entire banking system.
(Enuenwosu, 1973).
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The government's objective in acquiring the 240 per cent equity
participation 'is for the Government to get intimately involved in
commercial banking activities so as to guide them to operate to the
maximum benefit of the economy. This is as much in their inte est as
it is in the interest of the country' (Budget speech 1973/7').
With a new Federal Government in office in July 1975, after a
coup d'etat the indigenisation policy was reviewed and it was found
that 240 per cent indigenous participation in the leading foreign b tks
was not enough to deal with the basic problem of controlling the
financial system through the use of various qualitative and
quantitative instruments of monetary policy available to the CBN whir'i
had been rendered unemployable by the strong link between the foreign
banks and the international money market centres of London, Mew York,
and Paris. Consequently in September 1976, the Federal Government
decided to extend indigenous participation to all the expatriate banks
and to increase its equity interest to 60 per cent. The idea is that
the government and individual Nigerians' participation in the foreign
banks must not be less than 60 per cent3 this is in conformity with
the recommendation of the Committee on the Nigerian Financial System
which states inter alia:
Within the framework of 60 per cent Nigerian participation,
(i) public sector equity should be less than absolute
majority; (ii) public sector equity should be no less than
foreign equity in these banks (Report on CNFS para 23,
1976, p.25).
Table 3.24 shows that the government (Federal and state) has majority
shares in 13 out of 19 banks in operatia in December 1978 with just
51.7 per cent in the Union Bank. The government's share in the First
Bank and the United Bank for Africa (UBA) were 147.1 per cent and 248.9
per cent respectively. Other Nigerians held the remaining 12.9 per
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kO. 0
kO.0
kO.0
kO.0
kO. 0
kO.0
kO.O
kO.0
8.3
12.9
11.1
1.0
68.0
53.7k
60.0
100=0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
51.7
k7. 1
1 8. 9
60.0
60.0
60.0
100.0
60.0
100.0
99.0
32.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
k6.26
100.0
Union Bank Nigeria Ltd
First Bank Nigeria Ltd
United Bank for Africa Ltd
Savannah Bank Nigeria Ltd
International Bank for West
Africa Ltd
Nigeria-Arab Bank Ltd
Bank of the North Ltd
Allied Bank Nigeria Ltd
Kaduna Co-operative Bank Ltd
Kano Co-operative Bank Ltd
Mercantile Bank Nigeria Ltd
National Bank Nigeria Ltd
New Nigerian Bank Ltd
Pan African Bank Ltd
Wema Bank Ltd
Co-operative Bank of Eastern
Nigeria Ltd
Societe Generale Bank Ltd
African Continental Bank Ltd
Co-operative Bank Ltd
cent and 11.1 per cent equity shares of the two banks respectiv'ely.
Those banks where the government owned 100 per cent equity shares are
state owned and they were the former private indigenous banks.
So far the ownership of the Nigerian banking system has been
transferred, though not completely to the Nigerians. It is hoped th
with more Nigerians on the Board of Directors than foreigners, th
ould influence the banks to be more involved in the developient f
the economy. The banks should now, as it were, be "inward look
I nowing that their growth and development is concomitant with th
Jrowth and development of the economy.
Table 3.1$ Equity ownership of cercia1 banks in Nigeria Dcc 1fl8
Other
Commercial Banks	 Government Nigerians Foreign Total
Source : Ade T Ojo and 'Wole Adewunini. (1982) Banking and Finance in
Nigeria, p.147.
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3-6	 CONCLUSIONS
The historical structure of the Nigerian banking system has shown
that between 1891 when the first commercial bank was established in
Lagos and February 1933 when the National Bank of Nigeria was
tablished the banking system was wholly foreign dominated, and was
n most part uncompetitive. From 1933 to 1972, there emerged two
t pes of banks in the system: (i) wholly foreign banks (ii) wholly
1tgenous banks. For the first time competition was introduced into
banking system though with the indigenous banks in a
1advantageous position, having to contend with the in-built
vdntages of the older foreign banks. With the coming into effect of
NigerianEnterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) in 1972 the Federal
irnment acquired 10 per cent equity shares in the three largest
.atriate banks in the economy. Thus there emerged three types of
.inks in the system: (i) mixed banks; (ii) wholly foreign banks;
id (iii) wholly indigenous banks. Under the second phase of
indigenisation in 1976,. the Federal Government acquired additional 20
p r cent equity interests in the three largest foreign banks and 60
per cent in the other foreign banks. Thus the system has gradually
metamorphosed into two types of banks: (i) the mixed banks with
indigenous majority interests and (ii) wholly indIgenous banks
mainly state Government owned.
The legal framework of the banking system has shown that
effective legislation has to reckon with the various trade-offs.
Generally it can be maintained that the strategy for rapid economic
development is to permit the banking system a high degree of
flexibility so that it might respond to the demands of both savers
and investors while at the same time ensuring economically sound and
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responsible banking operations. As Olashore (1977) noted, the
objective of the CBN in applying these regulatory measures are:
- the development of a sound banking system;
- the protection of depositors of the banks;
- the promotion of rapid economic development throughout the
country;
- the provision of adequate banking services in all parts of
the country;
- the allocation of bank credit in accordance with the
Government economic guidelines and priorities such as the
programme of industrialization and indigenisation of the
economy; and
- the maintenance of internationally accepted standards and
practices of banking industry.
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CHAPTER FOUR
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
We shall in this chapter analyse the assets and liabilities
structure of the Nigerian banking system. Specifically, emphasis wi].].
e laid on the growth of loans and advances, investments and depoits.
detailed analysis of the items on the balance sheet - assets and
liabilities - reveals information on how effectively and efficiently
esources have been acquired and organised in the portfolio of assets
by the banks. The discussion will further give an insight into the
ontributions of the banking system to Nigeria's economic development.
The chapter is arranged so that the development of the banking
s stem is discussed in the next section. The analysis of the assets
and liabilities structure of the banking system is undertaken in the
hird section. The fourth section discusses the growth of branch
etwork. The branch network expansion of the banks will reveal a
number of useful information:
1 the problems and prospects of mobilization of saving by
the banks;
2 the concentration of the banks between the urban and the
rural areas; and,
3 the number of persons per bank office.
The fifth section will consider the need for and the problems of rural
banking scheme in Nigeria. This will highlight the existence of a
financial gap and the flourishing informal market in the economy; and
in the sixth section inter-system comparison of commercial banks
development is considered. The final section is by way of a
conclusion.
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11-2	 DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANKING S!ST4
The development of the banking system and, in fact, the
development of the financial system in general, may be measured in a
number of ways. It is pointed out in chapter two that the most
generally accepted measure of financial development is the financial
nterrelatioris ratio (FIR) defined as the value of financial assets in
xistence at one time divided by the value of all tangible assets,
4 hat is, national wealth. (See Goldsmith, 1969; Revell 1973).
nother measure is the ratio of financial instruments issued by
financial institutions to those issued by nonfinancial units, which
indicates the degree of institutionalization of savings. As pointed
at earlier, these measures, their shortcomings notwithstanding, are
ot easily applied to the Nigerian situation. The FIR, for example,
ssumes the existence of detailed accounts of not only financial
3sets held but also the national wealth. Similarly, the measure of
"new issues" of financial institutions relative to those of other
economic units assumes the existence of flow-of-funds accounts.
Moreover, as Abdi (1977) noted, this indicator is of limited use in
economies where the banking system's closest competitors are informal
money markets, where reliable data of new and old debts are
impossible.
In the present study, we adopt a slight modification of the FIR,
and use the ratio of banks assets to GDP. The rate of growth of the
banking system over the period under review is indicated by the net
changes in the value of total banks financial assets to GDP ratio.
Fig 1.1 shows the trend in the growth of total banking system's
assets, indicating that 1970 is more or less the "take-off" year in
the banking system's growth and development.
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30.5
31.7
27.9
27 . 1
27.3
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
7.7
2.0
5.3
14.9
3.2
8,530.9
9,105.7
11,238.6
13,717.14
15,5148.1
28,015
28,737
140,333
50,599
56, 9141
Table . 1	 Coiiinercial banks' asseta and the national product of the
economy 1960-81
(Million naira)
	
(Percentages)
End of Total assets	 GDP
	
Total assets as Changes in total
year	 of banks	 per cent of GD? assets as per
cent of GD?
	
1960	 235.8	 2,1400	 9.8	 -
	
1961	 2914.7	 2,378	 12.14	 2.5
	
1962	 285.2	 2,516	 11.3
	
-0.14
	
963
	
325.2	 2,9146	 11.0
	
96 14	 396.0	 3,1145
	
12.6
	
2.3
	
1965	 14314.3	 3,361
	
12.9
	
1.1
	
966	 1492.8	 3,6114
	
13.6
	
1.6
	
1967
	
14149.0
	
2,950
	
15.2	 -1.5
	
968	 560.1	 2,878
	
19.5
	
3.9
	
969
	
761.8	 3,851
	
19.8
	
5.2
	
1970	 1,152.0	 5,621
	
20.5
	
6.9
	
971	 1,275.9	 7,098
	
18.0
	
1.7
	
972	 1,1437.5	 7,703
	
18.7
	
2.1
	
973	 1,772.0	 9,001
	
19.7
	
3.7
	
9714	 2,811.2	 16,962
	
16.6
	
6.1
	
1975	 14,308.0	 20,1405
	
21.1
	
7.3
	
1976	 6,371.14	 25,14149
	
25.0
	
8.1
1960-81(average)	 19.2	 3.6
Sources : 1 CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years
2 IMF International Financial Statistics Year Book 1981
3 Nigeria, Federal Republic of. Fourth National
Development Plan 1981-85, vol 1, Federal Ministry of
Economic Develonent Lagos, 1981.
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As Table 1L1 indicates, total assets of the banking system as a
percentage of the GD? rose from 9.8 per cent in 1960 to 27.3 per cent
in 1981 with the highest share of 31.7 per cent being recorded in
1978. There was a moderate but steady increase in the ratio of the
ariking system's financial assets to GDP in the period 1963-70 ThA
roportion fluctuated significantly between the year 1970 when it was
.5 per cent and 197k when it dropped to 16.6 per cent
tainirig a proportion of 19.7 per cent in 1973. Overall, the	 eth
f the financial assets of the banking system outpaced that
coduct. The long-run growth trend in the ratio of the b
nancial assets to GD? as clearly shown in Fig 14.2, r flct
portant development in the banking system, and also the
	 crt t
le the system has played in the development of the economy.
The net changes in the banking system's financial assets as a
roportion of the GD? indicate that the rate of growth of the banking
system over the period 1960-81 has been unstable. This is clearly
hown in Fig 14.8. The peak periods were 1968-70 and 19714-77, thus
corresponding to the periods when the oil revenue surged prodigiously.
The troughs in the growth rate are in the periods: 1962 which is
explained by the expected impact of the new independent nation; 1967,
which is the result of the war effects on the general economic
activity; 1971, which may be explained by the increased demand for
money balances, and goods and services without corresponding increase
in production as a result of the integration of the war ravaged
thickly populated areas of the country with the rest of the country;
and finally 1978, the cause of which is the decline in oil revenue and
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the consequent effect on government spending and economic activity.
The annual average change in the banking system's assets as a
ercentage of the GDP for the period 1960-81 was 3.6 per cent.
Generally it is observed that specific events have a sh t-r
Tect on the development of' the banking system. For instar
anging relationships of the world economic situation su a
terioration in terms of trade, the rise in prices of petro o
ll in prices of raw materials and certain financial poli...ies 	 al
1 . ye been reflected to some extent in the way in which th bii 	 g
stem has developed. In some cases, these factors have aid d t
velopment of banking while in others they have hinderci
ample, it is noteworthy from Table ILl and Fig 1L2 that the a
gnificant increase in the ratio of the banking system's fin n a
sets to GDP in the period 197U-78. This may be explained y two
am factors. First, is the general rise of the price of crude
troleum in the international market which yielded large amount of'
income to the Government and through Government expenditure, the
general level of' income in the economy rose, and hence the rise in the
volume of savings and other deposits in the banking system. Second,
there was the impact of inflation on commercial banks in the 1970s
which could be associated with rising money value of the banking
system's deposits as well as rising money income.
ASSETS AND LIABILITIES STRUCTURE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
Economic development is accompanied by fundamental changes in the
structure of the financial assets and liabilities of the banking
system. In the developing countries, commercial banks are the
leading mechanism through which financial resources are transferred.
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The significance of the banking system's assets and liabilities as a
vehicle of transmission is not very clear in the financially developed
economies where they are one among an array of assets with nearly
perfect substitability. In financially developing economies where
financial holdings are limited to cash and bank liabilities, the
growth of liabilities and assets takes an added importance. Thus the
analysis of the composition of the financial assets and liabilities of'
the financial system reveals the development of' the commercial banking
and its impact on the economic and social development of Nigeria.
3.1	 Structure of Assets
Asset portfolio of' commercial banks in Nigeria can be grouped
into five classes:
1 Primary Reserves:
- cash and cash items made up of vault cash and balances
with the CBN
- balances with other banks
2 Secondary Reserves:
- treasury bills
- treasury certificates
- balances with call money fund
3 Investments:
- stabilization securities
- bankers' unit fund
- eligible development stock
- certificate of' deposits
Loans and Advances:
- Overdrafts
- bills discounted
5 Fixed Assets
- Movable properties
- Immovable properties
- stocks
6 Other Assets
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Table 14.2 shows the structure of the financial assets of the
Nigerian commercial banking system. To gain a deeper understanding of
the structure, a brief description of each group might prove useful.
Before examining each group, however, it is necessary to note the
phenomenal increase in total assets of the banking system from a
modest level of 235.8 million naira in 1960 to 15,5148.1 million naira
in 1981. (See Table 4.1 and Fig 14.1). The increase was moderate in
the early years 1960-70 and significantly higher in the later period
1970-81. The petroleum wealth came in 1970 and brought with it
economic prosperity, and this was reflected in the increased volume of
business of the banking system.
Primary Reserves
These include cash balances held in the vault by banks..
Commercial banks may deposit funds with other commercial banks as well
as with the CBN. Deposits with the CBN may be part of the statutory
deposits requirements in proportion to the banks' liabilities, or can
be free balances deposited simply to meet immediate cash requirements.
Since these funds earn little or no interest (statutory required
deposits by the CBN may earn some albeit small interest income) they
are held to a minimum. In addition to the above balances, commercial
banks may hold funds with other banks as part of their loaning
portfolio or on the contrary, they may raise inter-bank funds to cover
short-term liquidity requirements and 'to exploit market
imperfections' (Abdoh, 1977).
As shown in Table 14.2, the annual averages of the proportion of
banks' assets held as cash and cash items on one hand, and as balances
with other banks on the other hand, were 8 per cent and 8.5 per cent
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respectively for the period 1960-79. The proportions were highest in
the period 1975-76, a period when the commercial banks were "over
liquid" with no avenues to invest their funds because the Federal
Government, as a result of the increase in its revenue due to the
windfall earnings from crude oil exports, ceased to supply government
paper except in the case of development stocks. Since the development
stocks were long-term investment assets, they were not attractive to
the commercial banks and consequently the Government was unable to mop
up the excess liquidity in the banking system.
Secondary Reserves and Investments
These are assets that are easily convertible to cash in time of
urgent need. They consist substantially of government securities and
other money market instruments. Investment in private firms'
securities by commercial banks are rare or non-existent. These types
of investment have four origins:
- legally required investment. These are investments forced
on banks by the CBN directives. Commercial banks have no
control over this type of investments.
- policy oriented investments. These are investments that
are made not necessarily for profit but rather which imply a
policy emphasis with long-term uncertain return.
-profit motivated investments. Banks occasionally acquire
corporate securities for profit purposes.
-forced investments. These stem from bank takeovers due to
defacto and, or dejure insolvency of their debtors.
Table .2 shows that investments constitute the second single
most important asset item of the Nigerian banking system. Banks
applied more of their funds in investments than in loans and advances
in 1969 and 1970 when they had 414 per cent and per cent
respectively of their funds in investment. There were two main
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areasons for this development. First, there were the periods during
which loans were kept in check especially by the risk and uncertainty
of the economic and political situation occasioned by the war' and the
aftermath of the war. Second, the banks were obliged to invest in
government securities by the CBN directives - a measure designed to
make funds available to the Government to enable it to prosecute the
war. As Table t.3 and Fig k.14 indicate, investment by the banking
system within the economy increased significantly; it rose over OO
times the 1960 level in 1980, and it was 5.k times the 1970 level in
1979. The long-run growth in investment is an indication of the
greater participation of the banking system in the domestic financial
markets. Treasury bills constituted over 68 per cent of the total
investment instruments in 1960 and with the introduction of Treasury
certificates in 1968, they both constituted 93 per cent of the
investment instruments in 1970, and 89 per cent in 1972. This
proportion increased to 97 per cent in 197k, but declined
substantially to 53 per cent in 1977. By 1980 the proportion was 92.9
per cent.
Over the period 1960-80, there have been changes in the internal
distribution of the investment assets. In the period 1960-66 there
were only two main instruments available to the banks: Treasury bills
and Call money. By 1968, Treasury certificate was added to the list.
The Call money scheme was phased out in June 197k. By 1976 four new
instruments were introduced and utilized by the banks. These were
stabilization securities, Bankers' unit fund, Certificate of deposits
and Eligible development stocks.
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Loans and Advances
Loans and advances are the most important component of the asset
portfolio of the banking system. To the banks, they are the highest
income yielding assets. To the economy, loans and advances are
necessary to meet the investment financing requirements and current
expenditure of the productive system. Total commercial banks loans
and advances represented approximately 55.1 per cent of the total
assets of the banking system during the period 1960-67. This ratio,
however, declined in the period 1969-75 to 37.1 per cent; and in the
period 1976-79 it stood at 38.7 per cent (See Table L2). There was a
substantial decline in the proportion of loans and advances to total
assets of the banking system in 1968 from 61.2 per cent in 1967 to
kO.3 per cent and since then it has never attained the 1967 level up
to 1980. This phenomenon may be attributed to a number of factors.
First, the introduction of Treasury certificates in 1968 and four
other short-term instruments (stabilization securities, Bankers' unit
fund, Certificate of deposits and eligible development stocks) in 1976
met the short-term investment preferences of the banks. Second, the
uncertainty of the economic and political situation created by the war
held the banks loans and advances in check. Third monetary
authorities introduced portfolio constraint on the banks by requiring
them to invest in securities. Thus Table k.2 indicates that the banks
were paying attention to other placements such as indirect financing
through investment in securities. Investments became an active avenue
for banks' resources since 1968. Aside from the decline in the
proportion of loans and advances to total assets of the banking
system,the overall structure showed stability in the growth trend of
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the ratio. The long-run stability is consistent with the basic idea
that lending is the natural operation of commercial banks.
Loan assets of the banking system can be classified into two
broad categories. First is the overdraft, which is the privileged
line of credit that enables a customer to overdraw his account up to
and sometimes beyond the agreed limit. In effect, as Benston (1972)
observed, a chequing account with overdraft priviledges is a combined
demand deposit and demand loan accounts. When the balance is a debit
the account is a loan, when the balance is a credit, it is a deposit
account. Although overdraft is often regarded as unsecured line of
credit, most banks in Nigeria would want a customer to guarantee his
potential overdraft with negotiable or other collateral as might be
the case for any loan. The ideal thing is that generally overdraft
privilege is agreed to by the bank if the customer is considered a
good risk, and if the customer-relationship is expected to be
profitable overall. Another category of loan asset is the bills
discounted. Discounting bills receivable, mainly proniisory notes and
trade acceptances is an important loaning instrument used by the
banking system.
Liabilities Structure of the Banks
The liabilities side of the banks' balance sheet indicates the
sources of banks funds and liabilities incurred in the banks' normal
operations. It is shown in Table 4.2 that the bulk of increases in
the funds of the banks has come from customers' deposits. Deposits
are classified into demand deposits, that is the type of liability
which is fully monetary in character, savings deposits and time
deposits.
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Their volume and structure determine, to a large extent, the
operations of the banking system particularly in its lending activity.
The growth of deposits has been phenomenal. In absolute size, it rose
from 137 million naira in 1960 to 657.2 million naira in 1971 and by
1981 it was 10,667.0 million naira. The proportionate share has been
relatively stable ranging from 57.14 per cent in 1960 to 61.5 per cent
in 1980. The lowest proportion was recorded in 1972 when it was 51.5
per cent.
Tables 14.14 and U.14A show a clear long-run decline in the share of
demand deposits. Demand deposits which represented 60 per cent of
total deposit liabilities of the banks in 1960 declined to 140.6 per
cent in 1972. The proportion, however, rose to 56.9 per cent in 1977
before it started a downward trend again recording 145.7 per cent in
1981. It averaged 147.8 per cent for the entire period 1960-80. The
declining proportion notwithstanding the high proportion of demand
deposits and the fact that the constraint on savings and time deposits
(with respect to withdrawals) is often only a formal one, give the
Nigerian banking system a particularly high liquidity, which from the
economic point of view may be destabilizing and tend toward inflation.
But from the microeconomic point of view, Nigerian bnks, for various
reasons, have not felt obliged to wish for less liquid form of
liability, and for that reason they have not encouraged the formation
of effectively tied deposits by paying higher rates on them.
Savings and time deposits have, however, shown significant
improvement over the period. Savings deposits rose from 26.9 per cent
in 1960 to 30.0 per cent in 1966. It started declining thereafter and
registered 18.5 per cent in 1981.	 The decline was more than
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compensated for by the increase in the proportion of time deposits
from 13.1 per cent in 1960 to 32.9 per cent in 1968 and to io.6 per
cent in 1980. The expanded deposits not only demonstrate the
increased confidence that could not be discerned unambiguously from
changes in the demand deposits but are also preferable in terms of
banks' developmental impact. The increase in time deposits allows the
banks an added flexibility to lend for purposes other than working
capital and short-term self-liquidating commercial transactions. Thi
is particularly important in Nigeria where the policy emphasis has
shifted to loans to agriculture and industrial sectors. Demand
deposits may not be very reliable for such loans, because demand
deposits are in most cases held primarily for transaction needs and
only secondarily as portfolio assets.
As Table U. 14A further shows, the banking system has, in recent
time, been more successful in attracting savings and time deposits.
The ratio of demand deposits to money supply (narrowly defined)
increased from 3k.2 per cent in 1960 to 55.1 per cent in 1965, and
after a period of fluctuating trend (1965-73) to 55.8 per cent in
197 1L By 1981 it declined to 52.9 per cent. The proportion of term
deposits (savings and time deposits), on the other hand, was 22.8 per
cent in 1960 and 62.7 per cent in 1965. It rose to 75.k per cent in
1974 and by 1981 it declined to 62.8 per cent. While the annual
average of the ratio of demand deposits to money supply for the entire
period 1960-80 was k6.' per cent, that of term deposits was 51.5 per
cent. The increased attraction of term deposits by the commercial
banks is attributed to increased banking habit of the people rather
than to the payment of higher interest rates.
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Table 11. 11	 Ccmnercia]. banks' growth in Nigeria : the deposit
structure 1960-81
(Million naira)
Year end Demand	 Savings	 Time	 Total	 Money	 GDP
December deposits deposits deposits deposits supply (Ml)
1960	 82.2	 36.8	 18.0	 137.0	 2140.7	 2,1400
1961	 83.14	 142.14	 28.0	 1514.0	 2142.0	 2,378
1962	 90.6	 148.14	 314.8	 173.8	 250.2	 2,516
1963	 97.6	 56.14	 37.8	 191.8	 266.6	 2,9146
196 14	 115.6	 70.2	 146.2	 232.0	 313.5	 3,1145
1214.0
1314.6
110.14
1147.0
185.6
289.0
285.14
• 315.0
1430.7
720.7
1,266.8
80.14
89.14
51.8
714.8
914.6
129.8
160.14
205.2
2214.5
286.7
251 .3
60.6
73.2
79.14
108.8
120.8
207.0
211.14
256.0
357.8
686.5
1,051.0
265.0
297.2
2141.6
330.6
1401.0
625.8
657.2
776.2
1,013.0
1,693.9
2,839.1
2214.9
351.8
317.8
330.1
1438.3
631.3
639.9
700.2
866.6
1,290.5
2,297.5
3,361
3, 6114
2,950
2,878
3, 851
5,621
7,098
7,703
9,001
16,962
20,1405
1976	 2,185.1	 709.1	 1,270.0	 14,1614.2	 3,536.3	 25,14149
1977	 2,980.1	 930.1	 1,325.0	 5,235.2	 14,920.9	 28,015
1978	 2,700.9	 1,075.7	 1,526.0	 5,302.6	 14,858.1	 28,737
1979	 3,265.7	 1,283.8	 2,1418.3	 6,967.8	 5,616.5	 140,333
1980	 3,730.8	 1,518.14	 3,593.5	 8,8142.7	 8,598.1•	 50,599
1981	 14,880.9
	 1,979.3
	
3,816.8	 10,677.0	 9,228.6	 57,567
Sources : 1	 CBN
	 (i) Annual Report and Statement of Account
- various years
(ii) Economic and Financial Review - various years
(iii)Monthly report, 1981
2 IMF	 International Financial Statistics
- various years
3 Nigeria, Federal Republic of Fourth National Development
Plan 1981-85. Federal Ministry of Economic Development,
Lagos, 1981.
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Table k.)4 A	 Coiiinercial banks' growth in Nigeria : the deposit
structure 1960-81
(Percentages)
Year Demand	 Savings Time	 demand	 Time -*. Demand	 Time +
End deposits deposits deposits deposits savings deposits savings
Dec. (per cent of total deposits) (per cent of money (per cent of GD?)
supply)
1960	 60.0	 26.9
	 13.1	 3)4.2	 22.8	 3.14	 2.3
1961	 5)4.2	 27.5	 18.3
	
314.5	 29.2	 3.5	 3.0
1962	 52.2	 27.8	 20.0	 36.2	 33.3	 3.6	 3.3
1963	 50.9	 29.14	 19.7	 36.6	 35.3	 3.3	 3.2
1g64	 )49.8	 30.3
	 19.9	 36.9	 37.1	 3.7	 3.7
1965	 146.8	 30.3
	
22.9
	
55.1	 62.7
	 3.7	 14.2
1966	 '45.3
	
30.1	 214.6	 38.3
	
146.2	 3.7	 14.5
1967	 145.7	 21.4	 32.9
	
314.7	 141.3
	
14.6
1968	 144.5	 22.6	 32.9	 1414.5	 55.6	 3.8	 6.14
1969	 146.3	 23.6	 30.1	 42.3	 49.1	 '4.8	 5.6
1970
1971
1972
1973
19714
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
146.2
143.14
140.6
143.0
142.5
1414.6
52.5
56.9
50.9
146.9
142.2
145.7
20.7
214.14
26.k
22 • 0
17.0
18.14
17.0
17.8
20.3
18.14
17.2
18.5
33.1
33.2
33. 0
35.0
140.5
37.0
30.5
25.3
28.8
314.7
140.6
35.7
145.8
44.6
145.0
49.7
55.8
55.1
61.8
60.6
55.6
58.1
43.4
52.9
53.4
58.1
65.9
67.2
75.4
56.7
56.0
145.8
53.6
65.9
59.5
62.8
5.1
4.0
4.1
14.8
4.2
6.2
8.6
10.6
9.4
8.1
7.14
8.5
6.0
5.2
6.0
6.5
5.7
6.14
7.8
8.0
9.1
9.2
10.1
10.1
Average
1960
-1981 147.8	 23.1	 29.2	 146.4	 51.5	 5.4	 5.9
Sources : Same as Table 14.14
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It is, however, important to note that demand deposits, though
outpaced by term deposits (see Fig 4.5) increased in relative terms to
become a basic instrument of money economy. In relation to the GD?
the increase in the ratio is a further indication of the significant
expansion in term deposits and hence in the banking habit. The
proportion was 2.3 per cent in 1960; it recorded 60 per cent and 10.1
per cent in 1970 and 1981 respectively with an annual average of 5.7
per cent in the period 1960-80.
Another basic feature of the development of the banking system is
the level and growth of total deposits per capita. The information is
essential as it is one of the indicators of increased capture of
financial resources by the banks, which is related to the more
advanced stages of banking development (Rietti, 1979). Table 14.5
shows that total banking systems deposits per capita rose 55 times the
1963 level in 1981. It rose from 3.14 million naira in 1963 to 187.2
million naira in 1981. The annual average for the period 1963-80 was
36.9 million naira. Fig 14.6 shows that the long-run growth trend in
the various deposits per capita has been significant and stable.
There was a tremendous increase in the period 1978-81.
Two reasons can be of•fered to explain the increase in total
deposits per capita. First, is the fact that as the economic
development proceeds, the community chooses different ways of
allocating its available funds primarily on the basis of the services
offered by the banking system. For this reason, individuals in the
economy have become aware of the new and better banking services,
safety of deposits and facility of their use among other factors.
Second, the rise in income level generated by crude oil exports and
earnings has been a leading factor in the dynamic performance in the
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attraction of resources by the banking system. The dramatic increase
in deposits per capita started with the period of increased crude oil
prices and earnings of the 1970s. (See Fig k.6).
A cursory' look at Fig L.6 indicates that term deposits per capita
shows a higher rising trend over the period except in 1976-78, than
demand deposits. If therefore, we accept the thesis that more
advanced stages of banking development are identified with greater
attraction of long-term financial resources, then there is thus every
evidence to support our hypothesis that the Nigerian banking system
has performed creditably well in mobilizing resources. The analysis
so far puts up the increased use of banking facilities and reflects
the long-run trend in the manner in which sources of permanent income
is maintained. This is ultimately reflected in the greater soundness
and strength of the banking system because it has longer-term
resources to support their lending operations.
A second major source of funds to the banks is "other
liabilities" which include funds in the course of collection and those
credited to suspense accounts, deposits against letters of credit,
provision for staff pension funds and bad and doubtful debts. The
proportion of "other liabilities" in the total liabilities has
increased from 16.6 per cent in 1960 to 26.7 per cent in 1967. It
recorded the higiest ratio of 38.9 per cent in 1970. Between 1968 and
1980 the share of "other liabilities" remained more or less stable at
an average ratio of 35 per cent. The shareholders funds and reserves
have not been a very significant source of bank funds. The proportion
has been declining in recent times. It declined from 6.8 per cent in
1965 to 2. 1 per cent in 1980.
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37.9
514.2
66.5
65.8
	
14.0	 1.8	 0.8
	
5.2	 2.3
	
1.2
	
6.2	 2.9	 1.5
	
9.14	 1414	 2.0
	
9.7	 14.2	 2.14
	
11.2	 14.5	 3.0
	
114.2	 6.0	 3.1
	
23.2	 9.9	 3.9
16.9
28.5
38.9
33.5
3.14
9.2
11.8
13.3
1967	 61.5
1968	 63.0
1969	 614.6
1970	 66.2
1971	 67.8
1972	 69.5
1973	 71.3
19714	 73.1
1975	 714.9
1976	 76.8
1977	 78.7
1978	 80.6
	
1.3
	
2.1
	
1.7	 2.9
	
1.9	 3,3
	
3.1	 5.1
	
3.1	 5,5
	
3.7	 6.6
	
5.0	 8.2
	
9.14	 13,3
	
114.0	 17.14
	
16.5	 25.8
	
16.8	 28.7
	
18.9	 32.3
Table 1L5	 Commercial. banks' deposits per capita 1963-81
(million naira)
	
Total	 Demand	 Savings	 Time	 Time and
deposits deposits deposits deposits savings
per	 per	 per	 per	 deposits
Year Population capita	 capita	 capita	 capita	 per cap:.ta
1963	 55.7	 3.14	 1.8	 1.0	 0.1	 1.7
196 14	 57.1	 14.1	 2.0	 1.2	 0.8	 2.0
1965	 58.5	 14.5	 2.1	 1.14	 1.0	 2,14
1966	 60.0	 14.9	 2.2	 1.5	 1.2	 2.7
1979
	
82.6	 814.14	 39.5	 15.5	 29.3
	
1414.8
1980	 814.7	 1014.14	 1414.0	 17.9
	
142.14	 60,14
1981	 86.9
	
187.-\	 56.2	 22.8	 143.9	 66.7
Sources : 1 Population Bureau Office Lagos
2 CBN (i) Annual Report and Statement of Accounts -
various years
(ii) Monthly Reports, 1981
Note	 : The population is projected at 2.5 per cent of increase per annum
using 1963 census figures.
An important structural change occurred in 1967 with the dramatic
reduction in the proportion of "Balances held for other banks". The
proportionate share of this item was 17.5 per cent in 1960, but it has
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progressively declined to 1.0 per cent in 1969. Between 19714 and
1980, the highest ratio of 1.2 per cent was recorded in 1979. The
explanation for the steady decline was the significant decline in the
funds held for offices and branches abroad. Similarly borrowing in
the form of loans and advances from the CBN and other financial
institutions which constituted a very slender portion of the total
liabilities of the banks has steadily declined from 14.6 per cent in
1960 to 0.5 per cent in 1970. It rose to 2.0 per cent in 19714 but by
1978 it declined to a very low level of 0.2 per cent. The explanation
for this is the fact that the banks maintained a very high level of
liquidity. The trend underlines the need for expanding the inter-bank
market in Nigeria and for the banks to be more aggressive in seeking
for investment opportunities.
The next important basic question that should be dealt with here
is whether or not the growth of the banking system has contributed to
higher rates of investment in the economy over the period under
review. A simple definition of the contribution of the banking system
to the financing of capital formation consists of the calculation of
increases in the banks' credit to the public and private sectors of
the economy as a percentage of gross domestic investment. The calcul-
ations are shown in Table 14.6. Although this coefficient of mobiliz-
ation of bank resources can overstate the contribution of the banking
system to investment because part of bank credit is allocated to
investment and part to consumption expenditures, it is, nonetheless,
regarded as a satisfactory indicator of that contribution. Generally,
commercial banks' credit to the economy has shown a long-term upwards
trend, increasing from a moderate level of 125.14 million naira in 1963
to 9066.9 million naira in 1980. (See Fig 14.7).
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Table lh6 shows that the coefficient of mobilization of bank
resources increased from an annual average of 12.3 per cent in 1961-66
to 20.9 per cent in 1967-70. The coefficient declined significantly
to 8.3 per cent in the period 1971-75. It rose again to an annual
average of 13.7 per cent in 1976-80. For the entire period 1964-80,
this coefficient was 13.6 per cent. As Fig .8 indicates, the
coefficient fluctuated very much throughout the period 1963-80. The
contribution of the banking system to capital formation was highest in
the years 1968-70, and showed moderately increasing trend in the
period 1975-80. (See Fig Z.8). The pattern of the growth rate of the
coefficient can be explained by the fact that from mid 1960s to the
end of the war in 1970, the Government borrowed increasingly from the
banking system to enable it successfully to prosecute the war, hence
the banking system's contribution to capital formation was highest in
the years 1968-70.
The foregoing suggests that despite the sustained expansion of
bank credit as a percentage of investment, alternative sources of
investment financing continued to be dominant. Indeed such financing
still depends heavily on internal savings of firms and to lesser
extent on the sale of debt instruments and shares in the financial
markets.
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Table 1L6	 Coefficient of resource mobilization by comnercia].
banks 1963-80
(Million naira)	 (Percentage)
Gross fixed Commercial	 Annual changes Annual changes
capital	 banks credit of bank credit as a per cent of
Year formation	 tothe	 to the economy gross fixed
	
economy	 capital formation
1963	 393.0	 125.4	 -	 -
19614	 503.0	 255.0	 129.6	 25.8 )
1965	 615.0	 279.6	 214.6	 11.0 ) 12.3
1966	 601.6	 322.6	 113.0	 7.1 )
1967
	
1183.6
	
303.2	 -19.11	 -14.0 )
1968	 421 .11	 118.2	 27.2 )
1969
	 527.6	 577.0	 155.6	 29.5 ) 20.9
1970	 911.2
	 858.0	 281.0	 30.8 )
1971
	 1,283.0	 792.0	 -66.0	 -5.1 )
1972
	 1,1101.0	 999.6
	
207.6	 114.8 )
1973	 1,506.0
	 1,1111.1	 1111.5	 7.6 ) 8.3
1 9714	 3,231.0	 1,570.7	 '156 .6	 114.1	 )
1975
	 5,019.8	 2,083.2	 512.5	 10.2 )
1976	 8,107.3	 2,9118.1	 8614.9	 10.7 )
1977	 9,1120.7	 4,098.9	 1,1141.8	 12.1	 )
1978	 8,115.3	 5,037.11	 938.5	 11.5 ) 13.7
1979	 11,626.0	 7,0141.3
	
2,003.9
	
17.2 )
1980	 11,781.0	 9,066.9	 2,025.6	 17.2 )
Sources : 1 CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years 1960-80.
2 IMF International Financial Statistics
- various years
3 Nigeria, Federal Republic of: Fourth National Development
Plan 1981-85, Federal Ministry of Economic Development,
Lagos, 1981.
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THE GROWTH OF BRANCH NETWORK
It is important to examine the growth of the banks branch
network because it gives a snap shot of the structure of the banking
system and it is essential in indicating the prospect for the
effective mobilization of savings. One of the reasons financial
developments may instigate an increase in the aggregate volume of real
savings is the direct institutional effect (Abdi, 1977). This implies
that the existence of financial institutions may promote higher
marginal propensities to save. The institution-elasticity of priva e
aggregate volume of savings would obviously depend on the existence of
alternative channels. As Lewis (1970, p.229) contends, 'There is a
whole range of savings institutions that can be developed
Experience shows that the amount of savings depends partly on how
widespread these facilities are; if they are pushed right under the
individual's nose, to the extent of having street savings group, or
factory groups, or even deductions from earnings at source, people
save more than if the nearest savings institution is some distance
away'.
It is also argued that the expansion of branch network will
influence the mix of bank deposit liabilities. For example, the study
by Weisbrod (1980) found that the convenience of branch banking
permits customers to hold lower balances in non-interest bearing
demand accounts, and correspondingly to hold hig1er balances in less
liquid higher yielding assets. The greater proportion of savings and
time deposits in the banks' deposit liabilities, as observed above,
may be a consequence of the convenience provided to the community by
branch network expansion of' banks in recent years.
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Table 11.7
	
Coanercial banks and their branches 1960-80
Number Number	 Growth	 Average	 Number of
of	 of	 rate of	 branch	 ('000)	 persons
Year banks branches branching per bank population per branch
15.8
	
2.6
	
15.0
	
7.7
	
12.3
	
3.8
	
12.8
	
3.7
	
13.3
	
6.2	 16.0
	
5.14	 16.9
	
11.1
	 20.1
	
6.0	 21.3
	
1.3	 23.2
	
5.3
	 2k. 5
	
6.9
	
21.3
1960	 12	 190
1961	 13	 195
1962	 17	 210
1963	 17	 218
19614	 17	 226
1965	 15	 2140
1966	 15	 253
1967	 114	 281
1968
	
114
	
298
1969
	
13
	
302
1970
	
13
	
318
1971
	 16
	
3140
51,598
52,921
514,278
55,670
57,062
58,1489
59,951
61, 1450
62,986
614,561
66, 175
68,160
271,568
271,390
258,1467
255,367
252,1487
2147,7014
236,960
218,683
211,362
213, 778
208,097
200, 24140
1972	 16	 358	 5.3	 22.14	 70,205	 196,103
1973	 16	 383	 7.0	 23.9	 72,311	 188,801
19714	 17	 1403
	
5.2	 23.7	 714,1480	 1814,8114
1975	 17	 1433	 7.14	 25.5	 76,7114	 177,169
1976	 18	 45o	 3.9	 25.0	 76,800	 170,667
1977	 19	 508	 12.9	 26.7	 78,556	 1514,638
1978	 19	 585	 15.2	 30.8	 80,563	 137,715
1979	 20	 672	 114.9
	 33.6	 82,621	 122,9148
1980	 20	 7140	 10.1	 37.0	 814,732	 1114,503
Sources : 1 Population Bureau Office, Lagos
2 CBN (1) Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years	 -
(ii) Monthly Report, August 1976, p.9
3 Okigbo PNC (1981) Nigeria's Financial System, p.101
A look at Table 14,7 shows that there has been a remarkable
increase in the number of banking offices, although the number of
operating banks has remained more or less the same. In 1960, there
were only 190 bank branches owned by 12 banks. By 19614, the number of
banks and branches were 17 and 226 respectively. In 1969, the number
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of banks declined to 13, but the branches increased to 302. There
were 20 banks with 7140 branches in 1980. In his last budget speech,
the president of Nigeria, Aihaji Shehu Shagari (1982), stated that the
Government has granted licences to five new banks and approval has
also been given to nine others which will start operations as soon as
they have complied with the laid down conditions. He further stated
that 148 new branches have been opened bringing the total number of
branches to 917. (See Daily Times, 5 November 1982, p.27-8). The
growth rate of bank offices has been positive with the highest rate of
15.2 per cent being recorded in 1978. This phenomenal increase in
bank offices was due to the first phase of the Rural Banking Scheme
which lasted for three years, July 1977 to June 1980. By the end of
December 1980, for instance, a total of 200 bank offices have been
established.
Apart from the period 1960-614, the average branch per bank has
been increasing over the period, rising from 16 in 1965 to 214.5 in
1970. In 1975 it stood at 25.6 and rose to 37 branches per •bank in
1980. Since the branches are not equally shared among banks, it is
observed that the biggest three banks - Union bank, First bank and
United Bank for Africa - which before 1972 were foreign banks
controlled 66.8 per cent and 60.14 per cent of branches in 1960 and
1966 respectively. Their share of branch offices has declined to 56.0
per cent and 146.7 per cent in 1970 and 1978 respectively. The
National Bank of Nigeria and the African Continental Bank (ACB) both
wholly indigenous had together 25.3 per cent and 27.0 per cent share
of branches in 1960 arid 1966 respectively. Their share also declined
to 26.14 per cent and 19.3 per cent in 1970 and 1978 respectively.
(See Table 14.8).
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An important feature of the Nigerian banking system is the
inadequacy of the banking facilities. The tremendous increase in
branches notwithstanding, Nigeria is still gros8ly under-banked with a
ratio of one bank office to 1111,503 persons in 1980. This does not
compare favourably to other countries such as the United Kingdom with
a ratio of 1:110,000; the United States with a ratio of 1:6,000 and a
ratio of 1:52,000 in India (Okigbo, 1981). The implication of the low
bank density is that a lot of saving is not being mobilized within the
economy and that there is a good prospect of increasing branches
profitably to tap idle financial resources in the economy.
The extent of inadequacy of banking facility in the country can
be discerned from examining the state distribution of branches. Table
11.9 shows that by 1978 only four out of 19 states had 50 and above
bank offices. These are Anambra (50), Bendel (51), Lagos (111), and
Oyo (62). These states together had a total of 2711 branches. This
means that with only 23 per cent of the country's population, the four
states controlled over 116 per cent of the bank offices. There is a
concentration of bank offices in Lagos. For example, Lagos had 22.6
per cent of the branches in 1970. By 1976 it declined to 20.7 per
cent. Its share of offices was 19 per cent in 1978. This is because
Lagos is the nerve centre of business, the national capital, and the
headquarters of the Central Bank of Nigeria. It is, however,
noteworthy that the share is declining. This is because of the shift
in the emphasis by the Government to rural banking. All the 19 banks
in operation in 1978 had offices in Lagos. Thirteen of the banks had
offices in Kano. Oyo state ranked third with 12 branches, followed by
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Imo state (9), Rivers (9), Bendel (8). Sokoto state which is the
third largest populated state in the country had only k banks with a
total of 1k offices.
Table 21.8	 Coierc1al banks' branches 1960-78
Bank	 1960	 1966	 1970	 1976	 1978
Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd 	 62	 62	 86	 9k	 108
First Bank of Nigeria Ltd 	 56	 6k	 68	 97	 111
United Bank for Africa Ltd
	 9	 13	 2k	 33	 5k
Savannah Bank (Nigeria) Ltd
	
-	 2	 2	 14	 7
International Bank for West Africa
	
2	 14	 5	 11	 20
Ltd
	
2	 2	 14	 7
	
1	 1	 3	 5
	
20
	
30	 37	 38	 50
	
3
	
5	 12	 33	 36
	
-	
-	 .2	 5
	
-	
-	 1	 3
	
8	 11	 18	 20
	
-	
-	 9	 13
	
-	
-	 15	 23
	
-	
-	 7	 13
	
10
	
7	 8	 13
	
19
	
-	 15	 12
	 214
14
Nigerian-Arab Bank Ltd
Allied Bank of Nigeria Ltd
African Continental Bank Ltd
Bank of the North Ltd
aduna Co-operative Bank Ltd
ano Co-operative Bank Ltd
Co-operative Bank Ltd
Mercantile Bank of Nigeria Ltd
New Nigerian Bank Ltd
Pan African Bank Ltd
Wema Bank Ltd
Co-operative Bank of Eastern Nigeria
Ltd
Societe Generale Bank Ltd
Bank of Credit and Commerce
International
National Bank of Nigeria Ltd	 28	 32	 147	 56	 6
Totals	 190	 230	 318	 1450	 585
Sources : 1 Ojo and Adewunmi (1982) Banking and Finance in Nigeria,
(Graham Burns UK), p.52
2 CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1980
Note	 : The table excludes banks that have been closed down for various
reasons.
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Generally, the concentration of bank offices is biased in favour
of urban centres. This is because the major urban centres provide the
easy basis and sources of commercial banking business and
profitability, so that banks follow the business instead of leading
business. Secondly, the banking system was until 1976 dominated by
foreign banks which tended to establish their branches where there is
a concentration of expatriate businesses of few urban merchants and
traders. Third, most of the indigenous banks are state-owned and tend
to concentrate first, on the state capital.
Another observation is that although there is no restrictions on
branching, a few of the banks operate in more than a small number of
the states. By 1976, for instance, only Union Bank operated in all
the 19 states, while, apart from Bank of the North (12 states),
National Bank of Nigeria (1 14 states), First Bank (17 states), UBA (10
states), ACB (8 states), International Bank for West Africa (7 states)
and Co-operative Bank (5 states) all the others operate in at most
three states.
Finally, most of the state owned banks have a greater proportion
of their branches in their home states. For example, the Mercantile
Bank has ten of its thirteen branches in Cross River state, New
Nigerian Bank has 17 of its 23 branches in Bendel state and Pan
African Bank has nine of its thirteen branches in River state.
RURAL BANKING PROGRMIE
Having identified financial resources as a key factor in economic
development, the Government has since realised that no meaningful
development can be achieved without the development of the rural
sector. Since the rural economy represents a substantial proportion
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of the country's human and natural resources, a large amount of
capital is needed to help transform and modernise the sector. The
funds needed can be mobilized and channelled to productive investment
in agriculture and small-scale industries in the rural areas by the
banks. Unfortunately, commercial banks in Nigeria are concentrated in
the urban areas to the utter neglect of the rural community. As a
consequence, the Federal Government devised a programme of making
banking facilities available in the rural community.
In its report on the financial system, one of the recommended
objectives of the commercial banks by the Committee on the Nigerian
Financial System which was accepted by the Government is:
The banks should actively facilitate the transformation of
rural environment by promoting the rapid expansion of
banking facilities and services and banking habit in the
rural and near rural communities. They will thus serve as
paying and receiving stations for hand to hand currency and
provide facilities for remittances to and from rural areas.
They will provide savings deposit facilities for their
customers and thereby help to mobilize rural savings. Most
important of all, they will serve as vehicles for the
creation of credit in the rural areas. This credit will
take the form of equity and loans for small scale farmers
and entrepreneurs. (Government White Paper on the Report of
the Committee on the Nigerian Financial System. Lagos 1977)
The next important factor necessitating the establishment of
rural banking is the existence in the economy of the "financial
dualism". There is undeniable evidence that a significant constraint
on the integration of rural and urban sectors has been the dualism of
the financial markets. There are two parallel markets in the economy
with distinct characteristics. As Abdi (1977) observed, these markets
are often geographically separate and only rarely does arbitrage take
place between them. The smaller and more organised market utilizes
bank deposits and other financial institutions' liabilities besides
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currency. The unorganised or informal market, which embraces a large
proportion of the country utilizes, in the main, currency. The two
markets differ in their sources and terms of credit granted. The only
type of loans available outside family, traders and friends in the
unorganised money market may well be from professional money lenders
and produce buying agents. The informal money market has persisted
despite the exploitative interest rate. Many rural entrepreneurs have
depended on it to finance their small scale enterprises. For example,
Miller (1977) in his study of 302 farmers in West and Kwara states
showed that about 82 per cent of the available credit came from
friends and relatives and per cent came from money lenders.
Commercial banks and other institutional sources did not contribute
anything.
There is, therefore, the need to integrate the two sectors of the
economy and thereby eliminate the progress-retarding financial
dualism. One important way of integrating the two sectors is by
provision of modern financial institutions and instruments in the
rural areas. This is why the Government has embarked on the policy of
rural banking. Implicit in this policy has been the belief that the
level of savings in the rural areas is constrained by the absence of
assets that are attractive in terms of safety, yield and liquidity.
It is further expected that the integration of the financial markets
would reduce, if not eliminate, the distortion in resource allocation
between the rural and the urban areas. In addition equal access to
resources mobilized by financial institutions is expected to lead to
more equitable distribution of the growth dividend as the process of
capital formation is spread across all sectors of the economy and
across all strata of the population. Besides, the extension of
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banking services to the rural areas encourage some basic structural.
transformation.
One of the objectives of rural banking is to mobilize rural
savings. It is generally agreed that financial, problem at any stage
is closely tied up with savings problems. There is often the argument
that since the rural economy operates at or near subsistence level,
there is very little that can be squeezed out of income and
consumption. Consequently, it has not been realised that large
volumes of idle funds, though in small units per individual, exist in
the rural areas. The fact is that these reserves of productivity do
exist somewhere in the rural areas; the prime problem of developm nt
is to gather them and utilize them efficiently. This is why the rural
banking policy is necessary.
The volume of these reserves in the rural areas can be gleaned
from the amount of financial resources that the various traditional
credit societies or associations can mobilize. Bauman and Harteveld
(1977) in their study of Indian states of Tamil, Nadil and Kerala
showed that the deposits made through credit and savings associations
were equal. to 20 per cent of the total commercial banks' deposits. In
Ethiopia, the 1968-73 Development Plan estimated the annual savings
volume through rotating savings and credit associations to be 8 to 10
per cent of the country's GDP. Furthermore, the review of small
holder credit in Kenya undertaken by the African Rural Development
Study points out that the deposits by small farmers under the Co-
operative Thrift Scheme reached the quite unanticipated figure of US
$2 million by 1973 which was the Scheme's third year of operation.
(World Bank, 1975).
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These studies point up the fact that there exist huge reserves of
financial resources in the Nigerian rural economy seeking to be
productively mobilized. These resources are either underutilized or
unutilized because of lack of banking services in the rural areas. An
effective way of, first, making much of the reserves assume financial
form, and second, mobilizing the savings and investing them into
productive ventures is through the establishment of banks in the rural
communities.
Finally, there is the genuine need to increase the rural
cultivator's income and savings which will enable him to build up
physical as well as financial assets, and this in its turn, will
increase his credit-worthiness, reduce the risk premium on interest
rates and lower rural interest rates (Ghatak, 1975). But the growth
of financial assets may be hindered, particularly in leading
agricultural sector if there is a dearth of financial institutions
which could offer prospects for savings and investment. In such cases
as Ghatak (1977) rightly contends, the extension of financial
institutions such as commercial banks, may be useful in brin.ng about
greater diversification in the nature of accumulation of financial
assets in the rural sector.
The Federal Government, through the CBN, applied various measures
to get the existing commercial banks to expand to the rural areas. It
was not an easy task because the rural areas do not provide the
necessary business environment of lucrative ventures that can attract
commercial banks. It was then obvious that the CBN had to use its
powers to persuade, coerce and direct the commercial banks to open up
offices in the rural areas.
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The first measure resorted to was to invoke section 14 of the 1969
Banking Act. Under this section of the Act, banks were obliged to
obtain the prior approval of the CBN before they could open a new
branch. Such an application was rejected if it is not matched by
concrete plans for opening rural branches. Dubiously enough, the
banks utilised the approval for the urban areas without making good
their pledges to open rural branches. The CBN was therefore, forced
to place an embargo on branch expansion of major banks in the urban
areas in the hope that the banks would in the alternative seek
expansion to the rural areas. But that expectation failed; some of
the foreign banks were making so much profits in the few urban branch
locations, that they considered opening new offices even in the urban
centres unnecessarylet alone bothering themselves with expanding to
the rural areas. Thus the banks refused to expand to the rural areas
by the simple device of refusing to open new urban branches.
Having failed with this strategy, the CBN resorted to persuasion.
The banks were persuaded to adopt a new approach to the rural
development and to extend credit to the agricultural sector. At the
1976 Annual Dinner of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers, the governor
of the CBN, for instance, stated:
Closely related is the need for a conscious policy on your
part to open branches in the rural areas. This itself will
afford you the opportunity to move to more challenging, but
in the long-run, more rewarding ventures in the rural areas
from the stand-point of economic and social development.
This is the contribution we have to make to the development
of the neglected rural areas and any short-term sacrifice we
have to make will eventually prove to be worthwhile for the
banking community and the nation at large. (CBN : Economic
and Financial Review, June 1976, p.8)
Despite the appeal and persuasion, the banks remained unyielding in
their determination not to expand to the rural areas.
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Table 14 10	 Coimnunities without banking facil.ttie3 in 1977
Population ranges
	
Number of settlements
over 100,000	 114
50,000 - 100,000 	 28
140,000 - 50,000	 37
30,000 - 140,000	 147
20,000 - 30,000	 96
10,000 - 20,000	 208
below 10,000	 696
Total	 1,126
Source : CBN Bullion, 20th Aniversary, Edition July 1979, p.52
A more realistic and definite approach was devised by the CBN in
1977. The first step was to identify "unbanked" areas through a
survey which showed the need to provide 1,126 rural branches (See
Table 14.10). To distribute equitably the burden of rural expansion
among the banks, the CBN decided to allocate the identified rural
centres to the banks on a basis of a formula which relates the number
of each bank's rural branches to its total branch network throughout
the country (Oloshore, 1979). To facilitate the execution of the
programme, the CBN decided to phase the scheme. The first phase was
the period July 1977 to June 1980. Under the first phase, 200 rural
centres were identified and allocated to the banks for opening
branches (See Table 14.11). In identifying these centres priority was
given to local government headquarters so as to ensure that each local
government headquarters had at least one bank office. The second
phase started in August 1980 and it is expected to end in December
1 983. Under the second phase 266 bank offices have been allocated to
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the banks. The allocation is based on the relative size and branch
network of the various banks, except that no bank is allocated less
than six branches.
In appraising the first phase, it is necessary to note that it is
a success to the extent that of the 200 branches allocated to the
banks, 194 branches were opened by the end of December 1980. It is,
however, not enough to open these branches, the operations of the
branches with respect to the roles they are expected to play are of
crucial importance and must be monitored by the CEN. The stiff
resistance put up initially by these banks should serve as enough
warning to the CBN that unless their rural branch activity is
carefully and constantly monitored that they are bound to play a
negative role in the development of the rural areas by merely serving
as profit centres for their head offices, mobilizing rural funds for
investment in the urban centres. This will rather perpetuate the
financial dualism and leave the rural areas poorer.
Rural banking is a concept, and thus a rural bank is a bank
located in a predominantly subsistence agricultural community for the
purpose of mobilizing and relending idle funds with the ultimate aim
of modernising and uplifting the living standards of the rural areas
as a preliminary step to economic "take-off" of the national economy.
Unfortunately, in Nigeria rural banks are not separate entities but
are branches of old established banks subject to the rules, traditions
and policies of their individual headquarters. The implication of
this is that rural branches are very much likely to be influenced by
the parent banks and as such are not going to adhere to the ideals for
which they were established.
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Table L1 1	 Rural banking programme : allocation of identified
centres to the coercial banks
Allocation	 Completed	 Allocation
under first at the end	 under
Banks	 phase	 of December second
1980	 phase
African Continental Bank Ltd
	
16	 16	 19
Allied Bank Nigeria Ltd 	 6	 6	 7
Bank of Credit and Commerce
International
Bank of the North Ltd
Co-op Bank Ltd
Co-op Bank of Eastern Nigeria
Ltd
First Bank of Nigeria Ltd
IBWA Limited
Kaduna Co-operative Bank Ltd
Kano Co-operative Bank Ltd
Mercantile Bank Nigeria Ltd
New Nigeria Bank Ltd
Nigeria-Arab Bank Ltd
Pan African Bank Ltd
Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd
Societe Generale Bank Nigeria
Ltd
Union Bank Nigeria Ltd
United Bank for Africa Nigeria
Ltd
Wema Bank Ltd
National Bank of Nigeria Ltd
Total
6
	
6
	
6
	
19
	
5
	
5
	
8
	
7
	
8
	
39
	
37
	
11
	
10
	
13
	
3
	
3
	
6
	
6
	
6
	
6
	
3
	
3
	
6
	
14	 9
	
7
	
7
	
6
	
5
	
5
	
6
	
7
	
7
	
11
6
	
27
	
27
	
36
	
27
	
27
	
32
	
5	 14	 6
	
15	 15	 19
	
200	 1914	 266
Sources : CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- December 1980, p.38
For the scheme to succeed, each rural bank branch should see
itself failing if the community which it serves is financially
handicapped in its attempt to modernize and develop. In other words,
rural banks should participate actively in all aspects of rural
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development because the failure of any project will constitute a
threat to the very basis of their existence. This implies that rural
banks should lead development arid not merely follow it because there
is no development to be followed in the rural communities.
De 8lop!nent projects should be initiated and guided actively by the
bar s.
Another important observation is the slow rate of implementing
.he scheme. At the rate of 200 branches in three years, on the
we tge, it is going to take approximately 15 years to establish 1,126
ra hes. This slow pace is unacceptable. It is true that care must
,e 'iken not to overstretch the resources of the banks by compelling
;he to expand at an unbearable rate because the failure of a bank
ou I spell economic doom for the country. Nevertheless, the
ove riment should see that the scheme is fully implemented in time.
:n a lition to encouraging commercial banks to expand to the rural
trea , the Government should participate actively by establishing its
wn odel rural banks. This will not only establish the Government
md the banks' presence in the rural areas, but also act as models
or the commercial banks' rural branches in their operations.
1-6	 COMPARATIVE ANALTSIS
The growth and development attained by the Nigerian banking
ystem can further be clear if an inter-system comparison is
Lndertaken. The comparison here is restricted to the degree of
inancia]. deepening attained by selected developing countries which
re in a comparable stage of economic development. The selected
:ountries - Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania - share similar economic
haracteristjcs with Nigeria. In 1978, for instance, their per capita
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GNP were as follows: Nigeria had the highest with (US) $560 followed
by Ghana with $390, Kenya $330 and Tanzania $230. Gross domestic
savings as a proportion of GNP was also highest in Nigeria where it
recorded 28 per cent. It was 18 per cent in Kenya, 7 per cent in
Tanzania and 6 per cent in Ghana. But the growth rate of real GNP in
the 1970s had been highest in Kenya with average rate of 6.7 per cent
followed by Nigeria with 6.2 per cent, Tanzania registered 5 per cent
while Ghana had a low of 0.i per cent, an indicative of the economic
stagnation which has gripped the country in the 1970s (Kwarteng,
1982).
Table 1L12 shows that the total assets of the banking system
relative to GNP averages 23.3 per cent in Nigeria for the period 1970-
80. The average ratio was 17 per cent for Ghana in 1970-77; and it
was 28 per cent and per cent for Kenya and Tanzania respectively.
The demand deposits to money supply (narrowly defined) ratio was
highest in Kenya with an average of 71. L
 per cent, and with a fairly
high ratio of term deposits - savings arid time deposits - money supply
of !7 per cent on the average, Kenya may be said to have a fairly high
level of financial intermediation. In Nigeria, the demand deposits to
money supply ratio averaged 53.2 per cent over the period (but with
above average ratio during 197-79). The ratio of term deposits to
money supply was highest in Nigeria with a ratio of 60 per cent. The
combined ratios indicate a higher degree of financial intermediation
than in the other countries. The corresponding ratios for Tanzania
were 57 per cent and 31.5 per cent for demand deposits - money supply
and term deposits - money supply ratios respectively. Ghana had a low
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average demand deposits - money supply ratio of 117.3 per cent and also
an average term deposits - money supply ratio of 37.11 per cent, an
indication of lower level of financial intermediation.
Table k.12	 Ccinparlson of bank3 developnent and growth
Time and	 Total Change
savings	 Demand	 bank	 in bank
deposits deposits	 assets assets
Country	 Period	 (per cent of money	 (per cent of
supply (Ml))
	 GD?)
Nigeria	 1970-80	 60.0	 53.2	 23.3	 5.1
Kenya	 1970-79	 116.9
	
71.11	 28.0	 11.7
Tanzania	 1970-78	 31.5	 56.6	 29.11	 5.2
Ghana	 1970-79	 37.11	 117.3
	
17.0*
	 5.0*
United Kingdom	 1970-80	 118.2a	 66.8	 103.11c 17.3c
Japan	 1970-80	 156.5	 76.7	 103.9c 11.7o
Source : IMF International Financial Statistics, 1981
Notes : * Figures are for the period 1970-77
a Includes deposits in foreign currency
c Figures are for 1973-1980 period
The comparison is restricted to selected countries at a
comparable level of economic development because comparison with
developed economies can mislead. For example, the ratio of term
deposits tend to be low in developing countries due to lack of
financial sophistication, and perhaps, lack of people in positions to
save. In the developed countries, however, the major determinant of
the proportion of term deposits is whether the banks are considered
the major savings medium. In the United Kingdom, for instance, they
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are not. The Building Societies dominate the short-term savings
market and the insurance companies the long-term market. In Japan and
Germany, for instance, the banks are the major savings medium and
consequently term deposits are boosted. (See Forrest, l974, p.612).
Thus as can be seen from Table 14.12, the ratio of term deposits to
money supply is higher in Japan than in the United Kingdom. If this
consideration is not taken into account, it would mean, for example,
that Kenya attained more financial sophistication and deepening than
the United Kingdom and operates at the same level of financial
development as Japan or that Japan's banking system is more developed
than that of the United Kingdom.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing, it has been shown that the Nigerian banking
system has experienced tremendous growth and development. It has in
the process contributed significantly to the development of the
economy through savings mobilization and capital formation. However,
a comparison of the Nigerian banking system's level of growth with
those of advanced industrial countries like the United Kingdom and
Japan reveals that the Nigerian banking system is still at the
rudimentary stage of development. However, when the comparison is
restricted to some selected countries at similar stage of economic
development, it is observed that the Nigerian banking system has
attained a high degree of financial intermediation.
For greater contribution of the banks to the development of the
rural sector, the rural banking scheme should be pursued with greater
vigor, the objectives clearly defined, and the activities of banks
constantly monitored.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
5—i	 INTRODUCTION
There is a growing acceptance of the assumption that financial
institutions and in particular commercial banks contribute
significantly to economic development. As Porter (1966, p.3 147) put
it, 'The visible correlations in the world (between financial and real
development) are indeed commanding. Whether one relates the
development of the nation's financial system (however measured) to its
per capita income across countries at a moment of time or across time
for a particular country, the relationship between real and monetary
variables is undeniable'.
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature and
various hypotheses put forward to explain the relationship between
financial and real development, and examine their relevance to
Nigeria's economic development. The chapter will put into proper
perspective our analysis in chapter four and the subsequent chapters
of this study.
The chapter is divided broadly into eight sections. The next two
sections review the literature put forward to explain the relationship
between financial development and real development. In section four,
the assumption that sustained increase in capital formation is
essential for real growth is discussed; while section five examines
alternative hypotheses on the role of commercial banks. The next two
sections examine the relevance of these hypothese and concepts to the
Nigerian banking system and economic development. The last section is
the conclusions.
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5-2	 FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DETELOPHENT
The assumption that the development of financial institutions
matters at all for real development has raised many varying opinions
among economists. Some economists are inclined to attribute an
important and implicit causal role to financial institutions,
primarily commercial banks, while others are doubtful about such
influence or deny it. Cameron and Patrick (1967) concluded that,
'most economists regard financial institutions as a passive factor'.
The differing opinion aside, the positive view of financial
institutions in real development is held by many economists.
The economists who attribute a positive effect to financial
institutions in the development process are led by Schumpeter (19149).
Schempeter in his analysis of capitalist economic development argued
that two factors are essential for development namely financial
institutions and the availability of entrepreneurs. He contended that
in the process of development a new class of entrepreneurs is
necessary and 'financing as a special act is fundamentally necessary
in practice and theory'. Other corroborators of Schumpeter's view
include Adelman and Morris (1967), Cameron et al (1972), Gerschenkron
(1962), Goldsmith (1969), MoKinnon (1973), Patrick (1966), and Shaw
(1973), thougi with differing emphasis on the relative magnitudes of
the impact attributed to financial institutions in development.
Adelman and Morris in their study which covered over 70
developing countries evaluated the relative impact of a number (39) of
soojo-economic and political variables on the capacity of these
nations to develop. They showed that financial development had been
associated fairly closely, compared to other economic and non-economic
factors, with differences in the level and rate of growth of real
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national product per head. Out of the 1 purely economic variables
explored, they found the level of financial institutions' development
to be the best indicator of a country's development potential.
In his inspiring study of 35 developed and developing countries
Goldsmith asserts that financial institutions' development matters for
real development. He contends, 'The financial superstructure in the
form of both primary and secondary securities accelerates economic
growth and improves economic performance to the extent that it
facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i.e. to the place
in the economic system where the funds will yield the highest social
return'. This conclusion is based on his calculations of the
financial interrelations ratio (FIR), that is the value of financial
instruments outstanding divided by the value of national wealth,
(physical assets plus the net foreign balance) for each of the 35
countries. The FIR indicates a direct though, not proportional
relationship between financial and real development. He found the
ratio to be in the range of one to one and a half in the developed
markets or mixed economies and two thirds to one for developing
economies. He also found that the FIR increases over the course of
industrialization up to a certain level and then remains fairly
stable, that the importance of financial institutions in the financing
process is similarly linked to the development of an economy and that
among financial institutions the share of commercial banks falls after
the early stages of industrialization. Thus he ãonsiders the
relationship between financial and real development as direct and
visible and contends, 'The evidence now available is more in favour of
the hypothesis that there exists only one major path of financial
development, a path marked by certain regularities in the course of
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financial interrelations ratio, in the share of financial institutions
in the total financial assets, and in the position of the banking
system, ... a path from which (countries) have deviated only to a
minor extent' (p.10).
Cameron et al observed that financial institutions have specific
roles to play in development. Their study postulated the functions of
the banking system as intermediation, furnishing part or all the means
of payment or money supply and the provision of entrepreneural talent
and guidance for the economy as a whole. Cameron summarised their
view thus:
The way in which banks perform these functions may well
determine the degree of success of the development effort.
As intermediaries, they may vigorously seek out and attract
reservoirs of idle fund which will be allocated to
entrepreneurs for investment in projects with high rate of
social return or they may listlessly exploit their quasi-
monopolistic position and fritter away investment
possibilities with unproductive loans. (p.5).
Contrary to the view held by Schumpeter and others, Gurley (1967)
held a negative view of the contribution of banks and other financial
institutions to development. Gurley unlike Goldsmith, who argued that
there exists only one major path of financial development associated
with economic development, argued that, depending on the nature of the
economy, one could envisage alternative path. He explicitly expressed
doubt and challenged the prominance attached to financial development
in economic development. His argument rests on the premise that there
are alternative techniques of mobilizing savings and channelling them
into investment such as centralization techniques, fiscal or tax
subsidy technique and transfer of savings. However, Gurley did not
question the central issue of the debate, the role of financial
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institutions in real development. He argued that the technique of
finance through the financial institutions flourishes where there is a
decentralization of savings and investment and heavy emphasis on
external rather than internal financing of investment. The more
negative attitude of Gurley derives from his focus on socialist
countries.
5-3	 DEMAND-FOLLOWING AND SUPPLY-LEADING FINANCE
Both "schools of' thought" on the relationship between financial
and real development - those who hold positive view and those who hold
negative view of' the contribution of financial institutions to
development - failed to resolve the central issue of' the controversy,
viz, whether the development of financial institutions precedes real
development and therefore plays an active role in economic development
or whether it passively adjusts to the growth of the real sector.
The controversy is part of the continuing debate concerning the
role of money in determining the pace of economic activity between two
schools of economic thought which in recent years have been
characterised by the labels "Monetarist" and Post-Keynesian"
economics. Since the intensification of the debate, there have been
two extreme views to it, ranging from "money does not matter" to
"money is the determinant factor". In recent times the debate has
centred on the extent to which money matters. Each of these schools
puts up a number of arguments to support its claim. The monetarist
school contends, for instance, that the rate of monetary expansion
exerts a strong influence on nominal magnitudes such as GDP and price
level. The school, however, recognises that money variation is not
the exclusive determinant of' these nominal and real magnitudes, that
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uoh factors as fiscal, productivity, technology and organisational
innovations, factor endowment and those which change the demand for
money, exert significant influence on economic activity. (See Keran
1969, 1970; Anderson and Jordan 1968). Though these forces operate to
influence the pace of economic activity simultaneously, the impact of
monetary forces and the speed with which the economy absorbs the
impact exceeds that of those other factors. Thus while fiscal and
these other factors exert little net influence on the aggregate
spending, output and price level, a change in the growth rate of money
supply, on the other hand, exerts a strong independent impact on total
spending and hence on economic activity.
The Post-Keynesian school, on the contrary, has persisted to
accord money a secondary role. One reason given by Anderson (1973)
for the Post-Keynesian school's continued denigration of the influence
of money in its analysis is 'because of the rather weak or long
delayed response of aggregate demand to changes in interest rates'.
Some Post-Keynesians maintain that money creation in any economy does
not necessarily reflect creation of wealth and therefore, money does
not exert much direct influence on aggregate demand, thus money was
confined to a "passive permissive role".
The continuing debate has given rise to empirical tests, but
inspite of the large amount of research, the issue is far from being
resolved particularly the issue of causal relationship between money
and economic development. Sims (1972), for instance, provided
evidence of unidirectional causal relationship running from the money
supply to nominal income with US data. Using a statistical test now
called Sims' test he came to the conclusion that the 'hypothesis that
causality is unidirectional from money to income agrees with the post-
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war US dat, whereas the hypothesis that causality is unidirectional
from income to money is rejected'. Using Canadian economy and data,
Barth and Bennett (197k) reached a different conclusion. They con-
cluded that 'although Sims' result for the United States supports the
monetarist view of the role of money in the economy, our finding for
Canada offers no such support' (p.310). Auerbach and Rutner (1975),
on the other hand, in another study on the US economy, using quarterly
detrended data for the period 1921-73, found that the direction of
causality is bidirectional indicating a feedback. They concluded that
for the 'period 1921-73, a weak but significant relationship between
money and income was found with the presence of feed back indicated'
(p.19). Komura (1982, p.26) in a recent study supports Auerbach and
Rutner's finding. Using Japan's data Komura found that for the period
1955-77 there is a bidirectional causal relationship between money and
income, 'the largest effect of M2 on GNP is felt in one year while the
largest effect of GNP on M2 is realised in two years'.
Patrick's (1966) analysis of the role of finance in developing
countries introduced a new dimension to the debate by delineating two
types of financial development which could be "demand-following" or
"supplyleading". He defined the former as 'the phenomenon in which
the creation of the modern financial institutions, their financial
assets and liabilities and related financial services is in response
to demand for these services by investors and savers in the real
economy' (p.17k). A supply-leading phenomenon is the 'creation of
financial institutions and the supply of their financial assets,
liabilities and related financial services in advance of demand for
them especially the demand for entrepreneurs in the modern growth-
inducing sector' (p.175).
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Demand-following is a case of demand creating its supply and as
such its contribution to economic development is minimal. As Patrick
puts it, 'The demand-following approach implies that finance is
essentially passive in the growth process'. Its contribution to
growth is through the support and sustenance of the leading sectors in
the process of growth. Such demand-following phenomenon is often
associated with the banking system of late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries Britain and those modelled after it.
Supply-leading is associated to positive growth-inducing of
developing economies through its allocative efficiency and i s
encouragement of enterprise. The supply-leading finance performs tio
main functions in inducing economic growth, namely, the transfer of
resources from traditional non-growth sectors to high-growth modern
sectors and the promotion of entrepreneurship.
New access to such supply leading funds may in itself have
substantial, favourable expectational and psychological effects
on entrepreneurs. It opens new horizons as to possible
alternatives, enabling the entrepreneur to "think big". This may
be the most significant effect of all, particularly in countries
where entrepreneurship is a major constraint on development.
(Patrick, 1966, p.176).
Supply-leading finance is usually associated with Germany and Japan
where enterprises receive both financial and non-financial assistance
from banks and where banks participate actively in seeing the
successful operations of enterprises.
Patrick realised that these phenomena are not rigid to a country
overtime and noted that there is likely to be interaction of supply-
leading and demand-following phenomena, with supply-leading dominating
at the early stages of development, becoming less important as the
process of growth progresses, and then demand-following becoming
dominant.
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Although the supply-leading and the demand-following argument did
not conclusively settle the debate, it shed more light on it. Patrick
did not deny the basic assumption of this analysis that financial
development matters for real development, whether it is of the demand-
following or the supply-leading finance.
5_14	 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE SAVING-INVESTMENT PROCESS
Mobilization of savings for investment is one of' the most
important pre-conditions for accelerated economic development.
Development institutions and planning authorities in developing
countries tend to focus excessively on investment without giving due
attention to savings formation and mobilization. In a well balanced
economy, however, the two phenomena are really two sides of' the same
coin. While investment generates savings, it is not possible to
sustain a sound investment effort without adequate savings
mobilization (Ragazzi, 1981).
We are therefore interested in the role of the banking system in
the savings-investment process and hence capital formation in the
development process. Bhatia and Khatkhate (1975, p.133) have outlined
this role of banks thus:
In essence three main issues exist regarding the influence
of financial intermediaries: first, their impact on growth
of savings, especially of the household sector; second,
their role in the financialization of' these savings (that is
savings in the financial form); and third, their ability to
ensure the most efficient transformation of' mobilized funds
into real capital.
Since in most developing countries, government savings - that is the
excess of' current revenue over current expenditure - rarely exceeds
2.3 per cent of' GDP and often is negative, and corporate savings too,
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is limited because of the smallness of the sector, it is the savings
of the non-corporate sector (household) that is of crucial
significance in these countries because it is the only surplus sector
in the sense that its savings exceed its investment (Bhatt and
Meerman, 1978). We shall therefore, in this section base our analysis
on the generally accepted assumption that sustained increase in
capital formation is essential for real growth.
5-n. 1	 Capital Formation and Growth
That physical capital formation exerts a strategic influence n
the path and pace of economic development is well founded in econo ic
thought. The vital role of capital accumulation in developing
countries has been accepted by many schools of economics. It is
however, observed that economic development is commonly discussed i!1
terms of wealth, labour force, output and income. These real or
"goods" aspects of development have been the centre of attention of
economic literatures to the comparative neglect of financial aspects.
Yet as Gurley and Shaw (1955) rightly contended, development is
associated with debt issue at some point in economic system and
corresponding accretions of financial assets elsewhere. Consequently
capital formation is one of the crucial variables in formulating any
development programmes. In other words, while it is clear that
planning must start on the "real" side in terms of the availability of
factors, successful plan implementation cannot be achieved without
adequate finance (Hicks, 1966).
Various theories of economic growth from the classical, Marxist,
Keynesian, Neoclassical to the present have emphasised albeit in
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varying degrees, the significant role of capital in economic
development. Mathias (1973, p.122) summed the classical view thus:
A long intellectual tradition emphasized that capital was
the critical factor of production and that shortage of
savings, and hence capital was a critical constraint upon
the growth of an economy. This certainly was the main
emphasis of' classical economists led by Adam Smith who
emphasized that expansion was limited by the powers of'
"accumulation", and that capital was created by parsimony
sparing resources from consumption.
In the works of Marx capital accumulation was at the centre of his
analysis. Although the accumulation of capital leads to the
destruction of the capitalist economy, the investment of capital leads
to positive growth. In the Keynesian theory, not only did capital
investment play a central role in the capacity of production,
expansion and labour productivity, but also was found to be the most
volatile component of the aggregate effective demand of the economy.
The Harrod-Domar theory of growth, which is an important
conceptual extension of the Keynesian model, relates a country's rate
of growth of income to its saving/income ratio and marginal
capital/output ratio. In other words, growth rates are almost
entirely determined by capital formation. In emphasizing the
important role of capital in developing countries, Lewis (1954, p.155)
contends that:
The central problem in the theory of economic development is
to understand the process by which a community, which was
previously saving and investing 14 or 5 per cent of its
national income or less, converts itself into an economy
where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 per cent
of national income or more. This is the central problem
because the central fact of economic development is rapid
capital accumulation.
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In analysing the stages of economic growth, Rostow (1960) adopted
Lewis' view and defined the "take-off" stage into selfsustaining
growth as requiring, among other things, a rise in the rate of
productive investment from say 5 per cent or less to over 10 per cent
of national income. In framing any development plan, it is currently
common practice to calculate the amount of additional capital required
to increase output by one unit per annum in each sector of the economy
and for the economy as a whole.
While it is argued that if any one scarce factor associated with
underdevelopment should be singled out, it would be capita]. (Sharma,
1978), it cannot, however, be seriously argued that availability of
capital alone would lead to accelerated development. Other things are
necessary. For instance, the investment absorption capacity of the
economy such as the aval,lability of entrepreneurial capacity,
technical and managerial skills, other natural resources and the
existence of a political, social and institutional framework which
exploits the impulses of expansion. But these other things are seldom
possible without some increase in capital formation.
5-5	 ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES ON THE ROLE OF CO*ERCIAL BANKS
The hypotheses put forward on the role of commercial banks in the
savings-investment process may be classified into (1) the financial
repression hypothesis and, (2) the structuralist hypothesis. These
will be discussed in turn.
5-5.1	 Financial Repression Hypothesis
The financial repression hypothesis is associated with the
studies of Cameron et al (1972), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973). The
153
hypothesis concludes that financial development contributes
significantly and most to economic growth if it is unfettered by the
pervasive interference of the authorities in the operations of the
financial institutions. The poor performance of banks and other
financial institutions is therefore attributed to interest rate
regulations, ceilings on deposit and loan rates and sectoral
guidelines on loan operations. Such ceilings, which are in nominal
terms, result in low and often fiegative real rates of return on
financial assets and, therefore in low amount of savings mobilized and
channelled into investment projects.
The proponents of this hypothesis advocate a positive real
interest rate policy for the effective mobilization of savings and
their efficient allocation to alternative investment projects.
According to them, free market forces and financial liberalization
would bring about an optimum financial structure and development. It
would eliminate the fragmentation of markets, that is financial
dualism, and all the attendant distortions of full operations of the
market mechanism.
5-5.2	 The Structuralist ypothesis
The structuralist hypothesis is associated with Gerschenkron
(1962) analysis of the role of' banking systems in the early
industrialisation of Western European countries and the Soviet Union.
The approach emphasizes imperfections in the banking systems and
deficiencies in the demand side of financial services at the initial
stage of development. Gerschenkron argued that as the relative
backwardness of an economy increases, the role of the banks in
industrial capital formation declines. Using questionable criteria
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the structuralist categorised European countries on the basis of the
degree of their backwardness with Britain coming first in the list as
the most developed, Russia the last as the most backward and Germany
coming mid-way in the classification. In the more developed economy
of Britain the role of the banks in financing development was minima].
because of the availability of alternative sources of finance. In a
moderately backwards economy the banks play a prominent role as a
prime source of capital and entrepreneurship to stimulate
industrialization. In the case of extreme backwardness, the structure
of the economy is such that not even the banks could supply the
necessary capita]. and entrepreneurship required for industrialization.
Gerschenkron cited Russia industrialization as depicting the extreme
backwardness and contends:
The scarcity of capital in Russia was such that no banking
systemcould conceivably succeed in attracting sufficient
funds to finance a large-scale industrialization; the
standards of honesty in business was so disastrously low,
the general distrust of the public so great, that no bank
could have hoped to attract even such small capital funds as
were available, and no bank would have successfully engaged
in long term credit policies in an economy where fraudulent
bankruptcy had been almost elevated to the rank of a general
business practice (p.22).
5-6	 RELEVANCE OF THESE HYPOTHESES TO NIGERIA'S BANKING SYSTEM AND
DEVELOPMENT
1	 Demand-Following
The Nigerian banking system very much depicts the features of
demand-following finance development as enunciated by Patrick. For
one thing, it is modelled on the British banking system which is often
cited as a case of a demand-following banking system. Furthermore,
the Nigerian banking system adheres to the form of banking that became
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prevalent after the industrialisation of the UK of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries which was "commercial" with the sole accent
on short-term credit to trade and industry, the underlying theory
being that credit should be self-liquidating. The implications of
this are that banks normally refrain from explicitly financing fixed
capital formation because it would lock up bank funds contrary to the
tenets of "sound" commercial banking as reflected in the unjustifiable
"golden rule of banking", and also because it would reduce borrowers'
interest in the prosperity of their enterprises. These reasons are,
however untenable.
An examination of the deposit structure of the Nigerian banking
system reveals that an important percentage of financial resources
usually considered short-term can be used for longer-term lending
without endangering the liquidity of the banking system. The
fundamental principle on which the whole banking business is based
makes it safe for banks to borrow short and lend l9ng in a prudent
manner. Such transformation of short-term funds into medium-term and
long-term financial assets is one of the useful functions of a
financial intermediary in the saving-investment process (Ojo, 1976).
It is necessary to cite in this connection the early adoption of the
"sedimentary theory of banking" in Germany which contrasted with the
"golden rule of banking" or "real bills doctrine". The sedimentary
theory is based on the assumption that a certain core of funds always
remains with banks over longer periods of time (Khatkhate and Riechel,
-1980).
Another evidence of demand-following financial development in
Nigeria is the fact that banking facilities are concentrated in the
urban centres where there are already well established and flourishing
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businesses that demand the services of the banks. It required extra
exhortation by the government and the CBN to "force" the banks to
expand into the rural areas. One of the ways in which the banks can
enhance their savings mobilization function and therefore contribute
more to real development of the economy is not only to extend their
services to the rural areas but also to take active part in investment
in the rural communities. In other words, their role in the rural
areas need not be restricted to that of purveying credit and deposit
mobilization; the banks can and should also provide entrepreneurial
and managerial guidance to agriculture and small-scale industries
(Bhatt and Meerman, 1978).
2	 The Financial Repression Hypothesis
To a great extent the basic tenets of the financial repression
hypothesis reflect the features of the Nigerian banking system. Since
according to the proponents of the financial repression hypothesis,
the repressions manifest their effects on the limited savings
generated because of interest rate ceilings on deposits, limited loan
resources because of loan rate ceilings, the hypothesis is ultimately
reducible to interest rate policies. It is, however, recognised that
other forms of financial repression might result from other factors
such as portfolio regulations and oligopolistic financial markets
(Galbis, 1982).
The interest, rate structure in Nigeria is institutionally
determined and administered. Interest rate structure is consequently
not a good indicator of the scarcity or availability of capital in the
economy. The 1969 Banking Decree (section 114) gave the CBN the power
to prescribe minimum and maximum interest rates chargeable by banks.
157
Thus in March 1970, the CBN directed all commercial banks to link
their interest rates with the minimum rediscount rate. The minimum
and maximum rates and advances on loans were to be 2.5 per cent and
7.5 per cent respectively above the rediscount rate, with 1.5 per cent
above the minimum rediscount rate as the minimum and maximum
respectively on interest-bearing deposits.
Generally these interest rates have been maintained at a very low
and static level for a number of reasons: first, to enable the
government to borrow from the public at a very cheap price. As stated
by the CBN; 'the Central Bank has also been concerned to see that the
Government should obtain the finance it requires on the most
economical basis. These considerations have necessarily conditioned
the rate at which Federal Government loan operations have been
undertaken and Treasury bills issues made' (CBN Annual Report, Dec
1960, p.19). A second reason that has been advanced to justify the
policy of low and stable interest rates regardless of economic
circumstances is the Keynesian postulate that a low interest rate
implies a high rate of investment. As Galbis (1982, p.119) rightly
observed, the justification is based on a misinterpretation of
Keynesian investment theory which is not necessarily applicable under
full employment with inflation. There are other less plausible
justifications for low and static interest rate policy. There is, for
instance, the argument that low and stable interest rates can help to
strengthen the stability of financial institutions because low
interest rates on their liabilities help to protect their earnings.
There is also the influence of the well known "usury law" which limits
the payment of interest rates on moral grounds.
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The implications of the financial repression of holding
institutional deposits and loan rates of interest below their
equilibrium level is illustrated in Fig 5.1. Following the classical
view of the determinants of the hypothesis, saving, s, is a function
of the real interest rate. Therefore ceteris paribus the higher are
the rewards, the more will be the volume of financial assets offered
in the market. i, represents the administratively fixed institutional
interest rate which holds the real rate, r, below its equilibrium
level. Actual investment is limited to 10, the amount of savi'g
forthcoming at the real rate ro. If the ceiling applies to savers
interest rate only e.g only to deposits, the investor/borrower w uld
face an interest rate r2, the rate which clears the market by equating
demand for funds (investment) with the limited supply (saving). With
loan rate ceilings, non-price rationing of loanable funds must occur.
This typically takes place on the basis of quality of collateral,
political pressures, "name", loan size and covert benefits to the
responsible loan officer (Fry, 1979a).
The implications include also the fact that the non-price
rationing criteria discriminate inefficiently between investment
opportunities. Indeed there will be preference for traditional, low
yielding investments because these appear safest, simplest and
cheapest to finance. Loan rate ceilings discourage risk taking by
banks; risk premia cannot be charged when ceilings are effectively
imposed. In addition, there is no direct feed back from investment to
saving. The volume of saving and investment is determined soley by
conditions of supply i.e. by the savings function. This is the case
so long as real rate of interest is held below ri. Lastly, a decline
161
in real deposit rate of interest reduces real money demand and real
credit supply. In turn the real credit squeeze lowers both the rate
of new fixed investment and also investment in working capital. The
rate of capacity utilization of the entire stock of capital falls
hence the growth rate declines (Fry 197gb).
Since financial repression hypothesis focuses attention on the
level of interest rates on savings instruments available to the public
in relation to the rate of inflation, a test of the hypothesis can be
undertaken by an examination of the behaviour of interest rates
relative to the rate of inflation over time. If the real rates of
interest, that is the nominal rates deflated by the appropriate price
index have been positive over time, then it could be said that there
has been no financial repression; rather that would imply financial
deepening.
Table 5.1 shows a spectrum of interest rates covering various
types of financial assets and loan instruments. These range from
official rediscount rate - the CBM minimum lending rate - to various
deposit rates, borrowing and lending rates for the period 1970-80. A
cursory look at the Table reveals the static nature of the interest
rate structure over time. For example from 1970-V4 interest rate on
savings deposits remained low and static at 3 per cent; it rose
marginally in 1975 to 1 per cent and remained stable until 1978. The
same is true of the various time deposits rates and the minimum
rediscount rate.
There would have been nothing worrying about the static and low
interest rates, if the rate of inflation had been stable over the
years. But it was not. Inflation has become a permanent feature of
162
3.5
11.0
14.0
4.0
11.0
13.8
16.1
2.6
5.7
12.5
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
1970
1971
1972
1973
1 9714
11.0
14.0
14.0
11.0
5.0
5.0
11.0
3.5
2.0
5.5
6.5
6.5
33.7
214.0
19.5
211.11
11.2
6.3
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
-9.1
-10.11
1.11
-1.6
-7.6
-22 • 2
-16.5
-14.6
-15.2
0.2
-9.5
-11.3
0.4
-2.6
-8.11
-22.2
-16.1
-13.0
-16.14
-5.6
-1.2
the Nigerian economy since 1970, and there is bound to be an adverse
effect of inflation on real return on savings with return falling with
high rate of inflation.
Table 5.2
	 Estiaated real rates of interest* on over 12 Months tiMe
deposits, and savings deposit 1970-80
(Percentages)
Year Change in Nominal
	
Nominal	 Real interest Real
end	 conser	 interest rate interest rate on over 	 interest
of	 price	 on over 12	 rate on	 12 months	 rate on
month index	 months time	 savings	 time	 saving
1975= 100	 deposits	 deposits deposits	 deposits
Source : Derived from Table 5.1
Notes : *	 The real rate of interest is defined as the nominal
rate of interest adjusted by the change in the
consumer price index. The real rate is equal to
[(1+i)/(i+p)] - 1, where i is the nominal interest
rate, and p is the change in prices during the year.
Table 5.2 shows the rates of inflation and the real rate of
return on time and savings deposits rates with the banking system. It
is shown that the real rate of return on over 12 months time deposits
was negative for the entire period 1970-80 except in 1972 and 1980
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when positive returns of only 1.L per cent and 0.2 per cent
respectively were recorded. Real rate of return on savings deposits
was positive only in 1972 and negative for the rest of the period.It
is thus clear that there is a great measure of financial repression in
the Nigerian economy and it has been shown that the level of financial
repression through negative real rates poses important macroeconomic
questions concerning an economy's ability to accumulate financial
assets in real terms, the volume of national savings and domestic
investment, the efficiency of investment and the allocation of
resources. It has been argued that one of the reasons for the
reluctance of savers to use banking institutions is that they offer
relatively lower returns (Ragazzi, 1981).
A more general framework for testing the hypothesis of financial
repression is offered by the concept of the real demand for financial
assets held by the public. In this framework, financial repression is
the decrease in the real volume of the financial sector liabilities to
the public in relation to its determinants such as the real GDP and
the real rates of interest. McKinnon (1973, p.59) postulated the
following model:
(m/p) d
 = f(Y, r, d_p*/p)	 (1.1)
where : (m/pY	 is the demand for financial assets by the
public in real terms
Y	 is the real GDP
r	 is the average rate of return to capital
d_p*/p	 is the expected real rate of interest
All the explanatory variables have a positive effect on the real
demand for financial assets under repression.
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In testing the hypothesis for the Nigerian banking system a
modified version of the model is adopted thus:
(m/pY = f(y , Pt/Pt...i)
	
(2.1)
where : Y
	 is the GDP at current market prices
is the rate of inflation; and it represents
the opportunity cost of holding money
relative to alternative real or financial
assets
Interest rate variable is not included as an explanatory variable
because as noted above the rates have been more or less static over
the period. The test is to determine whether the demand for money
over a period of time is inflation-elastic or not. The inflation
inelasticity of demand for money may be evidence of financial
repression. The two determinants Y and t't.-i are expected to have
positive and negative impact respectively on the demand for money.
Both the narrow definitions of money (Mi) (currency in the hands of
the non-bank and public plus demand deposits with commercial banks)
and the broad definition (M2), (Ml plus savings and time deposits),
have been used in the analysis. Annual data for the period 1960-80
were used in the test.
It is common practice in the literature to take the logarithm of
equation (2.1) and since this suits the present analysis because it
enables the interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities, the
logarithm form of equation (2.1) yields:
in Mid/p	 ma 11
 + a12lnY + al3lnpt/pt..1 + altu 	 (3.1)
in M2d/p = ma21 + a22lnY + a23lnpt/pt_1 + a1i U	(.i)
Where the ai becomes the various elasticities and u the error term.
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The test results are presented here.
In Mid/p = _2.314 149 + 0.5358lnY +i.006lflPt/Pt_i
(0.02147)* (0.0575)*
	
0.96 14	 DW	 2.1
In M2d/p = -2.14732 + 0.59141lnY + 1.i26lnpt/Pt_1
(0.0276)'	 (0.061414)'
	
R2 = 0.963
	
DW	 1.6
Below each coefficient is its standard error.
'	 Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
From the test results above it is seen that a considerable
proportion of the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory
variables. The Durbin-Watson statistics (DW) of 2.1 and 1.6 for
the estimates of equations (3.1) and (14.1) respectively indicate the
absence of first order positive and negative auto-collinearity in the
data used for the regression analysis. All the coefficients are
statistically significant at less than 0.01 probability.
Of particular interest to this analysis is the coefficients a13
and a23 , the inflation elasticity of demand for money. Theoretically
the coefficients have an unexpected signs, indicating that increases
in the rate of inflation lead to increases in the demand for money.
In fact the coefficient of a 13 indicates that an increase in inflation
leads to almost proportionate increase in demand for money.
Theoretically, this ignores the opportunity cost of holding money.
The explanation that may be offered for this is that perhaps, because
of the future expectation of further inflationary pressures people
held more money, especially when there are no alternative assets that
can serve as hedge against inflation.
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More importantly, the coefficients of' a,3 and a23 indicate
elasticities of' 1.01 and 1.13 respectively. This implies that the
narrow and broad definitions of money are inflation-elastic. This
tinding rejects the hypothesis of financial repression in the Nigerian
banking system. However as Kwarteng (1982, p.261) in a similar
analysis contends, 'the inflation elasticity of the demand for money
in Nigeria may be due not so much to the non-existence of financial
repression in that economy, in fact there is some evidence of
financial repression in Nigeria as per the low levels of the real
return on deposits, but rather to the higher increases in export
revenues from oil and thus in income during the 1970s'.
The assumption so far is that saving and investment are
respectively interest elastic. The question is whether a free and
positive interest rate policy advocated by the proponents of financi 1
repression hypothesis would lead to higher savings and investment
than hitherto. Admittedly, the policy whereby the banks pay a very
low interest rate of about 4 per cent on interest bearing deposits and
at the same time charge as high as 7-11 per cent on their loans and
advances is discouraging enough to savers. It is likely to have a
negative effect on the performance of the banking system's savings
mobilization and investhent role.
An examination of Table 5.1 shows that saving Is interest
inelastic. For example, from 1970-7k the interest rate remained
static at 3 per cent and for the period 1975-78 it was also static at
k per cent rising to 5 per cent in 1979 and 1980. Over the same
period the savings index continued to rise steadily with spectacular
increase of 81.9 per cent in 1975 of 197k level. An explanation
usually offered by bankers for this trend is that the small savers do
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not undertake saving with an objective of earning interest income from
such savings, but rather as a mere safe custody of their savings for
an unexpected contingencies. As if to give credence to this view
Hitiris and Wiseman (1981, p.16) contended that for the few
undeveloped countries in which it was possible to study the.
relationship between saving and interest rate, the net impact of the
real interest rate on aggregate savings was found to be insiificant
or even negative, suggesting that higher rates of interest are
associated, if anything, with lower real saving (see also Williamson,
1968). Furthermore studies by Tomori (1972), Ojo (197'a), Ajaji.
(197k), Teriba (197 14) support the view that saving is interest
inelastic in the Nigerian economy.
However, plausible these arguments and findings are, saving is
not as non-responsive to real interest return as has been generally
portrayed. The banking system could therefore attract more deposits
and thereby mobilise more savings that could have remained idle or
channelled into less productive ventures if it could offer more
attractive interest rates. It is believed that because of the non-
availability of simple intelligible and convenient financial
instruments yielding a positive real return, potential saving is
frustrated and largely used for consumption. Thus to raise the
savings rate and ensure rational allocation of resources, it is
essential to evolve financial instruments of positive real interest
rates that are consistent with savings performances and motives of
households.
On the investment side, how an increase in interest rate will
deter investment is dependent on the expected return on investment.
Take for instance, the period 1970-714 when the return being declared
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by industrial and commercial enterprises in Nigeria were of the order
of 100 per cent on capital invested, first class prime advances rates
remained static at 7 per cent (See Table 5.1). Other advance rose by
2 percentage points from 8 to 10 per cent. This type of increase is
hardly likely to be decisive in the investors' plans and decisions to
invest if the expected return will be reduced not so significantly or
may in fact,inspite of the resultant increase in costs go up even
more. It follows that what was important for Nigerian investors
seeking funds in the boom conditions of 1970-76 was not so much the
rate of interest but whether or not credit would be available (Okigbo,
1981). To corroborate this assertion, Ragazzi (1981) further observed
that the popularity of the informal sector, despite the usurious rates
of interest underlines the importance of availability rather than cost
in determining the demand for and supply of rural credit. This
explains why, as Table 5.1 shows, the index of loans continued to show
a rising trend despite the rise in the produce and other advances
rates in the period 1970-7 L . In 1978 when both rates were 11 per
cent, the index of loans rose by 9.76 times the 1970 level when the
rates were 7.75 per cent and 8 per cent for produce and other advances
respectively.
The above analysis raises an important question : whether the
assumed repressive measures are indeed repressive. This is because
the proponents of financial repression hypothesis failed to appreciate
the perculiar financial structure of developing countries such as
Nigeria. As Adewunmi (1981, p.33) rightly observed:
they all (proponents of the financial repression
hypothesis) based their studies in advanced countries and
went on to interpret the results without sufficient
qualifications for the developing countries with entirely
169
different environments. The environments differ not only in
variety and volume of financial instruments and institutions
but also in the interrelations of the different subsectors
and sophistication of activities and operations.
If it is realised that the Nigerian banking system was until recently
dominated by foreign banks which maintained strong oligopolistic bank
market structure, it will be fully appreciated that competitive market
structure does not exist in Nigeria. Consequently, interest rates
management may not be regarded as a substitute for the determination
of interest rates by competitive market forces, but as necessary
alternatives when conditions for the existence of a competitive market
are not present and cannot be readily established (Galbis, 1981,
p.5). In the absence of competitive market structure, therefore,
positive interest rate policy, 'could potentially destabilize
financial markets, increase the power of oligopolistic financial firms
to exploit market imperfections by increasing the interest spreads
between loan and deposit rates, and simply perpetuate the existence of
a financial environment with rather low deposit rates of interest.
Intervention by the authorities would, in this setting, be required to
aid the market in establishing an adequate level and structure of
interest rates' (Galbis, 1981, p.6).
Furthermore, financial institutions may conceive their functions
only narrowly or they may be greater risk avoiders than is socially
desirable. In addition, because of the market deficiencies or
imperfections of developing economies two problems may arise. First
the equilibrium volume of investment may fall short of the volume of
investment compatible with the full employment of the community's
resources. Second, the volume and direction of investment may be
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considered inadequate for the long-run growth-potential of the country
(Hitiris and Wiseman, 1981, p.10). These two problems usually call
for intervention by the government. Besides, credit flow within the
economy is so politically sensitive that no government in both the
developing and the developed countries would allow it to be
manipulated to its detriment. It is therefore necessary that the
government through the CBN should direct the flow of bank credit to
the economy to meet its development objectives. There would have been
no serious government intervention had the banking system adapted
right from the onset to the local conditions and been prepared to
promote local development.
3	 The Structuralist Hypothesis
Gerschenkron's hypothesis is to a very limited degree applicable
to the Nigerian banking system and economy. To the extent that
Gerschenkron emphasizes the supply side of financing industrial
capital, this hypothesis may apply to Nigeria's experience. The idea
that there is deficiency in effective demand for bank financing in
Nigeria because of the difficulty of locating productive viable
projects argument is untenable. The fact is that the banks may not be
performing their functions effectively. Financiers in Nigeria do not
have to sit in their offices and wait for a few depositors and
borrowers, as might be the practice in places where the financial
habits are relatively better developed; otherwise it might be
difficult to break the "vicious circle" of low income, low volume of
profitable business (or no viable projects), no adequate security, no
creditworthy customers (Ojo, 1976).
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As Cameron (1972) observed, the way the banks perform their
functions may well determine the degree of success of development
effort. If the banks listlessly exploit their quasi-monopolistic
positions in developing countries, and fritter away savings and
investment possibilities, these economies will remain industrially
backward and Gerschenkron's description of the situation in Russia of
his study will adequately apply to these economies.
According to the structuralist argument, the mobilization and
allocation of savings in the backward economies would have to be
accomplished through a substitute institution such as the State since
the role of the banks is limited. This assertion is questionable in
many developing countries. It is observed early that government
saving in the developing countries rarely exceed 2-3 per cent of GD?
and that corporate saving is very limited too. The only surplus units
are the households, and their savings could be mobilized either
through fiscal measures or through the banks. It is observed that
resources mobilization througi fiscal measures - taxation - in Nigeria
is less than 30 per cent of the GDP (Onaderu, 1978). If therefore the
role of banks in savings mobilization is discountenanced the only
important source open to developing countries for capital formation
will be foreign and however following the collapse of the worldwide
optimism generated during the "development decade" of the 1960s about
the possibilities of massive foreign aid from the rich to the poor
countries, it was inevitable that many of the latter would come to the
realisation that in their desperate quest for economic development
they would have to rely much more on their own efforts than they had
supposed (obi, 1979). Besides capital inflow from abroad serves more
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as a catalyst and as a factor in easing the foreign exchange
constraint than as a major factor in supporting rising levels of
investment. In this situation the banking system emerges as the most
important medium for mobilising domestic savings; and the government
has long realised this hence much emphasis is placed on the role of
banking system in mobilizing and allocating savings for the
develonent of the economy.
5-7	 MONEY AND CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA
To complete this analysis of the role of the finanial
institutions in real development we examine the eviden a
complementary relationship between money balances, capital
accumulation and economic development in Nigeria. Table 5.k which i
derived from Table 5.3 shows the correlation among real growth rate
of GDP, investment, bank assets, money supply and price level in th
period 1960-80. It provides evidence of' the positive relationship
between money, capital and economic development in Nigeria. The high
correlation of 0.76 between the real growth rate of investment and the
GDP supports the generally accepted hypothesis that more rapid
economic development requires not only an adequate labour force and
appropriate technologies but also sustained momentum in capital
formation. This is also supported by the significant correlation
coefficient of 0.65 between the real growth of money supply and the
real growth of product (GDP), and the significant degree of
statistical association found between the growth of investment and
increase in money supply with a coefficient of 0.148. Furthermore, the
positive and significant statistical correlation between the real
growth of banks' financial assets and the real growth of the GDP of
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9.7
-3.9
-0.14
10.2
13.8
16.1
2.6
5.7
12.5
33.7
0.57 and between the real growth of banks t financial assets and
investment of 0.59 confirm the close relationship between economic
development and financial assets.
Table 5.3
	
Real rate3 of Increase of GDP, investment, baxik
assets, money supply and consiner prIces 1961-80
(Percentages)
Bank	 Money	 Price level
Year assets GDP	 supply 1975100	 Investment
1961	 17.9	 -7.0	 -5.8	 6.6	 -6.7
1962	 -7.6	 0.6	 -1.5	 5.1	 13.0
1963	 16.14	 20.1	 9.14	 -2.6	 32.1
196k	 21.2	 6.0	 15.7	 0.7
	
27.2
1965	 14.9	 2.6	 0.0	 14.2	 16.8
1966	
-9.3	 -2.0
1967	 8.2	 -17.9
1968	 25.5	 1.5
1969	 23.3	 21.3
1970	 32.9	 28.3
1971	 _14.6	 8.7
1972	 10.1	 5.8
1973	 16.2	 10.5
197k	 141.14	 67.5
1975	 114.6	 -10.0
-1.2
-6.3
14.0
20.5
27.7
-13.3
6.7
17.1
33.1
32.9
-10.5
-16.8
-8.8
114.14
140.3
25.1
6.7
1.3
91.2
114.14
1976	 19.3	 0.5	 23.9	 214.0	 3.14
1977	 12.1	 -7.9	 16.5	 19.5	 8.8
1978	 -114.2	 -17.5	 -20.5	 214.14	 -11.9
1979	 10.9
	
_3.14	 3.8	 11.2	 9.6
1980	 15.0	 55.9	 1414.2	 6.3
	
22.1
Sources : 1 FOS Annual Abstract of Statistics - various years
2 IMF International Financial Statistics - various years
3 CBN i	 Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
ii Economic and Financial Review - various years
14 Federal Republic of Nigeria i Fourth National
Development Plan, 1981-85
ii Third National
Development Plan, 1975-80
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Thei is a negative correlation between the rise in price level
id inveraent, and between the rise in price level and the real
'owth c' the GDP of _O.0 1I and 0.1 1 respectively. This is perhaps, a
rnsequ	 of the fact that the set up in inflation in recent years
s tendii to reduce the return on savings captured in the form of
wings	 d time deposits and has impeded the accumulation and
iannellir of investhent funds.
It should be added that while it is difficult to demonstrate
equivocally that there is a direct statistical relationship between
nancial and monetary development on one hand, and economic
velopment on the other, there is a strong indication that economic
owth has been rapid to the extent that monetary and financial
sources have expanded in real terms in Nigeria.
ble 5.1	 Correlation among real rates of increase of GDP,
investment, bank assets, money supply and consumer
prices
GDP	 Investment
k Assets	 0.57	 0.59
ey Supply
	 0.65	 0.8
isumer Prices 1	 -0.1 14	 -0.04
restznent
	
0.76
rces : Same as in Table 5.3
•e 1 : Consumer price incex is the best known and widely used proxy
for measure of cost of living in Nigeria. The other indices
such as the wholesale price index, implicit price index are
not available in any systematic regular official publications.
175
5-8	 CONCLUSIONS
In the words of Schumpeter, the capacity of the commercial banks
and other financial institutions to create credit makes them
essentially a phenomenon of development. In analysing development
finance, it is convenient to recall that the need to develop domestic
financial market institutions and patterns of behaviour necessary to
generate and mobilise scarce capital funds as a key condition for
economic development originated in the classic works of late
Schumpeter in the 1930s and has since been unfolding in the studies of
a small but growing band of economists such as Gurley and Shaw (1973),
Gerschenkron (1962), Goldsmith (1969), Adelman and Morris (1968),
Cameron (1972), and McKinnon (1976). Of course there is no
arrangement of a financial system which can guarantee the attainment
of a country's development objectives. Still it is fairly certain
that financial markets can materially influence the climate and create
the condition necessary to reach these goals. To again quote Rostow
(1960):
Virtually without exception, the take-off periods have been
marked by the extension of banking institutions which
expanded the supply of working capital; and in most cases
also by an expansion in the range of long-term financing
done by a central, formally organised, capital market
(p.J48).
In essence, the penultimate conclusion is that finance is highly
relevant for development. But it is also evident that its more basic
causal links are not so much through the number and variety of
financial institutions and instruments as in the adoption of
appropriate policies, notably the adoption of positive interest rate
policy. This is the fundamental challenge facing the Nigerian
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financial system and the monetary authorities: whether after having
helped set up the requisite financial institutions, they have the
necessary insight and courage to adopt appropriate economic policies.
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CHAPTER SIX
MEASURES OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING SYSTEM
6-1	 INTRODUCTION
The present chapter attempts to analyse the realised economic
performance of the Nigerian banking system. The chapter is divided
into five sections. The second section analyses the output
performance of the Nigerian banking system as measured by surrogate
such as deposits, earning assets and number of cheques processed. The
profits and profitability analysis of the banking system as reflected
in the magnitude of profits earned, profits after tax to asset ratio,
and profit after tax to capital ratio are analysed in section three.
Section four examines the intermediation activity of the banking
system as measured by loans and advances to deposits ratio and loans
and advances to assets ratio. The last section presents the
conclusions.
6-2	 OUTPUT ANALYSIS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
6-2.1	 Prob1es of Measurement and Concept
A long debated issue in banking theory is the identification and
measurement of bank output. 'Despite the strategic role that banks
play in monetary theory and in real world, there is little agreement
on what it is that banks produce' (Gorman 1969, p.155). Various,
sometimes conflicting, output measures serve researchers especially in
estimating banks' production function. (See Benston 1965 and 1972,
Bell and Murphy 1968, Greenbaum 1965)
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Banking is characterised by certain features which set it apart
from other industries and which have important implications for the
measurement of bank output. Banking is a service industry. In micro-
economic theory of the firm, for instance, the same output variable
performs many diverse roles. Production of output absorbs factor
inputs and is functionally related to cost. Output is also that item
which is sold by the firm, thus making revenue and profits dependent
upon output. Finally, the volume of output measures the size of the
firm (Fry, Harper and Stansell, 1982).
The theory of the firm cannot be applied without modification to
the bank and other financial institutions, because there is no readily
quantifiable single physical output as there is in the non-service
industry, that can adequately perform these many roles. In a
financial institution, for instance, factor inputs are used in the
processing activities inherent in financial intermediation. Following
micro-theory, therefore, output legitimately can be defined as the
volume of processing. Revenue f or a financial institution, however,
is not obtained by directly selling this processing output. Revenue
is related to volumes and types of loans and investments which are
limited by the volume of deposits. Since no particular naira amount
of loans and investments need be associated with a particular volume
of processing, revenue cannot simply be written as a function of
processing output. The implication of these observations is that if
one defines output to be processing activities, then the impact of
changes in output on revenue, profits and the size of the financial
institution will differ from the impact of changes in output on the
firm of' micro-theory. Conversely, if one defines output to be the
volume of loans and investments one cannot simply assume that output
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s a y direct functional relationship to factor input usage. Clearly
thr approach can lead to semantic difficulties and
sincerpretations (Fry, Harper and Stansell, 1982).
Banking produces what is technically termed a "multiproduct"
(see Alhadeff 1967, Greenbaum 1967, Heggestad and Mingo 1967),
th ugh the case for analysing bank as a single product firm is
gu.d by Hodgman (1973). The output includes among other things
positing and safekeeping, making loans of various types, giving
vice, performing trust services and transferring and collecting
rids. Attempts to measure bank output, therefore, should ideally
ce cognisance of this range of services, their interdependence and
nplementarity, as well as contribution of each of these to aggregate
bput, however defined.
Aside from the difficulties of measurement and concept of output
rticular to commercial banks and other services, output measurement
these services shares most of the problems inherent to output
asurement generally. For instance, in conventional method of
antity measurement the unit selected is that which is observed: a
ble, a car, number of cheques handled and so on. Differences in
ality are either not taken into account at all or gauged on the
sis of differences in the resources required to produce alternative
alities at a given moment in time. This involves the recognition
at utility derived from a good is seldom unidirectional; most goods
present a cluster of characteristics that are sought by the
stomers. As Kravis (1969, p.51) argued:
The more successful we are in selecting units that represent
the characteristics really sought by buyers (and the less
enmeshed we become in the intertemporal matching of purely
physical specifications), the more successful we will be in
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catching the quality changes that are increases in output
from a welfare standpoint but which elude present measures.
Revell (1980, p.20) corroborated this view and added another
twist when he contended:
It is commonplace that the output of services cannot be
satisfactorily measured, and it is therefore impossible to
say whether the services for which payment is being made has
changed in quality. The discussion of this point usually
omits an equally important consideration: one of the
fundamental services of financial institutions is to remove
from the shoulders of their customers a large part of the
risk associated with financial transactions. Risk is even
less susceptible to objective measurements than quality of
service.
In reality banks operate in a world of uncertainty and they produce
additional services by pooling risks for their customers and
individuals with funds to invest. However, important as such concepts
as risk and uncertainty are, they are rather tenuous and what could
best be done is to take note of the risk as such especially in the
Nigerian experience where the banks do not cooperate enough to supply
even the necessary basic data and information.
Another observation is that a bank's output is received far more
directly than in most manufacturing industries by its customers or
clients so that the direct relationship between employee and customers
comes into play far more in the case of banks than in most other
industries. All these make it difficult to fix rigid standards or
norms of output for a number of services rendered by banks (Kinsella
1980, Report on Indian Banking Commission, 1972).
Furthermore, bank output being a service is intangible and is
often sold as a package (Treadway 1969, Mackara 1975, Speagle and
Kohn 1958). In estimating provision for certain services and their
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contributions to final output, the jointness of the services should,
if possible, be taken into account. Unfortunately it is empirically
impossible to isolate the various elements of the package and measure
each component directly for the purpose of determining aggregate
output. The high degree of joiritness in the output profile of
commercial banks makes the application of' cost accounting technique of
limited value, because the cost methods measure output as equivalent
units produced from cost introduced in the production process
(Horngren, 1972).
Complicating the situation further is the existence of an "input-
output" dilemma in commercial banking. An example to illustrate this
dilemma is money placed in a deposit account. The deposits receive
the banking services of protection and bookkeeping. These services
may be considered as the output of the banks. The banks can also use
the deposits for supporting loans and investments and, therefore,
services provided to attract and maintain deposit accounts may also be
regarded as bank inputs to produce income generating output of loans
and investments.
The other feature which characterises commercial banks and other
financial institutions and which affect, to a large extent, their
performance and output, however measured, is that commercial banks are
subject to regulations by the monetary authorities. The control takes
many forms in Nigeria such as the use of' various instruments of
monetary policy to influence the cost and volume of bank credit,
prescription of interest rates for deposits and advances. Thus the
volume of commercial banks' output is influenced to a significant
extent by the actions of the monetary authorities.
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Finally commercial banks, like most service industries, are
labour intensive 'and not profiting from the same continuous gains in
productivity as manufacturing industry' (Revell 1980, p.9k). Output
of goods and services grows througi one of' two ways: the use of more
inputs, or the way in which inputs are combined is changed, thereby
affecting efficiency. The most important input in the production
process is labour. Changes in other inputs and changes in the way
these inputs are combined influence the volume of output that a unit
of labour can produce. This is called labour productivity. Labour
productivity can, therefore, be a measure of' output in non-service
industry but labour productivity cannot be easily measured nor cost be
used as an adequate measure of output in service industries such as
commercial banks. This is because service industries suffer from
"Baumol's cost disease". As observed by Baumol the productivity of
labour in services does not grow as fast as that of labour in goods
production (See Baumol and Oates, 1972). This would present less
problem as long as labour in each of the lines of production is
rewarded in proportion to its productivity. The fact, however, is
that wages and salaries increase at much the same rate in all sectors
of the economy. Labour in services receive almost equal reward as
labour in goods production eventhough productivity in services has not
matched productivity in other sectors.
6-2.2	 Output Measures Used in Literature
'Attempts to measure and compare bank productivity are bedevilled
by the absence of any coherent yardstick of output, changing economic
conditions and valuatIons in bank's mix of' business' (Frazer 1982,
p .103). As a consequence, therefore, various approaches have been
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adopted by various researchers. Two factors have seemed to determine
the approaches adopted by various researchers in this field. First,
the particular approach depends on the object of the study. For
instance, Powers (1969) noted that while Benston's (1963) measures of
bank output namely the number of deposit accounts or loans and the
average account of loan balance for various services suited his study
of banking operations, such measures were not appropriate for his
(Powers's) study of branch versus unit bank efficiency; Powers thus
defined bank output as level of lending and non-lending services,
using loans and investments as the measure of the former and deposits
as the measure of the latter. The second determinant of the measure
of' bank output is the availability of data. As Kinsella (1980)
observed, the availability of data has forced some researchers to use
pragmatic definition of output.
Most of the relevant previous studies in this field were
undertaken in the United States. Public concern and regulation of
banking structure in the United States have probably made cost and
output and the issue of optimal banking structure more important
topics of discussion than in the United Kingdom. Most of' the studies
used balance sheet items as proxies for output. Aihadeff (195 11) and
Horvitz (1963) used loans and investments in their study. Schweiger
and McGee (1961) used total deposits while Gramely (1962) used total
assets. Gramely was interested in the real value of output and was
the first to relate bank output to social values of the services
provided. Greenbauin (19611 and 1967) also recognised the need for
defining bank output in social terms. Greenbaum's measures divide
output into two components: lending and non-lending. Lending output
was defined as the gross yield weighted sum of diverse earning assets
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in the bank's portfolio. He computed yield weight for each of his
sixteen classifications of earning assets which he then multiplied by
their year end amounts. To this he added the non-lending gross
operating income which gave him the "social value" of bank output for
each bank.
Gorman (1969) in his lucid paper emphasised the need for a
definition of bank output consistent to overall approach to national
accounts. He developed two approaches to measure bank output: the
liquidity and transaction approaches. Comparing the two approaches he
found that they yielded different results. The principal argument for
the liquidity approach is that it is directly related to the decision
to hold deposits; in other words, the liquidity approach determines
output on the basis of the volume of liquidity desired by the
depositors. The transaction approach is based on the volume of
transactions handled by the banks. The two approaches differ only as
velocity or turnover differs. When velocity rises the transactions
approach yields more increase in output than does the liquidity
approach. Gorman argued that monetary policy has considerable effect
on bank output and productivity when measured by liquidity approach,
but does not seem to have much effect when measured by transaction
approach.
Benston (1972) attempted alternative measures of bank output. In
his approach bank output is classified into six relatively homogenous
services; demand deposits, time deposits, mortgage deposits,
instalment loans other loans and investment services. Benston used
two types of measures of the quantity of output of each service: the
number of deposit accounts or loans and the average account of loan
balance. The procedure enabled Benston to provide estimates of
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individual bank's services from which estimates of marginal cost and
economies of scale from contraction or expansion of specific services
can be estimated by the authorities. The rationale of this approach
is that output is best defined in terms of what it is that banks do
which causes them to incur operating costs. Benstori's contention is
that operating costs are related to the number of documents handled
and customers served rather than to the pound of deposits, loans or
assets.
Sealey and Lindley (1977) attempted to untangle the confusion
about bank output. They regard bank output as comprising a set of
financial services accruing to depositors and borrowers. These
services are input absorbing and therefore comprise the technical
output of financial institutions. They, however assume that since
production and cost require measures of these services in physical
units, the monetary volume of various types of earning assets is the
physical units of output of the banking firm which is analagous to the
physical units of output of non-financial firm.
The problem of bank output measurement was approached in somewhat
different manner by Millineaux (1978). Rather than attempting to
define a financial institution's output in terms of processing
activities or any other balance sheet items, Millineaux used duality
relationship between production and profit functions to develop a set
of tests for both technical and economic efficiency in a study of
scale economies in commercial banking.
In a more recent study Goldschznidt (1981) used "moneyness" as a
measure of bank output. According to Goldschmidt, 'An integration of
the role of banks in monetary process with their behaviour as profit
maximising producers, lead us to suggest "moneyness" as the measure of
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bank output'. He defined moneyness as a flow of services derived from
bank deposits. The identification of the level of moneyness embodied
in bank deposits measures the output of banks, and this can be done,
he argued, by adopting one of two approaches: first using various
financial assets including bank deposits as independent variables in
equations that try to explain variation in GNP. The regression
coefficients serve as moneyness weights for the corresponding assets.
The second approach focuses on consumers' demand for characteristics
rahter than goods and therefore bank deposits are viewed as goods
employed by consumers to produce some common characteristics.
Goldschmidt started by concluding that his definition and measurement
of bank output provides a link between the "micro" view of bank as
producers and the "macro" view of banks as financial institutions that
were granted the power to create money. Goldschmidt's approach seems
a variant of Gorman's liquidity approach to measurement of bank
output.
Finally, in another very recent study, Fry, Harper and Stansell
(1982) assume that output consists of processing of financial
transactions. According to them this processing is primarily devoted
to maintaining loans and share accounts. They expressed one type of
processing, the dollar volume of loan processing as a function of
factor inputs and other "factor absorbing" processing activities and
obtained a relationship between loan volume and employment of factor
inputs.
6-2.3
	
Measurement of Output of Nigerian Banks
A survey of the past measures of output of banks and other
financial institutions and a search for measures to reflect the
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activities of commercial banks statistically have revealed that there
exists no single valid measure of bank output. Instead there are a
number of possible series each revealing a special facet of bank
business. The characteristics of these various measures make their
aggregation impossible. In consequence, therefore, the mea.surement of
the Nigerian banking system's output is approached through a series of
surrogates showing the different characteristics of the Nigerian
banking system's output. The growth pattern in these series during
the period 1960-80 is analysed.
The selection of the surrogates used here is dictated very much
by the availability of data and information and other constraints.
There are no data on many balance sheet items including net income,
costs (apportioned between wages and salaries and deposit interest),
nor is there information on the number of accounts. The bank data
problem in Nigeria is inherent in the force of traditional belief in
respect of secrecy in bank as well as the issue of "confidence"
alleged to be invested in presenting true bank return5 especially the
various items of bank costs, revenue and profits. Furthermore there
is no known study of bank market structure in Nigeria.
It is pertinent to point out right away that the choice of the
various surrogates used does not deny the multiproduct nature of the
Nigerian banks. Services provided by the Nigerian banks include the
acceptance of current, savings and time deposit accounts, transmission
of monies, provision of credit, safekeeping facilities, giving advice,
transferring and collecting funds and provision of loans of various
kinds. Ideally, we would like to derive production functions for the
main categories of' the services and indeed refine such measures by
attaching appropriate weights based on their contribution to final
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output. This is not possible because of lack of adequate data and
information.
Furthermore, an important development in recent years in the
provision of services by banks in Nigeria is the strong customer
relationship. It is very hard to obtain certain services from banks
other than one in which one maintains an account. For example, it is
very difficult for one to obtain travellers' cheques from banks other
than "one's bank". Commercial banks have encouraged this customer
relationship by selling comprehensive package of financial services.
Since banks provide liquidity, safety and monetary changes,
deposits as a measure of output reflect the degree to which these
functions are being performed. Goldschmidt (1981) contends that as
the macro view of banks is concerned with that financial asset
(deposits or loans) supplied by the banks which is more directly
related to the policy targets, the question of what items should be
included in the definition of bank output should be answered by
looking for those items that are closely related to longrun changes in
income, prices and so on. Campbell (1978) found that in the long-run,
neither securities, nor loans make a significant contribution to the
explanation of changes in the level of GNP when they are used as
independent variables alongside various definitions of money stock.
This evidence supports the view that deposits which are part of money
stock are relatively more important than bank assets in explaining
variations of some of the major policy targets. Accordingly a measure
of bank output that is designed to capture the role of banks in the
monetary process might be based on bank deposits rather than assets.
However, as far as micro view of banks (i.e. banks as producers)
is concerned, asset activity is not less important than deposit
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activity since banks incur real costs in supporting the level of both
activities. Nevertheless, the important question here is whether
asset servicing adds to bank output. As Goldschmidt argues, if each
and every asset mix corresponds to a specific deposit mix then the
asset activity supplies no service in addition to that supplied by
bank deposits; if, however, changes in the asset side of the balance
sheet are independent of changes in the structure of bank deposits,
then asset servicing contributes additional output.
The level of deposits also determines the intermediation ability
of the banking system. The high input utilization resulting from
deposit management constitutes yet another justification for using
deposits as output measure. Bell and Murphy (1976, p.3) found that
5.7 per cent of employment in a typical bank in the United States is
absorbed by services associated with deposits. This is particularly
more so in Nigeria because of the labour intensive, low technology
nature of banking operations in the country.
Deposits as a measure of output have important social welfare
implications because they determine the ability of the banks to
finance industrial and agricultural activities and thus affect the
rate of the economy's economic growth. To further support the use of
deposits as one of the proxies of bank output, Revell (1980, p.81 ) has
this to say:
Strictly speaking it is best to measure increases in
bank business by the growth in deposits and other funds
business for].ending, but the incompleteness of some of the
balance sheet information makes it more convenient to use
volume of business as a proxy. Since the capital ratios are
low, the difference is only marginal.
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As Table 6.1 indicates the volume of deposits held by the
Nigerian banking system registered a sixty-four-fold increase during
the period under review, increasing from 137 million naira in 1960 to
8,8i 2.7 million naira in 1980. It recorded an average annual growth
rate of 20.5 per cent. The growth rate was higher in the period 1970-
80 when the average annual growth rate recorded was 32.5 per cent than
in the period 1960-69 when the average annual increase was 13.6 per
cent (See Fig 6.1). This pattern of the growth in bank output can be
explained by two factors. The period 1970-80, witnessed a tremendous
increase in Government earnings as a result of the emergence of the
crude oil exports. The increase in Government wealth and expenditure
led to a general rise in the level of income in the economy; and since
there is a positive relationship between the rise in income and the
level of saving the level of deposits with the commercial banks, the
major avenue for institutional savings in the country, had to rise
during this period. Second, the period 1970-80 marked the
implementation of the Federal Government rural banking programme which
involved the banks in opening branches in the rural areas. As we
noted in Chapter Four, large volume of funds in the rural areas tend
to remain idle or dissipated owing to the inadequacy and inefficiency
of institutional channels, and that these funds are substantial and
what is lacking is the speed and efficiency by which these funds are
translated into savings available for productive investment. As a
consequence, with the expansion of banks in the rural areas and the
opening of 200 branches between 1977 and 1980 the level of bank
deposits increased. However, as Table 6.1 and Fig 6.1 depict, the
growth in deposits both at current and constant prices dropped to a
very low rate of 1.2 per cent and -18.6 per cent respectively in 1978.
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1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
19714
8.2
2.2
-15.14
37.5
10.0
37.1
-9.5
15.1
23.14
148.7
114.2
12.2
-18.7
36.8
21.3
56.1
5.0
18.1
30.5
148.7
660.8
675.5
571.2
785.3
8614.2
1,185.2
1,072.1
1,23)4.0
1,523.3
2, 2614. 6
265.0
297.2
2141.6
330.6
1401 .0
625.8
657.2
776.2
1,013.0
1,693.9
This was the impact of the decline in Government expenditure as a
result of the fall in revenue from the crude oil exports in 1978 and
the consequent fall in general income level in the economy.
Table 6.1	 Deposits of the Nigerian banking system at current and
oomstant prices 1960-80
(Million naira) 	 (Percentages)
Deposits	 at Deposits	 at	 Growth Rate of Growth Rate of
	
current	 1975 constant of deposits at deposits at
Year prices	 prices4	 current prices constant prices
1960	 137.0	 391.14	 -	 -
1961	 15)4.0	 1412.9
	
12.14	 5.5
1962	 173.8	 14)43.14	 12.9
	
7.14
1963
	
191.8	 502.1	 10.14	 13.2
196 14	 232.0	 610.5
	
21.0	 21.6
1975
	
2,839.1	 2,839.1	 67.2	 25.14
1976	 14,16)4.2	 3,358.2	 146.7	 18.3
1977
	
5,235.2	 3,532.5
	
25.7	 5.2
1978	 5,302.6	 2,877.2	 1.2	 -18.6
1979
	
6,967.8	 3,1400.6	 31.14	 18.2
1980	 8,8'42.7
	
14,058.1	 26.9	 19.3
Average Annual Growth Rate	 20.5	 12.5
Sources : CBN i Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years
ii Economic and Financial Review - various years
Mote * : Computed with Consumer Price Index (1975=100)
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It is noteworthy that the amount of deposits outstanding recorded
a 18.7 per cent decline in 1967. This may be attributed to the
economic, political and social disturbances which culminated in a
civil war in 1967. The high recorded growth rate of 36 per cent in
1968 which was one of the war years can be explained by the
Government's decision to change the form of currency in circulation in
order to make the existing currency unusable by the Biafran
Government, the secessionist part of the country which was the other
side to the conflict. This decision forced many people to deposit
their cash balances with the banks in 1968.
Deposits and growth in deposits are not an unambiguous measure of
bank output, because changes in the level of deposits may not always
reflect the same directional, changes in output. Inflation produces an
automatic increase in bank deposits, so that deposit outstanding may
increase because of inflation without any increase in the quantity of
services provided by the banking system. Left to itself the process
would result in a fairly steady increase of deposits in line with
inflation, at least in the short-run, but the efforts of the
Governments to control inflation by operating on the money supply lead
to rather more spasmodic growth of bank deposits (Revell 1980). 'It
is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between inflation induced
increase of deposits and real growth of deposits.
To correct the current price deposits series of Table 6.1 for
price effect, the index of consumer prices was used as price deflator.
Consumer price index, the implicit price index or the gross domestic
product deflator and the wholesale price index are usually used in
measuring price movements. Of the three, only two: the consumer price
index and the implicit price index are currently in use in Nigeria.
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Of the two in use, there is no systematic regular official publication
of the implicit price index. Thus the consumer price index is the
best known and widely accepted proxy for the measure of the economy's
cost of living.
As shown in Table 6.1 the price deflated deposits series
exhibited a ten-fold increase during the period 1960-80. It rose from
391.4 million naira in 1960 to 1 ,O58 million naira in 1980. The
average arinuaj. growth rate is 12.5 per cent.
The influence of other distorting factors on the deposits series
was examined to establish the validity of this series as one of the
measures of the banking system's output performance. Deposit-mix
changes, affecting deposit activities, influence bank output without
changing the level of total deposits outstanding. The time plus
savings deposits to total deposits ratio indicates the directional
effect of' deposit mix changes on output.
There are, however, differing views about the directional effect
of the proportion of' time plus savings deposits to total deposits.
Time and savings deposits use fewer bank services because of their
lower turnover. Consequently an increase in the proportion of time
and savings deposits to total deposits implies a lower level of real
output of the banking system (Bhatia, 1978). On this Pritchard
(1965, p. I 0) argues:
because in their time deposit function the commercial
banks are neither intermediaries nor creators of loan funds;
they are simply custodians of' stagnant money. The
commercial banks do not loan out time deposits nor the
"proceeds" of time deposits.
While this may apply very much in the developed countries where
there are alternative sources of long term finance, it may not be so
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in a developing country like Nigeria. The longer the term of bank
deposits, the longer the banks should be confident and willing to part
with the funds by way of loans. Since a large proportion of time and
savings deposits represents the resources that can, in crisis-free
business periods, be lent on a longer term basis, the bigger these
deposits are as a proportion of total deposits, the better placed are
the banks to make term loans. Thns as Adewunmi (1981) argues, given
the right development-conscious and risk-accepting attitude to lending
on behalf of these bankers it can be hypothesized that the bigger the
time and savings deposits available to them the more efficient lending
and therefore services they will provide.
Table 6.2 and Fig 6.2 show the absolute amount of time and
savings as well as their proportion to total deposits. The absolute
level of' time and savings deposits increased steadily during the
period 1960-80. It rose from 5'LS million naira in 1960 to 5,111.9
million naira in 1980, thus registering an average annual increase of
25.6 per cent. The ratio of savings plus time deposits to total
deposits also showed an increasing trend between 1960 when in recorded
0.t0 and 1968 when it stood at 0.56, but fluctuated in the period
1969-80, reaching a level of 0.58 in 1980. Fig 6.3 emphasises the
expansion in time and savings deposits as well as the volatile
behaviour of' these deposits over the period 1960-80. The conclusion
thus far, is that the output of the Nigerian banking system as
measured by deposits had been increasing in the period 1960-80.
An important criticism which may be levied against the use of
deposits represents the capacity rather than the output of the banking
system. The divergence between capacity and the output level is not
serious for service industries like the banks because inventory
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accumulation is not possible and excess demand exists in such
industry as the banking, therefore capacity measure can serve as the
proxy for bank output.
Table 6.2	 Time and savings deposits of the Nigerian banking
systei 1960-80
(Million	 (Ratio)	 (Percentage)
naira)	 Time and savings	 Growth rate of time
Time and	 savings	 deposits! total 	 and savings deposits
Year	 deposits	 deposits	 deposits
1960	 514.8	 0.140	 -
1961	 70.6	 0.146	 28.8
1962	 83.2	 0.148	 17.8
1963
	
914.2	 0.149	 13.2
196 14	 116.14	 0.50	 23.6
1975	 1,302.3	 0.116	 33.8
1976	 1,979.1	 0.148	 52.0
1977	 2,255.1	 0.143	 13.9
1978	 2,601.7	 0.149	 15.14
1979	 3,702.1	 0.53
	
112.3
1980	 5,111.9	 0.58	 38.0
Sources : CBN i Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years
ii Economic and Financial Review - various years
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An alternative approach taken to measure output is the use of
earning assets. This approach rests on the promise that output of
financial institutions, particularly commercial banks are viewed as
financial services provided to depositors and borrowers, and that
since output generates revenue, earning assets, by far the most
important source of bank revenue may serve as the yardstick of banking
output. Thus as Altman (1980) contends, despite the proliferation of
banking services, the basic commercial and industrial lending and
investment process remains the life blood of commercial banks. To
support the use of earning assets as a measure of bank output, Sealey
and Lindley (1977) states that the use of dollar volume of various
types of earning assets as a measure of financial firm's output is
analogous to the physical units of output of non-financial firms.
The fact that the output of a financial firm is viewed as a
service flow and the physical units of this flow are measured by
earning assets which are generally thought to be a stock variable may
at first seem inconsistent. The view that earning assets and certain
other balance sheet entries are a stock is an implication of portfolio
approach to bank behaviour. However, as Pesek (1970) stated the view
that bank balance sheet entries are stock does not accurately reflect
economic realities since, 'by its very nature bank money is constantly
sliding into the abyss of non-existence, either as it is returned to
the banks for conversion into currency or as rentals ("or loans") of
it expires' (p.360). The continuing existence of earning assets and
deposit entries on the banks' balance sheet requires continuing
activity on the part of the banker to prevent the "ever changing stock
or rather, flow" of these entries from being destroyed. To further
quote Pesek, if balance sheet entries are to be considered as a stock,
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they are 'not comparable to a stock of Rembrandt paintings but rather
to a river, constantly renewed in the mountains and constantly
disappearing down the valley, with the banker controlling the sluice'
(p.360). Therefore, commercial banks and other financial institutions
can maintain a stock of earning assets or deposits on their balance
sheet only be constantly incurring costs.
In objecting to the use of earning assets as a measure ofbank
output, Mackara (1975) contended that viewing earning assets as bank
output is analagous to viewing inventories as output for the
manufacturing firm. He argued that looking at the firm's stock of
inventories yields little information about the firm's production
activities without information such as the net change and turnover of
inventories over a specified period of time. MacKara is referring,
and correctlyso, to the problem associated with the use of earning
assets as a measure of bank output. Conceptually, however, there are
distinct differences between inventories which are held by the
manufacturing firm and earning assets held by the bank. First, as
noted above, most balance sheet items are "perishables" in the sense
that cost must be constantly incurred to maintain a given level of
earning assets. Second, and equally important, is the fact that
inventories yield no direct revenue to the manufacturing firm while
earning assets are the banking firm's primary source of revenue.
Therefore the behavioural process involved in making inventory
decision on the part of manufacturing firm is distinctly different
from the bank's decision making process concerning the production of
services of what the earning assets are the physical measure (Sealey
and Lindley, 1977).
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The earning assets of the Nigerian banking system consist of
Government securities such as Treasury bills, Treasury certificates,
Call money fund, stabilization securities, Bankers' unit fund,
Eligible development stocks and Certificate of deposits; and loans and
advances and bills discounted. Table 6.3 shows the earning assets of
the Nigerian banking system. Fig 6.k also shows the trend in the
growth of each component of the earning assets. Bills discounted
though increasing has not been significant. The total earning assets
exhibited an increasing trend rising over 79 times the 1960 level in
1980. It increased from 119.7 million naira in 1960 to 9,71.5
million naira in 1980. The average annual increase is 2k. i per cent
as compared with 20.5 per cent average annual increase registered by
the deposit series. The difference in the two series may be
attributed to the monetary policy measures of the Central Bank with
regard to liquidity ratio requirements. For example, the widening of
the choice of instruments between 1970 and 1980 (see Chapter Four) had
led to the relative decline of cash and Treasury bills as instruments
for satisfying the CBN rules of liquidity.
It is important to note the significant average annual growth of
36 per cent in the period 1972-77. The increase is connected with
two parallel movements: the promulgation of Nigerian Enterprises
Promotions Decree (NEPD) 1972 and 1976, compelling alien companies to
sell part of their equity holdings to Nigerians. Much of the
purchases were financed by the banking system thus raising the level
of banks' loans and advances. The second movement is seen through the
rise in the transactions on the Nigerian Stock Exchange - a
considerable number of public issues also connected with NEPD 1972.
Most of the issues were financed by bank loans, the securities
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issued being used as security by the borrower. The procedure was
encouraged by the Government which tried to apply moral suasion to
induce the banks to finance these transfers of shares and issues of
new issues (Okigbo, 1981). It is also necessary to note the sudden
and tremendous increase in investments in the periods 1968-70. This
is 'as a result of the Government's wartime needs for funds' (CBN
Annual Report, 1971). With improved Government revenues, the growth
in the Government money market instruments slowed down in 1971.
The earning assets series of bank output suffer from the same
shortcoming as deposits series, that is, changes in the mix of
earning assets may affect the physical output of the banking system
without changing the naira volume of assets owned by the banking
system. It is, therefore, necessary to correct for this shortcoming.
To ignore the distortion would imply that all forms of bank credit are
perfect substitutes to the bank and the community. For example, it
would imply that 100 naira of Government securities, Treasury bills,
for example, is equivalent to 100 naira of business loan which is the
same as 100 naira of consumer loan in terms of the amount of bank
services associated with their creation. Such an implication is
difficult to defend because bank assets differ widely in terms of
services required to generate them.
To correct for this distortion, weights were deduced to make our
measure of each earning asset of the banks reflect not only the
money value of assets outstanding but also the expected yield of the
assets. All earning assets have an average expected yield that must
be considered in the evaluation of the bank output. In this study, an
easily measured quantity that can serve as proxy for the average
expected yield of each type of earning asset is the rate of interest
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actually paid for each earning asset (Powers, 1969). Thus interest
rate is used as the weight, and the form of the measure is the
interest rate times the amount of individual earning assets
outstanding. The formula is of the form:
Qj	 rij Xii
I
where
Q is the total output of the ith bank;
nj is the interest rate charged by bank i for jth type of'
earning assets;
Xii is the amount of the jth type of earning assets outstanding
during a given year by the ith bank. 	 -
It might be reasoned that greater disaggregation of the earning
assets data with loans and advances divided into sub categories could
have refined the weighting process. For the Nigerian banking system,
loans and advances represent fairly homogenous category of short-
term business loans because consumer finance in the country is still
at its infancy and banks are not active in mortgage lending. Only a
small proportion of' the asset portfolio of' commercial banks consist of
real estate loans in Nigeria. For these reasons loans and advances
were treated as a single broad category. Investments could have also
been divided between Government securities and other investments such
as Bankers' unit fund and certificate of' deposits. But because
Treasury bills and Treasury certificates constituted over 90 per cent
of' all investment instruments, it was felt that classifying
investments into categories was not necessary. The earning assets
were, therefore, classified into three main categories: (i) Loans and
advances; (ii) Bills discounted; (iii) Investments. This is shown in
Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3
	
Earnings of the Nigerian banking system 1960-80
(Million naira)
Loans	 Total earn- Total earn-
Year and	 Bills	 Investment ings assets ings assets
advances discounted	 unweighted	 weighted
1960	 111.5	 2.5	 5.7	 119.7	 10.5
1961	 117.7
	
2.2	 8.7	 128.6	 11.6
1962	 147.9	 6.2	 10.0	 1614.1	 12.7
1963
	
1614.0	 114.9
	
14.7	 183.6	 114.14
19614	 2114.7
	
30.1	 114.0	 258.8	 21.0
1965	 228.0	 142.1
1966	 238.0	 60.1
1967	 238.6	 36.14
1968	 220.6	 5.1
1969	 238.2	 14.5
1970	 3145.5	 59
1971	 1492.0	 10.0
1972	 611.5	 8.0
1973	 742.k	 11.1
1974	 9214.1	 114.0
1975	 1,509.1	 28.2
1976	 2,099.1	 23.8
1977	 3,050.8	 23.8
1978
	
4,070.0	 39.7
1979	 14,596.1	 22.6
1980	 6,356.5
15.9
35.14
35.8
206.2
349.0
5314.0
3214.8
1418.6
1424.5
778.3
832.0
1,391.1
2,016.5
1,573.5
2,628.14
3,115.0
268.0
333.5
310.8
1431.9
591.7
885.14
826.8
1,038.1
1,178.0
1,716.14
2,369.3
3, 5114.0
5,091.1
5,683.2
7,2147.1
9,471.5
23.3
26.3
24.6
27.3
33.3
147.7
58.0
78.5
92.0
124.5
158.3
2014. 1
245.0
513.14
5'46.8
727.8
Sources : CBN i Economic and Financial Review - various years
ii Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years
The weighted earning assets series exhibited almost equal rate of
average annual growth with the unweighted series. The weighted
earning assets average annual growth rate was 214.2 per cent compared
with 214.4 per cent for unweighted earning assets series. The very low
level of' the weighted series can be accounted for by the low level of
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interest rate structure of the banking system as institutionally
determined and administered by the monetary authorities as a
deliberate policy to enable the Government to borrow at a low cost.
The Central Bank has also been concerned to see that
Government should obtain the finance it requires on the most
economical basis. These considerations have necessarily
conditioned the rate at which Federal Government loan
operations have been undertaken and Treasury bills issues
made (CBN Annual Report 1960, p.19).
For a closer examination of the low output measures so far
discussed we refer to figure 6.5. The figure clearly indicat es that
an upward trend existed in the Nigerian banking system's output
performance during the period 1960-80. For the series used, the
figure shows that 1972 was the turning point in the increased output
performance of the banking system. One may be tempted to explain the
tremendous increase in these measures between 1972 and 1980 as a
consequence of the indigenisation of the banking system which started
in 1972. As a consequence of this policy, the foreign banks which
hitherto were less interested in the economic development of Nigeria
were brought under the Government and Nigerians control and ownership
and thus were made to become actively involved in the development of
the country. Furthermore the expansion of bank branches to the rural
areas gave impetus to the upward trend in the output measures so far
used. If these reasons are correct and accepted, it follows then that
banking structure - physical and ownership - matters for bank
performance and hence economic development.
The next measure of bank output as an indication of Nigerian
banking system's performance employed in this study is the number of
cheques processed by the banks. As a volumetric measure of output, it
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is fairly insensitive to price level changes and it is superior to the
other measures in this respect (Bhatia, 1978). On this Hodgman
(1969, p.161) agrees with Gorman's (1969) observations that:
The vast bulk of observable activities in commercial banks
relate to the processing of cheques and other transactions:
banks would need a very small labour force indeed if nobody
ever spent their deposits. Therefore, on this view the
function of a bank is to help depositors spend money, and
the volume of commercial bank output is proportional to the
volume of transactions handled.
This measure, however, fails to capture all the monetary asp ots
of banking system's performance and is in large part indicative of
only the mechanical workload in the banking system (Speagle and Kobn,
1958). The Nigerian banking system is still highly labour intensive,
and cheque-related transactions absorb a significant amount of labour
and other inputs. The number of cheques can thus be one indicator of
the banking system's output performance.
Table 6.k shows that the number of cheques processed by the
Nigerian banking system had an average annual rate of increase of 1L5
per cent. It was thus consistent with the increasing trend exhibited
by the other two measures of bank output - deposits and earning
assets. However, the large scale transfer of funds within the system,
resulting from a significant increase in the average size of the
cheques processed may create banking services which remain
unrecognised in this output measure.
The clearing efficiency was also measured as the ratio of the
monthly average number of cheques cleared in a year to the monthly
average number of working days in a year for the period 1960-80. This
is the average clearing efficiency and is shown in Table 6.k. The
average clearing efficiency recorded an increasing trend. It rose
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from 2,1425 in 1961 to 19,688 in 1979. There was a drop in 1967 as a
result of the civil war when the banking activity was equally
disrupted. The increasing trend (the civil war period decline aside)
may be explained by increasing large transfers of funds within the
banking system as people's banking habit increased and partly by the
increasing number of clearing houses located in most of the state
capitals. The number of clearing houses, for instance, rose from one
located in Lagos in 1961 to eleven in 1980.
Table 6.4	 Nigerian banking systea: ni.iber and amount of cheques
processed 1960-80
(Million)	 (Million naira)
Number of cheques 	 Amount of cheques	 Average clearing
Year	 cleared	 cleared	 efficiency
1960	 -	 -	 -
1961	 0.5	 360.7
	 2,1425
1962	 0.8	 6014.2	 2,762
1963	 0.9	 681.0
196 14	 1.2	 899.9
	
14,635
1975	 14.7	 12,381.14	 18,582
1976	 5.0	 18,650.9
	 19,869
1977	 14.9	 26,551.8	 20,0314
1978	 5.6	 30,312.1	 22,235
1979	 14.9	 18,582.14	 19,688
Source : CBN Economic and Financial Review - various years
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6-3
	
PROFIT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The role of profits and profitability in banking is crucial for a
number of reasons. First, profits are the foundation upon which rest
two main pillars of banking strength - adequacy of capital and
competence of management (Crosse and Hampel, 1980). A good level of
published profits reassures depositors that the business is
competently managed, and 'it is recognised that retained profits will
need to make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of
appropriate capital base, particularly in an inflationary situation'
(Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Sept 1975, CLCB 1978).
Second, bank profits provide the first line of defence against
the risk inherent in banking and therefore reassures not only
depositors but also the stockholders of the safety of their investment
particularly in times of economic adversity. In the words of' Bhatia
(1978, p.5k) 'profits perform many useful functions in an economic
system. They allocate capital, compensate investors for risks
assumed, reward operating efficiency resulting from price-output
decisions and provide for future expansion'. As observed by the
Committee of London Clearing Bankers (1978 , p.17k) 'unless the banks
can earn an adequate return on the resources they employ their ability
to play their role in the economy fully and effectively will be
prejudiced'. Banks whose profitability is below par are less likely
to accept the risk of venturing into new markets, initiating new
programmes or convenience-orientated services f or their customers or
developing innovating credit packages for both businesses and
consumers. Contrary to the belief of some writers e.g. Adewunmi
(1981), there is a direct link between profits performance and service
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to the public. Profits are the tangible reward which the market-
orientated economies bestow on those businesses which identify and
answer the demand of the consuming public (Rose, 1981).
Since these functions are the essential element of economic
performance, profits and profitability ratios may be employed as
indices of banking system's economic performance. As Rose (1981,
p.152) puts it; 'still one performance goal must stand out, head and
shoulders above the others if a bank is to be viable in the long run.
This is the goal of satisfactory profits. American industrialist
Charles Abbott once observed that "businesses without profits is no
business any more than a pickle is candy". Stockholders, depositors
and management are interested in this aspect of banking system's
economic performance. Rose (1981, p.56) emphasised this when he
wrote; 'Increasingly management, regulatory authorities, the
stockholders and the investment community at large are looking at the
"bottom line" - profitability -as a measure of how well a bank is
performing'.
Adequate profit performance is also required to generate new
capital and maintain capital. Banks' capital is essential for their
prudential strength and its main purpose is to act as a potential
cushion against unforeseen and severe losses. As Gardener (1982,
p.k2) observed, 'Retained earnings are the main source of this
cushioning in the capital account. Not only do profits feed the
capital account in this way, but also losses to be absorbed in bank
capital can be written off only against accumulated (retained) profits
and earmarked reserves generated through accumulated profits in the
capital account'.
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In measuring bank profits and profitability, a number of methods
have been developed by different financial analysts. Probably the
most comprehensive and significant modern study relating to bank
profits and profitability was carried out by Revell (1980). The study
investigated trends in interest margin and cost of intermediation in
80 series of aggregated operating accounts of banks and savings banks
in 18 OECD countries. Considerable efforts were made to standardize
the accounts and other statistical data used, although caution was
expressed in comparing banks in different countries. Revell concluded
that the best single indicator of the cost of intermediation is the
gross earning margin (GEM) because it represents what the customers
have to pay for the services provided. The GEM is the total revenue
of the institution (apart from abnormal items) less what it has to pay
customers and holders of debt capital for the use of resources
employed in financial intermediation. It differs from interest margin
(IM) in that GEM includes all non interest charges levied for
ancillary services rendered by the bank. The main profitability
indices used in the study were GEM/VB; IM/VB and profit before Tax/TB
where VB is the volume of business i.e. balance sheet total. The
study showed that the general trend in GEM/VB was upwards through
time, although there were exceptions.
Revell's methodology cannot be usefully applied to the Nigerian
case because of the paucity of data and information on some of' the
necessary and useful balance sheet items.
Rose (1981) in a recent study used the two most widely known
profit indicators: Return on assets and Return on equity but strongly
emphasised the importance of another set of profit ratios similar to
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Revell's. These are: (i) Net interest margin (NIM) which he defined
as the ratio of total income from loans and investments less interest
costs to average total assets; (ii) Net operating rate of return (NOR)
which is also defined as the ratio of total operating revenue less
operating expenses to average total assets.
Still in another recent study on bank performance Fanning (1981)
noted that the two fundamental measures of bank performance are growth
in total asset size and the growth in the operating profits before
taxes, interest and extraordinary items.
Thus it is widely accepted that profits would be a satisfactory
measure of a firm's performance since it provides a good indication of
the efficiency with which the firm uses the resources available to it
(Papps 1982); and as Bhatia (1978) observed, although profits may be
sensitive to environmental factors and regulatory constraints, over
the long run, however, the trend in profitability reflects the
prudence with, which the resources are being managed in an industry.
The use of accounting profits data for economic analysis creates
conceptual problems. In the banking industry, however, the divergence
between accounting and economic profit is not substantial because of
the relative insignificance of depreciation in total expenses.
Profitability analysis from the accounting data is therefore valid for
banking industry. To an analyst, profitability ratio is more
important, as seen above, then the absolute level of profits as a
measure of performance because an entity may improve its absolute
profits by employing additional resources but without improving its
profitability.
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Because of paucity of data and information the profits and
profitability data used in this study are limited to the period 1970-
81. As Table 6.5 shows, the profit level recorded by the Nigerian
banking system increased 12.6 times the 1970 level in 1981,
registering an average annual growth rate of 25.9 per cent.
Profits are also affected by inflation and thus the level of'
profits may increase because of inflation without indicating
efficiency in the management of bank resources. Inflation has become
a permanent feature of the Nigerian economy since 1970. In 1970, for
instance, the average consumer price index was 52.8 (1975= 100). For
1981 it was 263.5. The increase in index over the 12 years was thus
399.1 per cent or an average annual rate of increase of 16.1 per cent.
To take account of the effect of inflation on bank profits
therefore, we deflated the current price profits by the consumer price
index. The growth of profits in real terms showed an upward trend
during the period 1970-75 with a registered average annual increase of
20 per cent. Thereafter, except in 1977 when the recorded increase
was 59 per cent, the growth rate started declining. Thus the growth
in profits particularly between 1976 and 1981 was as a result of
inflationary trend in the economy. Therefore, the notion that the
profits of the Nigerian banking system have been excessive may not be
true. Although the accounting profit data can be validly applied to
the banking industry because the divergence between accounting and
economic profit is small, the historical cost accounting conventions
used is generally recognised to overstate profits during inflation
(CLCB 1978, p.l67). Fig 6.6 brings out clearly the influence of
inflation on profits particularly in the period 1976-1981.
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Table 6 • 5
	
Profits and profitability measures of the Nigerian
banking system 1970-81
(Million naira)	 (Percentages)
Net profits Net profits	 Net profit Price '
Year (current	 (constant	 Net profit total	 index
prices)	 1970 prices)	 capital	 assets	 1970:100
1970	 14.6	 114.6	 25.5	 1.3	 100.0
1971	 18.9
	
16.3	 26.9	 1.5	 115.9
1972	 27.8	 23.4	 36.2	 1.9	 118.9
1973	 35.6	 28.3	 41.4	 2.0	 125.7
19714	 143.5	 31.0	 J43.5	 1.5	 141.4
1975	 67.0
	 35.14	 52.6
	
1.6	 189.0
1976	 79.5
	
33.9	 50.6
	
1.2	 23'4.14
1977	 151.0
	
53.9	 74.9
	 1.8	 280.1
1978	 161.6	 146.14	 60.5	 1.8	 2148.3
1979	 156.1	 140.3	 147.6	 1.14	 387.3
1980	 157.2	 38.2	 141.6	 1.1	 1411.8
1981	 184.1	 37.0	 56.2	 1.2	 1498.0
Sources : 1 CBN i Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years
ii Economic and Financial Review - various years
iii Monthly Report, December 1981 and March 1982
2 Annual Reports of the various commercial banks for
various years
Note * : The Consumer Price Index is a derived consumer index based
on 1975 weights
Much more relevant to the financial health of the banks, however,
is profit attributable to shareholders after providing for taxation
(CLCB 1978, p.169). Thus profitability as shown by return on capital
showed an increasing trend from 1970 to 1975; it fluctuated in the
period 1976-81. This underlines the observation of the Committee of
London Clearing Bankers that bank profits are inherently cyclical.
The ratio, however, averaged 46.5 per cent for the entire period and
showed an average annual increase of 7.9 per cent.
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The other measure of profitability is the return on assets which
indicates the earning capacity of the banking system. This ratio
averaged 1.5 per cent during the period 1970-8 1. The declining trend
in the ratio in the period 1978-81 may be attributed to rural
expansion in bank offices. We noted that under the rural banking
scheme a total of 19k banks were established in the rural areas of the
country between 1977 and 1980. This must have overstretched the
resources of the banks which were invested with future expectations of
increased earnings yet to materialise. Besides, such expansion
usually involves high input prices such as wage rate which in Nigerian
banks has tended to rise at a higher rate than the national average
wage rate.
6-3.1	 A Couiparative Analysis
Accurate comparison of profit and profitability of banks of
different countries is not possible because of the differing
accounting practices and because, in some countries banking profits
are not fully disclosed. This problem is accentutated when comparison
is between developed and developing banking systems of different
countries. However, any comparison should serve only as an indication
of relative performance of the banks, ceteris paribus. n this
understanding a comparative analysis of the Nigerian banking system's
profits and profitability was undertaken.
As shown in Table 6.6 the comparison indicates that the Nigerian
banking system has performed creditably well. The return on equity
seems excessive. This may be explained by the fact that the Nigerian
banking system is more or less the financial system of the economy.
This implies that the banking system does not face any serious
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competition from the other non-bank financial institutions most of
which are limited in their scope of operations and also are at their
rudimentary stages of development. In the developed banking systems
commercial banks have to face keen competitlon and therefore share the
markets with other financial institutions. In the United Kingdom, for
example, the clearing banks have to face keen competition from not
only the building societies (which hold more sterling deposits than
the clearing banks) but also from other deposit taking institutions.
Table 6.6	 A coiiparative analysis of the profitability perforance
of coiinercial banks of selected countries 1972-1976
(Return on equity)
(Percentages)
/
1972	 1973
	
19714	 1975	 1976
United Kingdom (big four)
France (big three)
Germany (big three)
Japan (big three) -
United States (big three)
Nigeria
	
15.3
	 13.8	 8.0
	
12.9	 13.2	 1.7
	
7.9	 6.9	 9.1
	
15.2	 14.5	 12.5
	
12.5	 13.14	 13.9
	
36.2	 241.14	 243.5
	
6.7
	 9.7
	
20.2	 15.9
	
9.5	 9.0
	
9.1	 8.0
	
13.14	 12.5
	
52.6	 50.6
Sources: 1 The London Clearing Banks; (1975) Evidence By The
Committee of London Clearing Banks to the Committee to
Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions
(Table 38)
2 Table 6.5
The return on assets as shown in Table 6.7 seems to be in line
with the performance series of the more developed banking systems.
The good performance indicated here is also explanable by the same
reason of being more or less the financial system of the country.
That the banks do not face any strong competition from the other
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financial institutions does not imply that the banking system is not
competitive. There is a good degree of competition between the
individual banks.
Table 6.7
	
A comparative analysis of the profitability performance
of coiinercia]. banks of selected countries 1972-1976
(Return on Assets)
(Percentages)
Year	 United States	 United Kingdom	 Nigeria
1972	 -	 1.3
	
1.9
1973	 0.76	 1.5	 2.0
197k	 0.72	 1.0	 1.5
1975	 0.69
	
0.8	 1.6
1976	 0.70	 1.2	 1.2
1977	 0.71	 -	 1.8
Sources : 1 The London Clearing Banks (1978) Evidence By The
Committee of London Clearing Bankers to the
Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial
Institutions (Table 36)
2 Federal Reserve Bulletin (September 1979) Insured
Commercial Bank Income in 1978, p.697
3	 Table 6.6
6—is	 INTERMEDIATION ACTIVITY OF THE BANKS
The stated welfare assumption is that commercial banks more than
other financial institutions can directly affect the level of economic
growth through the granting of loans. Given this view, it follows,
therefore, that the greater the percentage of a bank's total resources
placed in loans the better the bank's performance (Brucker 1970).
Thus an important function of the banking system is to provide
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financial intermediation, and this is reflected in the loans and
advances provided by the banks. The amount of loans and advances
outstanding and the loans and advances to deposits ratio can be used
to evaluate the intermediation activity of the Nigerian banking
system.
As shown in Table 6.8 loans and advances outstanding of the
Nigerian banking system registered fifty-six-fold increase in the
period 1960-80. It increased from a modest level of 11' million naira
in 1960 to 6,379.1 million naira in 1980, recording an average annual
increase of 2Z.2 per cent. The percentage of the loans and advances
of the total assets has not, however, been stable. From 7.8 per cent
in 1960, the proportion registered a high of 61.2 per cent in 1966 and
thereafter plunged to a low of 30.5 per cent in 1970 and further to 26
per cent in 1975. After recording an improved share of 33.3 per cent
in 1976 there was an upward trend reaching 55.2 per cent in 1980.
This trend is clearly shown in Fig 6.7.
The loans and advances to deposits ratio gives an impression of
the extent to which commercial banks used the resources available to
them, and thus, it is considered a positive index of performance of
the banking system. The credit needs of the business firms are best
served through intermediation by commercial banks. Of the alternative
sources of funds, the interest rates in the unorganised money market
are generally higher than the interest rates in the organised money
market. In the organised money market, the banking system is the
dominant set of institutions. The non-bank financial intermediaries
in the country are still at their early stages of development and
therefore lack the resource base for effective lending operations.
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0.605
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0. 1403
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0.393
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0. 3314
1.017
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1.138
0.683
0.616
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0. 71414
0. 5514
270.0
298.1
275.0
225.7
2142.7
351.3
502.0
619.5
753.14
938.1
Table 6.8	 Loan3 and advanoe3 of the Nigerian banking syst
1960-80
	
(Million	 (Ratio)	 (Ratio)
naira)
Loans and	 Loans and advances	 Loans and advances
Year	 advances	 /deposits	 /assets
1960	 1114.0	 0.832	 0.1478
1961	 120.0	 0.780	 0.1407
1962	 1514.1	 0.886	 0.5140
1963
	
178.9
	
0.933	 0.550
19614	 21414.8	 1.0614	 0.618
1975	 1,121.5	 0.5141	 0.260
1976	 2,122.9	 0.510	 0.333
1977	 3,0714.6	 0.587	 0.360
1978	 14,109.7	 0.775	 0.1451
1979	 14,618.7	 0.66)4	 0.1411
1980	 6,379.1	 0.696	 0.552
Sources : CBN i Economic and Financial Review - various years
ii Annual Report and Statement of Accounts,
December 1980
The Nigerian banking system did not perform creditably well with
respect to the use of resources available to it as represented by
loans and advances to deposits ratio in the period under review as
expected. (See Table 6.8) After recording an encouraging ratio of
83.3 per cent in 1960, reaching a peak achievement of 113.8 per cent
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in 1967, the ratio remained disappointingly low for the rest of the
period, recording the highest proportion of 78 per cent in 1972, and
the lowest ratio of 51 per cent in 1976. The mean annual loans and
advances to deposits ratio for the entire period 1960-80 is 73 per
cent. Fig 6.8 shows the fluctuating but decreasing trend in this
ratio since 1967.
This phenomenorr is clearly of particular importance, since the
transformation of deposits into loans is the essence of bank
intermediation, for which the purchase of securities - the increased
share of which in total assets has completely made up for the drastic
decline in loans (See Chapter Four) - ought to be of subsidiary
nature.
The reduction in loans and advances to deposits ratio is due in
various degrees to different factors. A first set of circumstances
operated between the period 1968 and 1970 when the ratio dropped from
1.3k in 1968 to 0.56 in 1970 (See Table 6.8) - a period during which,
on the one hand, loans and advances were kept in check especially by
the risk and the uncertainty of the economic and political situation
arising from the 1967-70 war, and on the other hand, securities were
made attractive especially by the stabilization of their prices by the
CBN. Besides, the banks were faced with the "obligation to invest in
securities" - a portfolio constraint - which operated during this
period as a consequence of Federal Government's need for funds with
which to prosecute the 1967-70 war.
The next set of circumstances occurred in the period between 19714
and 1976, a period when a different form of portfolio constraint was
seriously operative. The CBN circulars placed a limit on the margin
by which loans and advances to deposit ratio of one year should not
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exceed the credit of the previous year. In addition, there was the
slow down in the loans and advances given by banks to the public in
1976 for the implementation of the indigenisation programme because of
their experiences in financing the first phase of the programme in
1972. Thus despite the payment of Udogi salary increases and the rise
in petroleum receipts which led to an inordinate swelling of demand
and other deposits, the banks were reluctant to finance new purchases
of new issued shares in 1976 as they had done in 1972 because of the
delays experienced in sending returned funds (since most of the issues
were oversubscribed), and in sending certificates of shares issued and
sometimes misdirection of shares.
An important proportion of the decline in loans and advances to
deposits ratio could be accounted for by the fact that the banks have
not been aggressive in seeking out loan opportunities; they have
generally waited for the investors to come to them with investment
proposals which have to be carefully examined.
6-5	 CONCLUSIONS
The intangible nature of the products of service industries like
banking creates serious output problems and makes it difficult to
evaluate the output performance of these industries.
The long-run output performance of the Nigerian banking system
exhibited an upwards trend in the period under review. The output
measures of deposits at current and constant prices, deposit-mix of
time plus savings deposits to total deposits ratios, earning assets
weighted and unweighted series indicated an average annual increase in
output performance of the banking system in the range of 12.5 per cent
to 25.6 per cent.
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The profit and profitability performance measures showed a mean
annual increase in the range of 7.9 per cent to 25.9 per cent, while
loans and advances measure indicated a long-run increase in the
banking system's intermediation activity performance of 2.2 per cent.
The loans and advances to deposits ratios and loans and advances to
assets ratios, however, suggested a deterioration in the observed
intermediation performance of the Nigerian banking system during the
period. On the whole the Nigerian banking system has performed well
to a greater extent than is generally recognised.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ALLOCATIONAL EFFICIENCI OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING S!ST4
7-1	 INTRODUCTION
The extent to which financial resources of the banking system are
directed into important and appropriate uses from the standpoint of
the overall economy is termed here allocational efficiency. The
impact of the banking system on the direction and level of economic
growth depends crucially on its allocation of financial resources
mobilized. Commercial banks are usually assigned a crucial role in
the transmission process, because as financial intermediaries, they
allocate scarce resources to the most productive uses. Inspite of
this, however, there are some conditions (as we saw in Chapter Five)
both in the developing and the developed countries, but more so in the
former group of countries, under which major intervention in the
operations of commercial banks becomes necessary.
Among the possible reasons a banking system's allocation of
financial resources may be inefficient is that the market criteria
alone do not determine bank portfolio composition. In ordering loan
application, for instance, subjective judgernents may be substituted
for an objective evaluation of risks and returns. For example one of
the reasons why governments in most developing countries intervene in
the operations of commercial banks is that these banks are biased
agaihst one sector of the economy or one segment of the population.
This discriminatory attitude is more prevalent in economies like
Nigeria where foreign banks dominated the banking system. On this
Otiti (1980, p.26) observed:
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Before indigenisation, the banking industry was dominated by
a few foreign banks ... As profit maximisers, they
featured prominently in the provision of facilities in
foreign trade or concentrated in sectors where profits were
high while neglecting vital sectors which, although
unprofitable in the short run, has prospect for future
growth. Specifically, these banks neglected the development
of indigenous entrepreneurship, agriculture and industry and
in effect virtually neglected the development of the
economy, concerning themselves more with the import trade,
thus promoting the sale of foreign goods in the country.
A related serious limitation of the market allocation of
financial resources by the banking system is, as noted by Adbi (1977),
the possible divergence between private and social costs and benefits.
The banks pursue benefit maximisation which may not coincide with
social benefits. Such lack of coincidence could result from market
imperfections but it could be attributed to other factors as well; the
financial institutions, for instance, may be greater risk avoiders
than is socially desirable. In other words, there is a conflict
between market equilibrium, which presumably expresses the wishes of
the market participants, and the long-run objectives of the government
which are based on considerations of the socially optimum growth rate.
In the present chapter, therefore, we are not concerned with thec(
conventional market efficiency criteria of evaluating the allocational
efficiency of the Nigerian banking system's resources. The banks
allocational efficiency is here assessed by the extent to which the
Nigerian banking system has been able to finance the credit needs of
the priority sectors of the economy.
In the context of the overall strategy of Nigeria's economic
development, the overriding objective is, as usual, to develop the
economy as fast as possible and usher the country into a "self
sustaining growth" and "economic take-off". To this effect the
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highest order of national priorities is accorded to aricultureJ
industry, transportation and manpower development (Second National]
Development Plan, 197O-7, p.35).
The chapter is divided into six sections. The next section
highlights the position of agriculture and industry in the development
of the economy. The third section examines the performance of the
banking system in allocating its loans and advances to the two sectors
relative to other sectors of the economy. The fourth section examines
the loan maturity and loan security patterns of the banking system.
The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme is briefly discussed in
section five while section six is the conclusions.
7-2	 AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY IN THE ECONOMY
7-2.1	 AgrIculture
Agriculture has continued to retain its dominant place in the
economy, particularly when it is realised that it is from agricultural
exports that the economy has received its principal stimulus to
economic growth. Agriculture therefore, is the mainstay of the
economy and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. Some 70
per cent of the nation's labour force depends on the agricultural
sector for a living and it provides a significant proportion of the
food supply to the rapidly growing population. As the Third National
Development Plan rightly outlines, agriculture will continue to
furnish the bulk of the nation's employment opportunities and provides
most of the country's raw material requirements for local industries
and for exports which will continue to be an important foreign
exchange earner.
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In 1961, agricultural export earnings stood at 268 million naira
or 89 per cent of all exports and accounted for 66 per cent of total
foreign exchange earnings. In 1967 and 1968, the contributions of
primary export products to foreign exchange earnings were 62 per cent
and 73 per cent respectively. To this may be added the savings to
national foreign exchange resources arising from local supplies of raw
agricultural materials which would otherwise have been imported for
the use of the nascent processing industries. In 1960 the share of
agriculture in the GDP was 63 per cent and in 1966 it was 55 per cent.
(See Table 2.2)
However, the proportionate contribution of agriculture both to
foreign exchange earnings and the GDP declined significantly with the
emergence of crude oil exports. For instance, by 1970, the for ign
exchange earnings of the sector declined to 25 per cent and by 1980
it accounted for only 2.0 per cent of the total. (See Table 2.3) In
terms of the GD?, the sector's contribution declined from 63 per cent
in 1960 to 17 per cent in 1981.
Agriculture has all along been accorded an imPortan\
consideration which it deserves in the various national plan
documents. The problem has been with the implementation of the
planned objectives. During the First National Development Plan, 1962-
68, agriculture received some l84 million naira or 13.5 per cent of
total capital expenditure programme of 1,354 million naira. During
the plan period, approximately 3 per cent of the estimated public
sector expenditure on agricultural production was unspent. This
affected the development and growth of the sector adversely because
the underutilization of the capital "provision" left most of the
farmers' problems unsolved.
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Under the Second National Development Plan, 197O_7 1 , out of the
total revised plan allocation of 30 14,972 million naira, 135,266
million naira was disbursed between 1970 and 1978. Of the revised
plan allocation of 7914,1485 million naira for federal agricultural
programmes 37,787 million naira was spent in 1973. More attention was
given to agriculture in the Third National Development Plan, 1975-80.
The planners realised the need to mobilise more domestic resources for
the development of the sector. The Plan states, 'However viewed
against its expected role in the socio-economic development of the
country, the performance of the sector in recent years clearly under-
lines the need for much greater mobilization of resources at all
relevant levels of the economy than has hitherto been done' (p63).
The estimated total national capital expenditure for the agricultural
sector programme was 2.20 billion naira. The Fourth National Develop-
ment Plan focuses very much on agriculture and manufacturing areas in
order to reduce 'the damaging dependence on oil' (Shagari, 1981).
The realisation of the important role of agriculture in the
development of the Nigerian economy has spurred the Federal Government
into taking various strategies to. boost agricultural production. One
of the strategies was the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN). The
primary objective of the programme is to arouse the consciousness of
Nigerians to the need to be self-sufficient in food production. The
scheme also involved Government subsidisation of agricultural inputs
such as fertilizers, insecticides and improved seedlings.
Another important scheme to boost agricultural production is the
Integrated Rural Development (IRD). This scheme is financed jointly
by the various state Governments and the Federal Governments. The
Programme, which aims at providing improved services to farmers in the
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form of an integrated package, will ensure the evolution of
appropriate infrastructural, institutional and administrative
apparatus to facilitate the rapid development of the country's
agricultural potential. In areas where the programme is not yet ready
to take off on state-wide basis, a simplified small holding programme
known as the Agricultural Development Area (ADA) will be implemented.
The ADA involves essentially the provision of improved extension
services, input distribution and rural feeder roads.
The other scheme is the River Basin Development Authority (REDA).
The concept of River basin development as a tool of agricultural
transformation was introduced in 1970. In 1973, two RBDA were
established. Subsequently, in 1976, nine others were set up. The
Authorities were charged with a range of responsibilities, including
the harnessing, management and exploitation of the country's water
resources for agricultural and other activities. An allocation of 92
million naira was made to the eleven RBDA programmes and projects in
the current plan period which included construction of dams and
boreholes for the provision of water for agriculture and other uses,
construction of feeder roads and jetties, development of irrigation
and drainage infrastructures and training of various cadres of
technical and managerial manpower.
In April 1980, the Federal Government launched yet another
scheme - the Green Revolution Programme (GRP), designed primarily to
modernise the agricultural sector and achieve self-sufficiency in food
production by 1985. Under the scheme the Federal Government intends
to allocate funds for the resuscitation of areas of food crops,
livestock and fish production. The GRP included the increased supply
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of fertilizers and other material inputs and the expansion of credit
facilities under the guarantee scheme to the farmers.
7-2.2	 Industry
Industrial sector in Nigeria is, by and large, at the early
stages of import substitution particularly in the area of light
consumer goods both durables and non durables and processing
activities to semi-finished state. Whilst this is a logical starting
point for initial industrialization, as an attempt to minimize
dependence on imported consumer goods and enhance self-reliance, it
cannot create the necessary industrial infrastructural base that will
guarantee self-sustaining growth (Zayyad, 1981).
Although the contribution of this sector to the GD? has risen
from 5 per cent in 1960 to 8.1 per cent in 1969 (See Chapter Two), its
percentage share as at present is still low. It was 8.7 per cent in
1981. The Government regards industrialization as a means of
diversifying the economy in order to ensure balanced growth and
enhance balance of payments position of the country.
The Federal Government's industrial policies have recently been
put together in a policy document: 'Nigeria's Industrial Policy and
Strategy Guidelines to Investors'. The document sums up Government's
policies thus:
The direction of Government action in the industrial sector
shall be to encourage and promote directly and indirectly
rapid development of manufacturing and allied activities as
a major factor in the overall economic prosperity of the
nation and as a positive input in the attainment of
vital social goals.
The principal objectives of industrialization in Nigeria included the
foil owing:
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- development of indigenous capacity to harness local
resources for the production within the country of
industrial goods and services necessary to meet the basic
needs of the people;
- maximization of local value-added, with special emphasis
on the utilization of local raw materials in the pursuit of
the goals of national self-reliance as well as optimum
development of agro-based industries;
- rationalised intersectoral and intra-sectoral linkages as
well as processing, especially in the iron and steel and
petrochemical subsectors;
- greater emphasis on local research and development both by
the Goverrment and by industrial establishment themselves;
- employment generation;
- vigorous export promotion;
-dispersal of industries to ensure more even development and
such that economic viability of industries will not be
jeopardised (Ciroma, 1981).
The strategy for achieving the above objectives includes
intensive efforts by Government to improve the availability of
industrial infrastructures in all parts of the country, as well as
judicious application of incentives and disincentives to make
investment in the manufacturing attractive while at the same time
encouraging greater investment in the priority subsectors; the siting
of industries in relatively backward areas, and .rapid increase in
local value-added, particularly the use of' local resources and the
development of industrial technology. Towards this end, a more
effective use is made and will continue to be made of such incentives
as the Pioneer Status which ensures 3-5 years tax holiday for pioneer
industries; Approved User Scheme which involves import duty free on
certain raw materials or at a concessionary duty rates; Accelerated
Depreciation of Capital Investment. There are other incentives such
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as Custom (Drawback) Regulation which entails the reimbursement for
duty paid on imported raw materials if the product is exported and
Graduated Excise Tax Reduction of local value-added tax concession.
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972 and 1976 is an
important scheme devised not only to encourage indigenous
entrepreneurs to invest and take advantage of Government incentives in
the industrial sector but also had the objective of encouraging
foreign investors with high technological know how into more
sophisticated industrial activities. The effectiveness of this
programme depends, however, on the way it is implemented. A constant
revision of the programme will hinder foreign participation in
industrial investment in the economy because it will create doubts and
uncertainty.
In addition to providing various incentives and industrial
infrastructures, the Federal Government in recognition of the
limitation of the private sector in Nigeria has directly participated
in investing in high technology industries such as Iron and Steel,
Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), Nitrogenous fertilizers, Petrochemicals
and Pulp and Papers.
7-3	 BANKING SYSTEM' S ALLOCATION OF LOANS AND ADVANCES
Having outlined the important role attached to these two sectors
in the economy, the allocation of banking system's loans and advances
in conformance with development plans and strategies regarding the two
sectors and relative to the other sector will be considered indicative
of the banks' allocative efficiency.
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1973	 2.9
197k	 2.9
1975	 2.6
1976	 3.8
1977	 k.5
1978	 5.6
1979	 7.1
1980	 7.3
	
8.8	 27.14
	
7.3	 27.7
	
7.14	 33.1
	
7.14	 35.3
	
7.9	 35.7
	
10.2	 38.1
	
10.14	 142.1
	
114.8	 147.1
	
19.14	 52.6
	
21.5	 514.14
	
21. 14	 55.6
	
22.7	 60.2
	
22.8	 61.7
Table 7 • 1	 Analysis of the Nigerian banld.ng system's loans and
advances 1960-80
(Percentages)
PR0DJCTI0N
	
Agriculture, Manu-	 Mining	 Real Estate Total
Forestry and facturing 	 and	 and	 Production
Year Fishing	 Quarrying Construction
1960	 19.8	 4.3	 1.0	 6.3
	
31.k
1961	 21.0	 5.5	 0.8	 9.2	 36.5
1962	 23.k	 7.6	 0.7	 6.7	 38.k
1963	 22.0	 10.6	 0.6	 7.2	 140.0
196k	 2k.7
	
10.7	 0.5	 k.7	 kO.6
1965	 25.3
	
10.7	 0.5	 k.8	 kl.3
1966	 1.6	 13.1	 0.5	 8.6	 23.8
1967	 1.3
	
lk.k	 0.7	 8.1	 21L5
Sources : CBN i Economic and Financial Review - various years
ii Annual Report and Statement of Accounts,
December 1980
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Table 7.1	 Analysis of the Nigerian banking system's loans and
advances 1960-80 (continued)
(Percentages)
SERVICES
	
Public	 Transportation Total
Year Utilities and
	 Services
Comniuni cation
1960	 0.9
	 -	 0.9
1961	 0.2	 -	 0.2
1962	 0.2	 -	 0.2
1963
	
1.1	 -	 1.1
1964	 0.6	 -	 0.6
1965	 1.2	 -	 1.2
1966	 O.I	 3.L	 3.8
1967	 1.3
	
3.2	 1L5
1968	 1.0	 4.1	 5.1
1969	 0.7	 4.0	 'L7
1970	 0.2	 5.	 5.6
1971	 0.8	 6.3
	
7.1
1972	 0.8	 7.2	 8.0
1973
	
1.5	 6.9
	
8.4
197k	 0.8	 7.0	 7.8
1975	 1.2	 5.7	 6.9
1976	 1.0	 8.5	 9.5
1977	 1.5	 7.6	 9.1
1978	 1.6	 6.9	 8.5
1979	 1.2	 7.2	 8.1
1980	 1.3
	
7.6	 8.9
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Table 7.1	 Analysis of the Nigerian banking system's loans and
advances 1960-80 (continued)
(Percentages)
GENERAL COMMERCE
Bills	 Domestic Exports Imports Total
Year	 Discounted	 Trade (1) (1)	 (1)	 Commerce
1960	 2.2	 36.9	 -	 -	 39.1
1961	 1.9
	
32.4	 -	 -	 34.3
1962	 4.0	 36.0	 -	 -	 40.0
1963	 8.3
	
33.6	 -	 -	 41.9
196)4	 12.3
	 27.3	 -	 -	 39.6
1965	 15.6	 21.4	 -	 -	 37.0
1966	 20.2	 4l.)4	 -	 -	 61.6
1967	 13.2	 46.8	 -	 -	 60.0
1968
	
2.3
	
49.9	 -	 -	 52.2
1969
	
1.9
	
9.5	 13.3
	
27.5	 52.2
1970
	
1.6	 9.2	 19.8
	
17.0	 47.6
1971
	
2.0	 11.2	 18.3
	
12.6	 4)4.1
1972
	
1.3	 11.9	 14.6
	
8.3
	
36.1
1973
	
0.5	 11.2	 11.5
	
12.2	 35.4
1974
	
1.5	 io.6	 9.8
	
8.6	 30.5
1975
	
2.0	 10.0	 7.0
	
9.0	 28.0
1976
	
1.1
	
9.9
	
4.5	 9.5
	
25.0
1977
	
0.8
	
9.7
	
3.3
	 9.14	 23.2
1978
	
1.0
	
10.0
	
1.9
	
8.2
	
21.1
1979
	
1.4
	
g.6
	
1.7
	
6.0
	
18.7
1980
	
0.4
	
10.0
	
1.6
	
7.0
	
19.0
Notes : (1)
	
The figure for Domestic trade, Exports and Imports
were not disaggregated enough and therefore were put
under Domestic Trade until 1968.
239
3.2
14.7
6.6
6.6
1.3
2.0
0.14
0.7
10.0
5.6
6.6
6.0
1.14
2.3
3.14
2.6
2.6
2.8
3.2
3.6
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14.6
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5.8	 18.0
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2.8	 13.3
	
3.0	 114.8
	
3.0	 12.7
	
2.9	 12.1
1968	 14.0
1969	 1.9
1970	 0.8
1971	 1.2
1972	 2.3
1973	 1.6
19714	 2.3
1975	 3.6
1976	 2.14
1977	 3.1
1978	 3.6
1979	 1.8
1980	 3.2
Table 7.1	 na1ysin of the Nigerian banlctng system's loans and
advances 1960-80 (continued)
(Percentages)
OTHERS
Credit and Governments Personal and Miscellaneous Total
Year Financial	 Professional	 (2)	 Others
Institutions	 (2)
1960	 5.1	 1.9	 21.6	 -	 28.6
1961	 14.0	 1.14	 23.6	 -	 29.0
1962	 1.1	 1.0	 19.3	 -	 21.14
1963
	
1.5	 0.9	 114.2	 -	 16.6
19614	 3.0	 0.8	 15.14	 -	 19.2
1965	 1.2	 0.7	 18.6	 -	 20.5
1966	 2.5	 0.14	 1.9	 6.0	 10.8
1967	 33	 0.6	 2.7	 14•14	 11.0
Notes : (2) The figures for Personal and Professional and
Miscellaneous were also put together under Personal and
Professional until 1965.
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Table 7.1 shows the percentage distribution of the banking
system's loans and advances among the sectors of the economy. It is
shown that the banks' allocation of resources to the agricultural
sector is unimpressive. The sector's share of loans and advances
increased from 19.8 per cent in 1960 to 25.3 per cent in 1965.
Thereafter there has been a declining trend. The share declined
sharply from 25.3 per cent in 1965 to 1.6 per cent in 1966. The
inevitable neglect of the vital sector by the banks and the Government
during the war period 1966-1970 is clearly shown in the Table and Fig
7.1. The average annual allocation of banks' loans and advances for
the period 1966-70 was 1.7 per cent. This neglect is understandable
because the Government directed all the economy's resources to the
successful prosecution of the war.
But the situation did not improve much after the war because the
Government continued to neglect this sector because of the new found
wealth in the crude oil exports which it erroneously thought to be a
substitute for agricultural wealth and production; and also because of
the "wealth illusion" or "false sense of opulence" of the economy up
to 1975. The Third National Development Plan made efforts to put
agriculture in its rightful priority position. Thus between 1971 and
1975; the proportion of the banking system's loans and advances
allocated to this sector averaged annually 2.6 per cent. Within the
period 1976-80 there was a slight improvement in the percentage share
of credit to the sector. It rose from 3.8 per cent in 1976 to 7.3 per
cent in 1980, registering average annual share of 5.7 per cent for the
period 1976-80. For the entire period 1960-80 the average annual
loans to the agricultural sector was 8.9 per cent, but for the period
1960-65 alone the recorded annual average share of banks' loans to the
242
sector was 22.7 per cent. Thus if we contrast the average annual
proportion of 22.7 per cent during 1960-65 with the average annual
percentage share of 14.2 during 1971-80 one might concluded that the
agricultural sector had been completely neglected in recent years as
far as loans from banks are concerned. In this respect, therefore,
the banking system has not performed its allocative role creditably.
There is thus the need for changes in the banking system's credit
policy.
In absolute value, however, the amount of loans and advances
going to agriculture rose from 22.6 million naira in 1960 to 1463.5
million naira in 1980, recording an average annual increase of 31.5
per cent. (See Table 7.2). Fig 7.1 and 7.2 show clearly the period of
neglect of the sector as 1966-714. A siiificant increase in loans and
advances to the sector occurred in the period 1975-80. However it
is observed that most of the loans were commercial credits which were
meant for the finance of purchases and exports of the Marketing
Boards' controlled produce. Only a very small proportion of the loans
were granted for direct agricultural production. The banking system
was more interested in financing facility - the bill market scheme -
introduced in 1962 to finance Marketing Boards exports. The facility
broke down in 1967 when the commercial banks withdrew from the scheme
as a result of the war which made such financing very risky. The
bank's withdrawal from the scheme accounted for the drastic fall in
the proportion of loans and advances to the agricultural sector during
the war period. Since 1967, the financing function of the Marketing
Board has been taken over by the Central Bank, and the non-
availability of the scheme to the banks after the war was responsible
for the inability of the banks to reach their 1965 level of proportion
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25.3
1.6
1.3
1.7
1.8
2.0
1.8
3.0
2.9
2.9
1965	 270.1	 68.3
1966	 298.1	 4.8
1967	 275.0	 3.7
1968	 225.7	 3.8
1969	 242.7	 14.8
1970	 351.4	 7.0
1971	 502.0	 9.3
1972	 619.5	 19.2
1973	 753.5	 21.6
1974	 938.1	 27.2
13.1
-93.0
-22.9
2.7
26.3
45 8
32. 9
106.9
12.5
25.9
of loans and advances to the agricultural sector despite the present
efforts being made by the Government to encourage and persuade the
banks to lend more to this sector.
Table 7.2
	
AnalysIs of Coinercia]. banks' loans and advances to the
agricultura]. sector, 1960-80
(Million naira)	 (Percentages)
Total	 Advances and Loans and advances Annual increase
loans	 loans to the to agriculture as 	 of loans to
Year and	 agricultural percentage of total agricultural
advances sector	 loans and advances sector
1960	 1114.0	 22.6	 19.8
1961	 120.0	 25.2	 21.0	 11.5
1962	 1514.1	 36.1	 23.4	 43.3
1963	 178.9	 39.3	 22.0	 8.9
19614	 244.8	 60.4	 24.7	 53.7
1975	 1,537.3	 37.3	 2.14	 •	 37.1
1976	 2,177.9	 79.6	 3.7	 113.4
1977	 3,07 14.6	 139.1	 14.5	 714.7
1978	 14,109.7	 2214.0	 5.6	 61.0
1979	 14,624. 14	 329.6	 7.1	 35.1
1980	 6,349.0	 1463.5	 7.3	 140.6
Source : CBN i Economic and Financial Review - various years
ii Annual Report and Statement of Accounts,
December 1980
iii Monthly Report, December 1981
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The interest of the banks in financing the marketing end of the
agricultural activities was because the CBN granted discounting
facilities for the produce papers and therefore, the papers served as
first class liquid assets for the banks. Thus, apart from being
riskiess they are short-term advances. The conclusion is that the
banking system has shied away from financing the priority sector of
agriculture because such financing is considered very risky. The
Nigerian commercial banks can be qualified as greater risk avoiders
than is socially desirable, and consequently there is the need for the
intervention of the monetary authorities to direct the banks loans to
the desired sectors. The dismal performance of the banking system in
financing the agricultural sector is depicted in Fig 7.3. Not only
has the proportion of loans to the sector been low, but the annual
changes in the loans and advances have been fluctuating very much over
the period 1961-80.
Nwankwo (1975), however, argued that although it appears that the
amount of banks' lending going to agriculture declined drastically,
both absolutely and in relation to other sectors, despite the fact
that topmost priority is assigned to agricultural development in
planning strategy, a close examination makes this less surprising. He
contends that the decline is technical and statistical rather than
real, because with effect from January 1966, loans for the finance of
agricultural exports which hitherto had been included under
agriculture were classified under general commerce. This explains
further the sharp and drastic decline in loans and advances going to
the sector from 1966.
In the manufacturing sector, on the other hand, the banking
system's performance, although not impressive, has been better than in
6
agricultural sector. As indicated in Table 7.3 the banking system's
allocation of loans and advances to the manufacturing sector shows a
long-run increasing trend. It increased from a modest level of L.9
million naira in 1960, to 1,955.5 million naira in 1980 registering an
average annual increase of 288.8 per cent within the period 1960-80.
Fig 7. shows that the increase was not much in the period 1960-68 and
rose moderately in the period 1970-72 before hitting the lowest level
ever in 1973. Thereafter there was a tremendous increase in the
period 197I-80. Table 7.3 also shows that the manufacturing sector's
share of the banking system's loans and advances has been increasing
over the period 1960-80. It rose from 1L3 per cent in 1960 to 23.8
per cent in 1971. It declined, however, to a very low proportion of
0.8 per cent in 1973 (See Fig 7.5), after which it assumed an
increasing trend reaching 30.8 per cent in 1980. The significant
decline in 1973 to 0.8 per cent can, perhaps be explained as a result
of import liberalization of 1973. Before 1973 domestic industries
were heavily protected through import restrictions. This created
scarcity of durable and non-durable goods and the attendant
inflationary pressures. As a consequence the Government was forced to
dismantle the import restrictions in 1973. Consequently, there was a
huge inflow of imported manufactured goods, leading to a fall in the
demand for domestically produced goods. The implication was,
therefore, an inevitable decline in productivity and consequently a
decline in the need for borrowed fund from the banking system. The
average annual proportion of loans and advances to the manufacturing
sector for the entire period 1960-80 was 18.1 per cent compared with
8.9 per cent over the same period for the agricultural sector.
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-6.6
13.2
82.3
56.7
20.3
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24,003.2
1965	 270.1	 29.0
1966	 298.1	 39.1
1967	 275.0	 39.6
1968	 225.7	 37.0
1969	 2142.7	 141.9
1970	 351.14	 76.4
1971	 502.0	 119.7
1972	 619.5	 11414.0
1973	 753.5	 6.3
19714	 938.1	 258.5
Table 7 • 3	 Analysis of Coanercia1 banks' loana and advances to
the manufacturing sector 1960-80
(Million naira)	 (Percentages)
Total	 Advances and	 Loans and advances Annual increase
loans	 loans to the	 to manufacturing	 of loans to
Year and	 manufacturing as percentage of	 manufacturing
advances sector	 total loans	 sector
1960	 1114.0	 14.9	 14.3
1961	 120.0	 6.6	 5.5	 34.7
1962	 154.1	 11.7	 7.6	 77.3
1963	 178.9	 19.1	 10.6	 63 2
196 14	 244.8	 26.3	 10.7	 37.7
1975	 1,537.3
	
1410.7
	
26.7	 58.9
1976	 2,177.9	 609.0	 28.0	 148.3
1977	 3,074.6	 837.8	 27.2	 37.6
1978	 4,109.7
	
1,138.0	 27.6	 35.8
1979	 14,62 14.4	 1,357.3
	
29.4	 19.3
1980	 6,3149.0	 1,955.5	 30.8	 144.1
Sources : CBN
	
i Economic and Financial Review - various years
ii Annual Report and Statement of Accounts,
December 1980
iii Monthly Report, December 1981
An important feature observed from Table 7.1 is the relatively
large proportion of loans and advances going to the general commerce
sector, which is made up of loans to exports, imports and domestic
trade. In 1966 and 1967, loans to this sector accounted for 61.6 per
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(1)
cent and 60 per cent respectively of the total, and between the period
1960 and 1973, in no year was it below 3t per cent. The average
annual share for the period 1960-73 was 414.4 per cent. The
concentration of loans to the general commerce sector was due to the
dominance of expatriate banks whose primary interest is to finance
import and export trade in the country.
Although the proportion of loans and advances to the
manufacturing sector has been increasing, it has grown rather slowly
in proportion to the total loans granted annually by the banks (S e
Table 7.3). In realisation of the unwillingness of the banks to
grant more loans to these sectors and in keeping with the topmost
priority accorded to production (agriculture, industry and services)
the CBN in one of its controlling and supervisory functions has issued
since 1969/70 fiscal year annual directives prescribing aggregate and
sectora]. distribution of bank loans and advances to the economy
through the monetary policy circulars called Credit Guidelines. These
guidelines have generally striven to steer credit away from the
traditional, less productive, sectors of the economy such as general
commerce and "others" to the more productive "preferred" sectors such
as agriculture, manufacturing and services. Minimum allocations have
always been specified for the more productive sectors and maximum
allocations have been prescribed for less productive sectors. Thus
the extent to which the banking system has performed its allocative
role could be assessed by the degree of banks' compliance with the
Central Bank's directives.
In the first three fiscal years spanning 1969/70 to 197 1/72 as
shown in Table 7.4, the monetary policy guidelines specified the
desired percentage changes in the sectoral distribution of loans and
251
advances to the economy. Because of the high inflationary pressures
in the economy in these years, a ceiling on the expansion of credit
was fixed at 10 per cent in 1969/70, raised to 20 per cent in 1970/71
and lowered again to 8. per cent in 1971/72. Within the overall
ceiling, credit to the manufacturing sector was initially allowed to
increase to annual rate of 30 per cent in 1969 then raised to I5 per
cent in 1970 and brought down again to 30 per cent in 1971/72. Bank
loans to the general commerce sector were to increase by a range of
5.1 to 10 per cent during the period, while those to services sector
was permitted to increase initially by 11 per cent, then by 50 per
cent because of the short fall in credit to this sector in 1970/71,
but had to be reduced to 11.2 per cent in 1971/72. In contrast loans
to the category "others" were to decline at annual rate of 10 per cent
in 1969/70 to remain at the level it reached in fiscal year 1970/71
and again to decline by 33.6 per cent in 1971/72 relative to the level
at the end of the preceding year.
In the succeeding four fiscal years March 1972 to April 1976, the
guidelines restored the rationing of bank loans and advances desi,gned
as usual to give a favourable bias to directly productive sectors.
Accordingly the production and services sectors were to obtain as
minima 1t5 per cent and 11 per cent respectively of banks' aggregate
loans and advances in 1972-7k. These proportions were adjusted to 8
per cent and 10 per cent respectively in 1975/76. The less preferred
sectors of general commerce and "others" were to receive maximum
proportions of 30 per cent and 12 per cent respectively in 1972-9
with slight reduction to 10 per cent for "others" in 1975/76.
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The sectoral distribution of loans and advances in the fiscal
year 1976/77 to 1978/79 differed very little from one another and from
the preceding years' guideline specifications. What was new in this
period was the extension of this type of credit guidelines to
the merchant banks and that the guidelines were less binding in the
sense that the prescribed ratios could be exceeded provided the exce s
was used to finance indigenisation programmes.
The monetary circular guidelines of 1979/80 and 1980/81, howev'r,
called for significant structural changes in the distributi n of
commercial banks' loans and advances. As Table 7.k show tot
minimum allocation of preferred sectors increased to 70 and 75 pe
cent in 1979 and 1980 respectively. Other changes include the re-
classification of the subsector of exports from the less preferred to
the preferred sectors and the increase in the allocation to
manufacturing and a deliberate split of the subsector allocation into
agro-allied industries and "other manufacturing". Furthermore, in
1980, the minimum share of the agriculture subsector was raised from 6
to 8 per cent. A new subsector, Development Finance Institution was
introduced into the preferred sectors and allocated the 3 per cent
formerly allocated to Credit and Financial Institutions in the less
preferred sectors. Bills discounted was removed as a subsector of
general commerce since such financing could be classified into either
imports or domestic trade. All these adjustments raised the total
share of the preferred sectors from 70 per cent to 75 per cent and
correspondingly reduced the less preferred sectors' share from 30 per
cent to 25 per cent.
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In addition to stipulating the sectoral allocation of loans, the
guidelines also tackled the problem of inadequate credit to the
Nigerians. Thus in 1971/72, the required minimum percentage of its
total loans which each bank should give to indigenous persons was
fixed at 35 per cent. It was also specified that in order to satisfy
this requirement 'and to foster the end of expected Government policy
that commercial activities gradually pass into the hands of indigenous
persons, it will be necessary for banks to shift from expatriate to
indigenous persons, their loans and advances for general commerce'
(CBN, 1980). In the 1972-76 guidelines the minimum was raised to not
less than kO per cent and the Nigerian business was defined to mean
those businesses that are owned 51-100 per cent by Nigerian persons.
Indigenous borrowers were allocated 86 per cent of total banks' loans
and advances in 1979. However, it was not considered necessary to
raise the stipulated minimum in 1980 sinâe following the virtual
completion of indigenisation most business borrowers would be
indigenous. But it was found necessary, for the purpose of
stimulating industrial production, to raise the portion of indigenous
borrowers' share of total bank loans that should be reserved for
small-scale industries from 10 per cent out of a minimum of 70 per
cent to 16 per cent. The re-distribution of the enhanced reserved
share was raised on the basis of annual business turnover as follows:
A
B
C
D
E
Up to 25,000 naira
25,000-50,000 naira
50,000-100,000 naira
100,000-200,000 naira
200,000-500,000 naira
Total
(Percentage)
1979	 1980
	
1.0	 1.6
	
1.0	 1.6
	
2.0	 3.2
	
2.5	 4.O
	
3.5	 5.6
	
10.0	 i6O
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Having explained the CBN presoribed sectoral allocations of'
banks' loans as shown in Table 7. we can now examine the extent to
which the banks have complied with the guidelines. This is shown in
Table 7.5. A cursory look at Table 7.5 shows that there was no full
compliance with the stipulated policy targets by the banks. Taking
the production sector first, it is shown that the deviations from the
policy targets were positive in the years 1970/7lto 1971/72 and
1976/77 to 1980/81 while negative deviations were recorded in 1969/70
and 1972/73 to 1975/76. The negative deviation was most serious in
1969/70 when it was 18.5 per cent. While the positive deviations are
desirable, it is necessary to investigate the sources of the positive
performance. An examination of the subsectors indicates that the
positive performance emanates from the real estate and construct'
ion subsector which has consistently been positive for all the years
1970-80. The only year in which it recorded a negative deviation was
in 1969/70. It is further observed that within the real estate and
construction subsector, a greater share of the loans went to the
construction subset in which government contracts for the construction
of roads, bridges, pQrts and other buildings dominated, and a very
small percentage was allocated to private residential buildings.
This further emphasizes the banking system's preference for
short-term less risky and so-called self-liquidating loans. The bulk
of the loans to real estate and construction subsector are not only
short-term but also guaranteed by the Government. This attitude of
the banks prompted the CBN to specify, in 1978/79, that of the 10 per
cent loans to the subsector half should go to residential buildings
and of the 9 per cent in 1979/80, 5 per cent should be allocated to
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residential building; and in 1980/81 residential building was to
receive 6 per cent out of the 10 per cent prescribed for real estate
and the construction subsector.
It is also evident from Table 7.5 that the banking system has not
complie.d even for one year with the prescribed policy target for
agriculture. The negative deviation was as high as 85 per cent in
1971/72. Although there has been some improvement in recent years,
the Table reveals the reluctance of the banking system to lend to
agriculture and this substantiates our earlier observation that the
Nigerian banks are greater risk avoiders than is necessary.
The banks' performance with respect to loans to the manufacturing
subsector is not impressive either. There were negative deviationa
from the prescribed targets in the years 1969/70 when the devia'ion
was 18.9 per cent and 1972/73 to 1980/81 with negative deviation
as high as 6.6 per cent in 1979/80.
The non-compliance of the banks with the prescribed targets in
the preferred sectors is again manifested in the services sector.
Apart from 1970/71 and 1971/72 the banks ? performance is very
disappointing. It showed negative deviations in 1969/70 (of 10.1 per
cent) and in the period 1972/73 to 1980/81. In 1980/81,the recorded
8.5 per cent share of the services sector was 3.5 percentage points
below the prescribed minimum of' 12 per cent.
It is encouraging, however, that with the guidelines less of the
banks' loans and advances are being lent to general commerce even
though there was no full compliance with prescribed targets. As would
be expected, the negative deviations of the production and services
sector were made up in the less preferred sector - "others". The
sector recorded positive deviations over the entire period 1969-80.
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The allocation to this sector exceeded the prescribed maximum by as
much as 17 per cent, 31 per cent and 81 per cent in the years 1969/70,
1970/71 andl97l/72 respectively. The average annual percentage by
which the actual allocation of loans to "others" sector exceeded the
prescribed maximum for the entire period 1969-80 was 114.3 per cent.
It is thus evident that the Nigerian banking system has not met
adequately the financial needs of the economy from the development
priority standpoint. It is true that the needs for credit can be
assessed by actual demand, but in a developing country like Nigeria,
the bankers do not have to determine the credit needs of the economy
by simply sitting behind their desks waiting for potential borrowers
to come in. As Crosse and Hempel (1980, p.210) observed, 'To know
something about the credit market of a community, it is necessary to
go outside the bank, in thought at least, and find out who is
borrowing where'. In other words the bankers have to stimulate
effective demand for credit in the economy.	 -
7_li	 THE TERM STRUCTURE OF BANK LOANS AND ADVANCES
To further evaluate the allocationa]. efficiency of the Nigerian
banking system, we examine the term "structure of.bank loans and
advances". This is revealed in the pattern of loan maturity structure
and pattern of loan security of the banks. The analysis will show the
suitability of the loans and advances to the borrowers' needs
particularly to the priority sectors of the economy.
7-I. 1
	 Maturity Pattern of Bank Loans and Advances
The maturity pattern of commercial banks' loans and advances in
Nigeria can be divided into four categories:
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1	 those maturing within three months;
2	 those maturing within six months;
3	 those maturing within twelve months;
those maturing later than twelve months.
As observed by the CBN, 'During the 1963-68 period about two thirds of
all advances granted by the commercial banks matured within three
months. The predominance in commercial bank loan portfolios of loans
maturing within three months Is to be expected in view of the fact
that commercial bank activities have been largely concentrated in
financing trade' (Economic and Financial Review June 1969, p.5).
This observation was corroborated by Ojo (1976) who showed that in
1972 about 50 per cent of all bank loans in Nigeria was made on call
basis, more than 60 per cent within three months maturity and only
about 1 per cent was of more than five years maturity.
As shown in Table 7.6 there has not been much change in the above
observations in the maturity pattern of the banking system's loans
and advances.L For instance, from 1963 to 1975, 90 per cent, on the
average, of banks' loans and advances were of less than one year
maturity. The proportion of this kind of loans was 79.5 pr cent in
1 979. Within the same period, 1963-75, 8.3 per cent of bank loans
matured between 1 and 5 years, having on the average, only 1.5 per
cent of the loans of over five years' maturity. The situation seemed
to have improved in 1979 when 3.6 per cent of the loans were of over
five years' maturity and 16.9 per cent had a maturity of between one
and five years. The sharp drop in 1970 of the proportion of loans
maturing after five years from the more or less constant level of 2
per cent to 0.7 per cent is quite disturbing.
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Table 7.6	 MaturIty pattern of Cnercial banks' loans and advances
1963-79
(Percentages)
Maturity	 1963
	
196 14	 1965	 1966	 1967	 1968	 1969	 1970	 1971
Pattern
Within	 91.9	 93.6	 95.0	 88.8	 91.0	 90.14	 89.3
	 89.9	 87.0
1 year
1-5 years	 8.1	 )	 )	 9.0	 7.0	 7.6	 8.5	 9 14	 11.9
) 6.14 ) 5.0
After	 0.0	 )	 )	 2.2	 2.0	 2.0	 2.2	 0.7	 1.1
5 years
Total	 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 7.6 continued
(Percentages)
Maturity	 1972	 1973	 19714	 1975	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979
Pattern
Within	 90.0	 88.2	 86.6	 88.3
	
...	 ...	 ...	 79.5
1 year
1-5 years	 9.0	 10.9
	
11.9	 10.3	 ...	 ...	 ...	 16.9
After	 1.0	 0.9	 1.5	 1.14	 ...	 ...	 ...	 3.6
5 years
Total	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
Sources : 1	 CBN Economic and Financial Review, June 1969
2 Ojo, Ade T and Adewumni, 'Wole (1982), Banking and
Finance in Nigeria
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The implication of this pattern of maturity of banks' loans and
advances is that since the banking system concentrates on the shortest
maturity loans, it can only make a disproportionately insignificant
contribution in the medium- and long-term industrial and agricultural
financing. With short-term loans and advances, the banks can only meet
the working capital needs of industries and probably the seasonal
financial requirements of farmers. However, while this type of
working capital is important to these sectors what is necessary for
long-term planning and development for these sectors is "development
capital", made up of loans and advances of sufficient duration. 'The
restriction of bank lending to working capital requirements which is
customary in, say, the United Kingdom would be perculiarly unfortunate
in the light of the needs and nature of the industries struggling to
establish themselves in underdeveloped territories where no long-term
capital market exists' (Nevin, 1961, p.50).
Thus the strict adherence of the banks to the orthodox commercial
loan or real bill doctrine of so call self-liquidating loans is
unimpressive arid discouraging. These canons may have been useful in
nineteenth century Britain. Even then, without a certain degree of
courageous lending British industrialists would have found it
difficult fo find the necessary capital to develop. The reason
usually offered by bankers for restrictinig their loans to short-term
is the short-term nature of their deposits. But as the Radcliffe
Report (para. 128) observed, 'individual balance go up and down,
depositorsoome and depositors go, but the total on current account
goes on for ever' (See CLCB 1978, p.50). So although the banks must
cater for a degree of day to day volatility, long experience enables
them to assume that their deposit base as a whole will remain
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reasonably stable. Given this stability, an important percentage of
the financial resources usually considered short-term can be used for
long-term lending without endangering the liquidity of the banking
system. More recent experience of post-war Germany and Japan shows
clearly what contribution a dynamic banking system can make to real
economic development. 'By going out of their way to explore other
criteria for lending, by going beyond the so called canons, by
venturing along with their customers, commercial banks in these
countries helped to develop the level of entrepreneurship which we see
in those countries today' (Frimpong-Ansah, 1971).
The process of "maturity transformation" - transforming short-
term deposits to longer-term loans - is one of the useful functions of
commercial banks. The banks usually contend that a great proportion
of their loans granted are de facto medium- and long-term when account
is taken of their more or less automatic renewal. This is true to a
very limited extent because as Ojo (1976) noted, in a number of cases
a renewal of existing loans has not been automatic, customers would
first have to repay the loans at the expiration of each approved loan
term before a new one is granted. The argument here is that banks
should designate such proportion of their loans and advances as
medium- and long-term. The designation is important because it will
not only eliminate the problem of the customer having to borrow at
highter costs elsewhere to repay previous loans in order to be granted
another loan but also will enable the borrower to undertake long-term
investment planning for the application of the proceeds of the loan.
266
7—k.2	 Pattern of Loan Security
'A realistic collateral policy should serve to improve
creditworthiness enough to enable bank management to make economically
desirable loans and should not be used to restrict credit' (Crosse
and Hempel, 1980, p.222). Nigerian experience has been one where the
collateral policy of' the commercial banks has not been realistic in
the sense that the policy does not take into account the social and
economic environment perculiar to the economy in which the banks
operate. The security and collateral policy of the Nigerian banking
system is entirely alien to the Nigerian economy and this is why the
collateral securities the indigenous borrowers have available are not
acceptable to the banks and the type of securities demanded by the
banks are not available to a greater proportion of Nigerians. The use
of such collaterals as title to goods, negotiable securities and life
insurance policies is foreign to the Nigerian economy and these are
available to a small percentage of the population, who may not
actually need them in order to borrow from the banks since such people
can invariably use their "names" alone as an acceptable security.
There is thus a good measure of bias against one segment of the
population and sector of the economy by banks in the allocation of
their loans and advances as a result of the type of security demanded
by the banks. As Atenaga observed, '... even when the business comes
there is hardly any project evaluation, most decisions being made on
the basis of who is behind the project. The files of projects with
Government backing, no matter how little, are not even evaluated, just
passed along and so limited funds are generally always diverted more
to unprofitable schemes to the detriment of the economy' (Business
Times, 20 July 1981, p.2k).
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Broadly considered loans and advances granted by the Nigerian
banking system can be grouped into three categories:
1	 Secured against real estate;
2	 Unsecured; and
3	 Otherwise secured.
The last group includes those secured by bills of lading or other
documents of title to goods, negotiable securities, guarantees, life
assurance policies, liens e.t.c. (CBN Economic and Financial Review,
1969, p.8). An examination of Table 7.7 indicates that commercial
banks prefer to have their loans and advances made against "otherwise
secured" security. The proportion of banks loans granted against this
type of security was 51.9 per cent in 1975 and, in no year between
196' and 1975 (for the years which data were available) was the
proportion less than kO per cent, and the average annual percentage
for the period was per cent. As we noted earlier the securities
against which these loans were made are those that are not within the
reach of many Nigerian borrowers. Most farmers and small-scale
industrialists do not possess such negotiable securities, life
insurance policies and other documents of title to goods. The
implication, therefore, is that credit expansion is restricted to
only some few privileged individuals, while a large proportion of the
nation's savings lie idle in the banks, with banks maintaining
liquidity ratios of over 60 per cent. For instance in 1970, 1972,
197k and 1975 the liquidity ratios of the banking system were as high
as 89.5 per cent, 58 per cent, 65.11 per cent and 56.11 per cent
respectively. At the same time, a considerable amount of genuine
demands for credit were being turned away for reasons of lack of
adequate security.
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Table 7.7
	
Security pattern of connercial banks' loans and advances
1963-1979
(Percentages)
Type of Security 1963 196 14 1965 1966 1967 1967 1969 1970 1971
1 Secured	 29.3 24.14 22.3 27.0 25.5 27.5
against plant
equipment and
other real
estate
2 Otherwise	 314.1 140.7 145.0 143.3 148.3 47.9
secured
3 Unsecured	 36.6 314.9 32.7 29.7 26.1 24.6
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100	 1000 100
Table 7.7 continued
(Percentages)
Type of Security	 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
1 Secured against
	
31.1 30.9 28.5 28.0	 ...	 ...	 ... 40.2
plant, equip-
ment and other
real estate
2 Otherwise	 45.2 147.3 149.7 51.9	 ...	 ...	 ... 148.1
secured
3 Unsecured	 23.7 21.8 21.8 20.1	 ...	 ...	 ...	 11.7
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Sources : 1
	 CBN Economic and Financial Review, June 1969
2 OJo, Ade T and Adewumni, 'Wole (1982), Banking and
Finance in Nigeria
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The next type of loans preferred by the banks are loans
unsecured. The average annual share of loans and advances granted
under this condition was 27.2 per cent in 1963-75 period. This
proportion declined significantly in 1979 to 11.7 per cent. It should
be noted, however, that even though this type of loans is tagged
unsecured, a large percentage of them are in real sense more secured
than those shown as secured.
The unsecured (loans) are usually temporary out-of-pocket
loans ... granted to customers of undoubted financial
strength and to salary earners in the middle and top income
groups, whose monthly salaries are paid regularly into the
banks (from which any temporary accommodation given would be
liquidated). This explains to some extent why about 90 per
cent of all bank loans maturing within three months were
granted by non-indigenous banks. Apart from their being
mainly for consumption and less productive purposes, loans
in the "unsecured" category are usually granted in small
amounts than those shown as secured, and in many cases they
might be too small to be of much economic significance to
the borrowers (Ojo, 1976, p.39).
As Table 7.7 shows the least preferred type of loans by the banks
are loans secured against plants and equipment and other real estate.
The average annual proportion of bank loans granted against this type
of securities is 27.5 per cent in the period 1963-75. The figure is
higher than those of unsecured loans because of the increase in the
acceptance of real estate as collateral security by the bank in recent
times as a result of indigenisation of the banking system. The
proportion was kO.2 per cent in 1979.
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The type of security available to Nigerians is real estate,
particularly landed property, but unfortunately this is the type of
security least preferred by the banks particularly by foreign banks.
For instance before the indigenisation of the banking system, foreign
banks gave a large proportion of their loans against "otherwise
secured", while the indigenous banks granted a small proportion of
their loans against the same type of securities in the corresponding
period. As Table 7.8 shows, in the period 1963-68, for which data
were available the expatriate banks gave, on the average, U7.1 per
cent of their loans against this form of securities while the
indigenous banks correspondingly advanced only 32.1 per cent of their
loans against the same form of securities. In contrast, under loais
secured against real estate, the indigenous banks, on the average,
granted 55.9 per cent of their loans and advances while the foreign
banks gave only 15.k per cent of their loans against real estate.
Under unsecured loans, the expatriate banks gave 37.5 per cent of
their loans and advances to their customers, as against only 12 per
cent granted by the indigenous banks. As pointed out earlier, this is
because the expatriate banks have more of this group of borrowers
whose monthly salaries are regularly paid into their accounts with the
banks, with the result that such loans are in actual fact secured. It
is clear that the expatriate banks following the "traditional banking
principles" prefer negotiable securities and other instruments of
title to goods without taking 'account of the particularism of the
domestic situation in moulding banking canon' (Nwankwo, 1975, p.92)
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7-5	 AGRICULTURAL CREDIT GUARANTEE SCREME
In the realisation of the problems posed by the paucity of the
flow of credit to the agricultural sector and because of the
ineffectiveness of credit guidelines to stimulate adequate flow of
funds to the priority sectors and also the need to underwrite the
often feared credit risks, and finally to minimise the problem of lack
of adequate collateral securities, the Federal Government set up an
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund. The law establishing the
Fund was promulgated in March 1977. The Scheme involved an authorised
capital of 100 million naira which was subscribed to by the Federa
Government and the CBN in the proportion of 60 per cent to kO perc .
respectively.
Through the scheme, loans granted to farmers by commercial banki
and merchant banks are guaranteed up to 75 per cent by the Federal
Government and the CBN. The maximum loan that could be guaranteed to
an individual farmer is 50,000 riaira and in case of co-operative
societies and other corporate bodies it is 1.0 million naira. To
avoid the misuse of the funds made available under the Scheme, the
Schedule to the Act defines agricultural purposes in respect of which
loans can be guaranteed by the Fund as those connected with the
establishment or management of plantations for the production
of rubber, oil palm and similar crops, the cultivation of cereal
crops, animal husbandry including cattle rearing and poultry and fish
farming. In addition the Act provides that where such loans are to be
used to purchase livestock, machinery or farming equipment, the loan
should not be paid directly to the borrower, but to the supplier of
the desired farming equipment, who is required to furnish the bank
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with document as evidence of the items needed. It is an offence under
tile Act to apply the loan for purposes other than the ones for which
it was granted.
The security which may be offered to a bank for the purpose of
any loan made under the scheme includes any or a combination of the
following: a charge on land or on movable property of the borrower, a
life assurance policy, stocks and shares and a personal guarantee.
The interest rate chargeable by banks on credit facilities
provided under the Scheme will be prescribed from time to time by the
Federal Commissioner for finance. At present, the rate chargeable on
loans to institutions which on-lend to others is per cent per annum,
and in all other cases 6 per cent per annum.
The performance of the Scheme and the banks is shown in Table
7.9. Between 3 April 1978 when the Scheme came into operation and
December 1980, a total of 2,339 agricultural loans amounting to 7t.6
million naira were guaranteed by the Fund. In the first year of its
operation a total of 31 loans valued 11.3 million were guaranteed,
and in 1979, the total number of loans guaranteed rose to 1,105
amounting to 33.6 million naira; the number and value of loans
guaranteed in 1980 were 893 and 29.7 million naira respectively.
Inspite of the fact that this scheme reduces the risk burden on
commercial banks, the banking system has not shown interest in
advancing loans to the agricultural sector. It was reported that some
banks claimed that they were not sufficiently liquid to lend to
agriculture and also gave the credit restraint of the CBN as a rather
lame excuse for not granting loans to farmers under the scheme. Under
the above pretex viable agricultural proposals have been turned down
(Adegite 1978). In view of this the CBM has directed all banks to
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lend to agriculture over and above the 6 per cent prescribed under the
sectoral allocation guidelines. Investigation has shown that the
banks never met the 6 per cent prescribed sectoral allocations in the
1978-80 period and therefore did not perform well under the scheme.
Table 7.9	 Loans granted by the Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Scheme Fund 1978-80
Number of Loans
	 Amount ('000 naira)
State	 19781	 1979	 1980	 1978	 1979	 1980
Ana!nbra	 16	 50	 1414	 2147.14	 1,283.1 1,126.1
Bauchi.	 15	 132	 190	 1,271.2	 1,5143.3 1,327.9
Bendel	 18	 96	 146	 558.2	 6,701.3 2,132.0
Benue	 3	 5	 5	 290.5	 1140.5	 63.0
Bomb	 12	 21	 7	 178.14	 739.2	 39.0
Cross River
Gongola
1mb
Kaduna
Kano
Kwara
Lagos
Niger
Ogun
Ondo
Oyo
Plateau
Rivers
Sokoto
	13	 13
	
-	 15
	
26	 88
	
77	 170
	
22	 229
	
1414	 38
	
5	 16
	
3	 12
	
15	 22
	
1	 114
	
22	 814
	
8	 141
	
16	 18
	
25	 141
	
27	 1483.5	 288.8
	
15	 -	 501.5
	
•52	 605.3	 1,7014.14
	
158	 985.6	 3,185.6
	
814	 627.8	 3,138.6
	
214	 2,0143.1	 8114.8
	
214	 300.0	 3,203.1
	
31	 83.0	 202.6
	
20	 772.8	 2,291.0
	
15	 25.0	 358.9
59
	 1,013.6
	
3,976.9
27
	
688.7
	
8514.3
19
	
14314.6
	
2,036.0
146
	
675.7
	
633.0
556.0
1436.8
993.6
1,1412.0
2, 9914.9
1,082.1
3,510.8
3314.2
3,037.6
1,850.5
5,21414.3
1,238.1
1,789.7
1416.14
Total	 3141	 1,105	 893 11,2814.14 33,596.7 29,685.2
Source : CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, December
1979, and 1980.
Note 1 : Started in April
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7-6	 CONCLUSIONS
Although, generally, loans and advances by the banking system to
the economy have increased, it is obvious that they have been
inadequate both in terms of' overall volume and in their sectoral
distribution. The banks by concentrating a greater proportion of
their loans on general commerce and insisting on "adequate" collateral
securities are biased against a particular sector - agriculture - and
segment of population. This undesirable operational policy of the
banks has necessitated the direct intervention of the monetary
authorities to correct the sectoral distortions in loan allocations.
Consequently guidelines on the allocations of bank loans have
continued to be issued each financial year since 1969/70 with emphasis
on more credit in favour of the priority sectors of production and
services. The guidelines have favourable impact in directing more
loans to the priority sectors than would have been possible. However,
it is clear that commercial banks have consistently resisted financing
the agricultural sector. Contrary •to the guidelines' specifications,
the proportion of loans to "non-productive" less preferred sectors has
continued to increase. Particularly disturbing is the continued
proportional increase of loans allocated to the "others" sector. The
banking system has not, therefore, performed efficiently its
allocationa]. functions because the banks are greater risk avoiders
than is socially desirable which as a consequence has led them to
operate an undesirable collateral security policy that restricts
credit.
An important observation in the guidelines is that the
distinctiai in the breakdown of the sectors and the application of
strictly numerical criteria for assessing the performance of the banks
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leave a lot of room for misjudgement of the credit needs of the
economy. For instance, it is extremely difficult to distinguish
between general commerce (domestic trade) and agriculture (or trade in
agricultural products). Besides, that the increasing volumes of loans
are going to, say, the manufacturing sector (rising from 4.5 per cent
in 1960 to 21.8 per cent in 1970 and 30.8 per cent in 1980) does not
distinguish between varying needs in the manufacturing sector.
It is our view that there is need for a finer breakdown of the
sectors and the level of loans and advances allocated to them A
beginning was made by separating residential and other construction in
the real estate and construction subsector in 1975 and the reinov of
)ills discounted as a subsector of general commerce in 1980, but hi
did not go far enougli.
Our observation corroborates •Okigbo's (1981 .) suggestion that the
CBN's policy should, for instance, break agriculture into a finer
group to separate direct production finance from indirect financing.
Processing should be separated from direct production and from food
procurement. The industrial aspect of agriculture, while important
for stimulating raw materials production, stands apart from
agricultural production proper. Furthermore, in industry which is an
omnibus category, there is a great difference in the credit needs of
large and medium-scale industries on the one hand, and small-scale
industries on the other. Each of these categories requires a
different orientation in terms of credit policy. These observations
apply to the other sectors and subsectors.
Finally, the banking system's restriction of its loans and
advances to the shortest maturity advances has been criticised
by many scholars (Nwankwo 1975, Diaku 1972, Ojo 1976) to name but
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a few, because the banks are disposed to lend on medium- and long-term
basis. The banks should reconsider their archaic traditional
commercial loan policy and engage not only in more maturity
transformation but develop a dynamic demand for their loans in all
sectors particularly in the priority sectors of the economy by helping
their customers to work out sound projects 'and help them with credit
supported by useful suggestions to grow' (Frimpong-Ansah 1971).
The Nigerian banking system should not regard Government
directives on its loan operations as punitive measures because
Government directives are aimed at overall development of the economy,
and therefore, banks' compliance with the directives will, both in te
short-run and long-run, enhance banks' profitability. An observation
y Stammer (1972) of Hong Kong experience should serve a good lesson
to the Nigerian banking system and the monetary authorities. Stammer
observes:
The availability of commercial banks' loans and advances
virtually from the start of industrialization - often to
relatively untried businesses against little security - has
contributed to the rapid success of industrial development.
The Hong Kong commercial banks have to some degree accepted
risks which elsewhere are the responsibility of equity
investors. Their liberal lending policy is more surprising
when one considers that a large part of deposits is owed to
foreigners and banks are not supported by official
rediscount facilities (p.32-25).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN FINANCING THE NIGERIAN PUBLIC SECTOR
8-1	 INTRODUCTION
The last chapter examined the allocative efficiency of the
banking system with respect to the private sector of the economy. In
the present chapter we are interested in further' exploring the role of
the banking system in financing the public sector of' the Nigerian
economy.
Today the goal of accelerated economic development through
comprehensive development plans is widely accepted throughout the
developing countries. Development planning has become particularly
popular in the developing countries because it is regarded as the best
strategy of' utilizing their available scarce resources, transforming
their economies, and of' narrowing the development gap between them and
the advanced industrial countries. Unfortunately, however, there is
never enough Government resources or public savings defined as the
excess of current revenue over current expenditure to finance the
Government part of the development plans. As a consequence, resort is
increasingly being made to other sources of funds such as borrowing
domestically (and abroad).
In Nigeria the need to raise substantial sums of funds
domestically to finance the various development programmes since 1960
has meant that the Government has had to depend very much on the
financial institutions particularly the banking system. The
Government in implementing the various development programmes has thus
borrowed substantially from the banking system and we are, therefore,
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interested in examining how the banks have responded to the public
sector needs for financial resources to finance the development plans.
The present chapter is divided into four sections. The next
section examines the size and the role of the public sector. Section
three discusses the composition, size and growth of the national
public debt. Section four analyses the ownership of the public debt.
The last section is the conclusion.
8-2	 THE SIZE MID ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The public sector in Nigeria can be defined to embrace the thre
tiers of the Government, Federal, State and Local - as well as the
parastata]. institutions and enterprises. There are important links
between the various arms, and in particular the Federal Government
accepts the responsibility, to a great extent, of financing the other
parts of the sector.
It has been observed that the size of the public sector in
Nigeria has been expanding with the boundary between the public sector
and the private sector receding over the years. As tJzoaga and Okafor
(1975) observed, the increasing bureaucratization of economic life
has made it difficult to draw a watertight line that separates the
real private sector from the operational public sector in Nigeria.
This is because no particular economic activity is reserved
exclusively for the play of private initiative. Furthermore, Ejiofor
and Okafor (1980) noted that the Udoji Report 'emphasised the
increased bureaucratization of economic life'.
Today the public services of Nigeria are involved in affairs
that were beyond the immagination of our civil servants 15
years ago. We are now selling insurance and minting coins,
we are sailing ships and refining oil ... we are banking and
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building. Tomorrow, we shall be forging steel and educating
every young Nigerian through his primary years (Udoji
Report: Public Service Review Commission, para. k19, 1975).
The increasing importance both in size and structure of the
public sector in recent years is the outcome of certain economic and
political developments in the country since 1960. (See Chapter Two).
Some of these changes include the fact that the mid-1960s witneaed
the emergence of new development patterns. Since 1960 Nigeria
embraced systematic economic planning as as instrument for effect ye
management of the economy and thus has formulated four and execut d
three comprehensive development plans. •These are:
1	 The Six-Year Development Plan, 1962-68.
2 The Second National Development Plan, 1970-7k.
3 The Third National Development Plan, 1975-80.
U The Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-85.
Implementing these plans involves stupendous investment
expenditures not only on improvement of infrastructures but, in view
of the absence or lethargy of the private sector enterprises, on the
development of the superstructure as well. For instance, the 1962-68
Plan and the 1970-7k Plan involved capital expenditure of 2.2 billion
naira and 3.0 billion naira respectively while the Third National
Development Plan involved capital expenditure of 30.0 billion naira.
The Fourth and current plan envisages capital expenditure of 82.0
billion naira. The Governments of the Federation have had to finance
a large part of the Development Plans. Over the three plan periods
the share of the public sector in the total investment programmes has
shown a consistent increase. It increased from 1,073 million naira or
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39.9 per cent of the total investment in the plan period 1962-68 to
2,237 million naira or' kl.6 per cent of the total investment in 1970-
7k plan period. By 1980 the share of the public sector to total
investment in 1975-80 plan period was 20 billion naira or 66.7 per
cent (See Table 8.1). The increase is due to the emphasis being
placed on investment in economic services especially in transport,
mining and manufacturing sectors as well as Government Commitment to
indigenise the economy through direct public participation in various
economic activities.
In addition, national defence requirements which before 1960 were
very small have grown tremendously both in size and complexity thus
absorbing a substantial proportion of the national product. Next,
there was the creation of 12 states in 1967 and a further
restructuring of the country into 19 states with 20 Governments in
1976, as well as the carving out of many more local governments in the
country. These increased the size of the public sector, and being the
dominant segment of the sector, the Federal Government was saddled
with heavier responsibility of being the main source of finance to the
states and local governments.
As Okigbo (1981) contended, the role of the public sector goes
far beyond the financial sector, it is the prime mover of economic
activity because of its tremendous size and the proportion of output
for which it is directly responsible. Between 1960 and 1977
Government expenditure on consumption (excluding defence expenditure)
and investment accounted for a rising proportion of total expenditure
on product. It increased from about 10 per cent in 1960 to nearly 27
per cent in 1976 and 45.2 per cent in 1977. Government expenditure on
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investment had by 1973, overtaken private sector investment and by
1977 stood at more than twice the relative value of private sector
investment.
Table 8.1	 Share of public and private sectors in total inveatient
progranine 1962-80
(Million naira)	 (Percentages)
Plan	 Total	 Actual Actual Public sector's Private sector
Periods Investment Public Private share of total share of total
sector sector investment	 investment
1962-68	 2,200	 1,073	 1,612	 39.9	 60.1
19707 14	 5,300	 2,237	 3,100
	
141.6
	
58.14
1975_80*
	
30,000	 20,000 10,000
	
66.7
	
33.3
Sources : 1 Olaseni Akintola-Bello (1977) Capital Budgeting
Decisions in Nigerian-Public Enterprises
(PhD Thesis University of Wales).
2 Federal Republic of Nigeria
i The Second National Development Plan, 1970-714
ii The Third National Development Plan, 1975-80
Note * : This is the effective public capital programme obtained by
setting out inter-governmental transfers and assumed under-
spending from the nominal programme of 33 billion naira.
The 10 billion naira for the private sector is obtained by
assuming underspending of 20 per cent.
The contribution of the public sector to GD? is shown in Table
8.2. The contribution of the sector shows a marked increasing trend
since 1962 relative to the private sector. In 1962, only 9.2 per cent
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of the GDP was directly contributed by the public sector but by 1974
it was 39 per cent and declined to 36 per cent in 1978. The private
sector's contribution, on the other hand, has declined from 90.9 per
cent in 1962 to 61.9 per cent in 1974 and by 1978 it increased
slightly to 64 per cent. Table 8.3 explains further the relative
roles of the private sector and public sector in accounting for
investment expenditure of the economy. The contribution of the public
sector rose from 35.7 per cent in 1965 to 61.5 per cent in 1974 and
reached 68.3 per cent in 1977, but it declined to 57.9 per cent in
1978. The private sector's share of the investment fell from 614.3 per
cent in 1965 to 38.5 per cent in 1974, and further to 32.5 per cent
and 31.7 per cent in 1976 and 1977 respectively before moving up to
42.1 per cent in 1978. The increased investment by the public sector
is a consequence of increased public sector acceptance of an
obligation of general economic health of the country which has led the
Government to intervene generally and specifically in the organisation
of industry and agriculture. In Nigeria many basic industries are
publicly owned. This is partly because of the desire to avoid a
private monopoly in circumstances where economies of scale dictate a
small number of concerns and to ensure proper balance between social
and commercial objectives, and partly because of the need to rescue
industries which are economically important from foreign domination
(e.g. banks). Moreover, the ingrained habit, in most developing
countries of looking up to the Government to provide, is a plausible
explanation of increasing trend of public sector spending.
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Table 8.2	 Public sector contribution to GDP 1962-1978
(Percentages)
1962	 1965	 197k	 1976	 1977	 1978
Public sector	 9.2	 9.2	 39.0	 38.0	 36.7
	
36.0
Private sector	 90.9
	
87.9
	
61.9	 61.7	 63.3	 611.0
Source : Okigbo PNC (1981) Nigerian Financial System : Structure
and Growth
Table 8.3
	
Gros3 Investaent by public and private sectors 1962-78
(Percentages)
1962	 1965	 19711	 1976	 1977
	 1978
Public sector
	
110.11	 35.7	 61.5	 67.5	 68.3
	
57.9
Private sector
	 59.6	 611.3
	
38.5
	
32.5
	
31.7
	
112.1
Source : Okigbo PNC (1981) Nigerian Financial System : Structure
and Growth
A look at Table 8.11 shows that the Federal Government expenditure
increased from 163.9 million naira in 1961 to 19,811.11 million naira
in 1980 recording about 120 times the 1961 level, an average annual
increase of 30 per cent. Fig 8.1 shows that the growth of government
expenditure became remarkable since 1972. As is clear from the Table,
since 1970 the Federal Government became a major source of revenue for
the states. Expenditures on transfers consist of Federal Government
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statutory appropriations to states as well as loans and grants to
state Governments. This form of expenditure forms a substantial
proportion of Federal Government expenditure on current account.
Transfers on capital account are much smaller than on current account.
In aggregate, the expenditure on transfers grew from 15.6 per cent in
1961 to 52 per cent in 1971 and to 57.3 per cent in 1973 before it
started a downward trend to J43 per cent in 1978. In 1979 it was 25
per cent.
It is also seen that the growth of the public sector is related
to increases in the wealth of the country. While the Government
expenditure grew at an average annual rate of 30 per cent, total
output (GDP) rose from 6.9 per cent in 1961 to 15. per cent in 1971
and to 140.5 per cent in 1975. It declined marginally in 1976 to 38.1
per cent before rising to 142.9 per cent in 1978. It was 39.2 per cent
in 1980.
One conclusion emerging from this analysis is that, as a whole,
the growth of the public sector is due to increases in the resources
available to the Government during the period. This implies that the
demand for public goods and services especially in developing
countries is highly income elastic. This is understandable In most
developing countries where considerable expenditure is needed to ease
some of the social and economic infrastructure problems which
constitute great constraints on economic growth and development
(Akintola-Bello, 1977).
The relevant question to our study, however, is how these
expenditures have been financed over time. There are three main
sources of finance open to the Government: budget surplus or public
savings, internal loans and grants and external loans and grants.
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In the 1960s public savings were negative. For instance, during the
six year period 1965-70 Government budget registered deficits of
almost ten-fold increase, rising from 148 million naira to 1465.6
million naira (Olaloku, 1975, p.1 141). By 1972, as a result of oil
revenue, the budgetary deficits had been wiped, out and by 19714 public
saving had become the main contributor to Government expenditure.
However, the public savings have never been enough for needed
Government expenditure. The general picture thus still remained that
of revenue lagging behind expenditure, and the revenue gap has even
been widening in recent years with the enormous increase in defence
expenditure in relation to which no statistics are available. By way
of comparison, Adler (196 14) has given the unweighted average of the
ratio of revenue to the GNP for all low-income countries as 114.7 per
ent while the corresponding average ratio of expenditure to the GNP
is 16.1 per cent leaving an average gap of 1.14 per cent of the average
GM? to be recovered by borrowing. (See Obinna 1973). The Federal
Government has resorted to internal borrowing and external loans to
augument the public savings. We are interested in the domestic
sources of financing the public expenditures to see how the banking
system and particularly the commercial banks, have contributed to such
financing. This method of financing the public sector has given rise
to the public debt.
8-3
	
THE COMPOSITION, SIZE AND GROWTH OF THE NIGERIAN PUBLIC DEBT
8-3.1	 Composition of the Public Debt
The Nigerian public debt may be classified between funded or
floating and unfunded debt. The funded debt usually refers to the
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public debt incurred through the sale of Government paper or financial
instruments such as the issue of Treasury bills, Treasury certificates
or other loans like Development Stocks issued through the markets and
the "Ways and means Advances", given by the CBN. The unfunded debt,
on the other hand, generally consists of those loans which are
redeemable at a definite date with or without an option for repayment
at an earlier date. Such debt is made up of liabilities that are
incurred without the market e.g. deposits in the savings banks,
provident fund and similar mobilization of funds.
The other method of classification is to group the de t
instruments according to maturity structure. The distinction is dravzn
between short-term, medium-term and long-term liabilities. The short.
term instruments are generally Treasury bills and "ways and means
advances" and those not exceeding one year. While those debt
nstruments exceeding one year but not exceeding five years are
niedium-term; and long-term debts are those debt instruments exceeding
five years. The interest rates on these liabilities also represent
time dimension. Accordingly we classify the Nigerian public debt as
shown in Table 8.5.
The table shows that the Nigerian domestic debt consists largely
of debts raised through the issue of Treasury bills, Treasury
certificates, National reconstruction and development savings
certificates (NRDSC), National savings certificates and premium bonds
and Development stocks. Treasury bills are traditionally short-term
loans issued for only sixty or ninety days. The issue rate of
interest has varied from 3.5 per cent to 5 per cent. Treasury
certificates which were introduced in December 1978 are of two types;
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one maturing within one year and carries a slightly lower interest
rate while the other has a life of two years and carries a rate of
interest slightly higher.
National savings certificates and premium bonds were medium-term
instruments with a maturity of five years. They were introduced in
1962 as a means of encouraging small savers to invest directly and
voluntarily in Government debt. Consequently the savings schemes were
channelled through the post office. With the distribution of post
offices covering the whole country penetrating into the rural areas,
opportunity was afforded to a substantial percentage of Nigerians to
participate in the scheme. The savings certificates carried an
average of 5 per cent simple interest per annum while the yield on
premium bonds was earned in form of prize of winnings in quarterly
lottery draws with the total prize being not more that 5 per cent per
annum on accumulated investment. This meant that the holder of
premium bonds who was unlucky not to win in any of the draws
throughout the life of his bond simply had his bond redeemed at par on
maturity (Adewumni, 197Z, p.57). Both savings certificates and
premium bonds are no longer in use.
The long-term public debt instruments comprise the national
reconstruction and development savings certificates (NRDSC), the
Federation of Nigeria development stocks and some bilateral loans.
The NRDSC is a direct mandatory borrowing scheme by the Federal
Government introduced in 1968 to help mobilize funds for both the
successful prosecution of the civil war and to finance the post-war
reconstruction programme of the 1970s. The contribution was based on
the level of income of each individual. Each contributor's share was
5 per cent of taxable income or one naira per annum in case of flat
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rate tax payers. The contribution earned an annual interest rate of 3
per cent. The loans were meant initially to be redeemed by 1977 but
the Government decided in 1972 to redeem most of the loans.
The Development stocks were one of the earliest group of debt
instruments used by the Government to mobilize funds for financing
public sector expenditures. They were first used in 19146 and have
been issued since then. They are currently the most important long-.
term debt instrument at the disposal of the Government. Development
stocks are not redeemable until maturity but can be sold before
maturity subject to market conditions. The maturity structure of the
stocks ranges from five to twenty-five years and the interest rate
structure ranges from 5 per cent to 6 per cent depending on the
maturity of the stocks. The longer the life of the stock the higher
the interest rate.
Table 8.5	 Structure of public debt instrtunents in Nigeria
(Years)	 (Percentage)
Type of Instrument	 Maturity	 Interest Rate Structure
A	 Short-Term:
1 Treasury bills
	 1/4	 5.0
B Medium-Term:
1 Treasury certificates	 1-2	 5.5
2 Savings certificates*	 5	 5.0
3 Premium bonds*	 5	 Prize
C Long-Term:
1	 NRDSC*
	
9	 3
2 Developnent stocks	 5-25	 5-6
3 Bilateral loans	 15-140
Source : CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts - various years
Notes : * Has been phased out
293
Finally the other long-term debt is the one incurred through
bilateral loans. This was popular in the 1950s when there were no
formal impersonal borrowing instruments. It is usually a direct
negotiation leading to a contractual agreement between the Government
as a borrower and an individual organisation as a lender. For
instance, most of such loans were raised from the marketing board and
the University of Ibadan. The amount of loans raised by the Federal
Government through each of the various instruments is shown in Table
8 .6.
The Table shows that throughout the period 1960-80 Treasury
bills, development stocks and bilateral loan schemes constituted the
major Government debt instruments. By 1968, however, Treasury
certificates were introduced and it has since become an important
Government debt instrument for mediuin-'term loans. The amount of loans
raised through the Treasury bills rose from 22 million naira in 1960
to 2,119 million naira in 1980. In terms of proportion of total
loans, it declined from 2 percent in 1960 to 25.8 per cent in 1980.
The decline was accounted for by the introduction of Treasury
certificates in 1968. The loans raised through the Treasury
certificates increased from 20 million naira in 1968 to 3,027.6
million rxaira in 1980 thus rising from 3.9 per cent of total domestic
debt in 1960 to 36.8 per cent in 1980. There was a decline in the
value of Treasury certificates' contributions to the domestic debt in
1975 due to the suspension of the new issues of the certificates in
April 1975; this was, however, resumed in 1976 and that accounted for
the tremendous increase from 219 million naira in 1975 to 652 million
naira in 1976. Bilateral loans' contribution has declined drastically
from 24.9 million naira in 1960 to 114.8 million naira in 1970 and to
2914
i.0 million naira in 1980. It is gradually being phased out. In
recent years, the major source of this type of loan has been the
Marketing Board. The contribution of the development stocks has shown
as increasing trend throughout the period. It rose from 5.3 million
naira or 10.2 per cent of total domestic debt in 1960 to 3,069 million
naira or 37.3 per cent of total internal debt in 1980.
It is necessary to point out that up to 1977 only the Federal
Government could borrow from the public. The state Governments could
arrange financing by banks and other financial institutions by private
placement of their paper. However, the Committee on the Nigerian
Financial System in their report recommended (and it was accepted by
the Government) that the right to raise funds in the Nigerian capital
aiarket through public issue and sale of Government papers should be
extended to the state and local governments. The Report states:
Each state can be allowed free access to the capital market
to issue and redeem its own bonds subject to nationally
fixed specifications and conditions (para. 7.31, p.102)
Local Governments whose areas of jurisdiction cover
Nigeria's major urban centres (e.g. the Federal and State
capitals) should be allowed to publically issue project-tied
bonds guaranteed by the Government funds in those areas
where the pressure on Local Government finanáes are highest.
Also, Local Governments would be exposed to the financial
discipline generated by public flotation. (para. 7.39,
p.103).
Although these recommendations have been accepted by the Government,
only one state - Bendel - has been courageous enough to take up the
opportunity. Bendel state in 1978, issued 20 million naira, 7 per
cent, First Bendel State of Nigeria Development Stock maturing in
1988. So far the experiment has been successful.
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8-3.2	 The Size and Growth of the Nigerian Public Debt
Table 8.7 is an attempt to measure the size and the growth of the
Nigerian public debt in the period 1961-80. It is shown that in 1961,
the total Nigerian public debt (internal and external) was 1141.6
million naira and it increased over 71 times to 10,085 million naira
in 1980, thus registering an annual average growth of 26.2 per cent
over the period 1961-80. The growth rate was highest in the periods
1976-80, with an average annual growth of 39.1 per cent, and in th
period 1966-70 with a recorded average annual increase of 30.6 per
cent. The reason for the high growth rate of public debt in 1976-8
was the decline in the revenue from crude oil exports (as a result
unfavourable demand in the world crude oil market) which has beco
ince 1970, the most important determinant of the flow of funds into
the public sector. To make up for the decline in the revenue, th
Federal Government stepped up its domestic borrowing. Similarly the
igh growth rate in the period 1966-70 was owing to increased war-time
financial needs of' the Government. With the end of the war in 1970,
he proportion started to decline from 148.2 per cent in 1970 to as low
as 3.1 per cent, 0.9 per cent and 5.9 per cent in 1971, 1972 and 1973
repsectively. The average annual growth rate during the period 1971-
75 was 11.3 per cent. Another important reason for the decline in
public debt during the period was that the end of the war coincided
with the emergence of the crude oil export earnings as a major revenue
source for the public sector. As observed by the Committee of the
Nigerian Financial System (1976):
From the mid-1960s to the end of the civil war, the
Government borrowed increasingly from the financial system.
But the situation changed dramatically since the early
1970s. Frombeing a net debtor to the financial system,
Government became a net creditor. Not only was the
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Government reluctant to increase its level of Treasury bill
borrowing, it actually decided in 1975/76 to phase out
Treasury certificates and even discouraged the purchase of
Treasury bills by reducing its interest rate from 14 to 2 per
cent (CNFS, para. 7.05, p.95).
Fig 8.2 shows the long run growth trend of the Nigerian public debt
and depicts that the public debt consists mainly of internal debt.
The Nigerian public debt is again classified between internal and.
external debt in Table 8.7. An examination of the Table shows that
while internal debt was rising steadily over the period 1961..80,
external debt as a proportion of the total was declining. For
instance, in 1961 the proportions of internal and external debt were
almost equal being 50.8 per cent and 149.2 per cent respectively. In
1964 the percentage of internal debt had risen to 70.2 per cent as
against 29.8 per cent for external debt. External debt was 114.14 per
cent in 1970 as against 85.6 per cent of total debt for internal debt.
After recording a low level of 7.3 per cent in 1977, external debt
rose to 18.5 per cent of the total in 1980. The proportion of
internal debt was consequently highest in 1977 with a share of 92.7
per cent.
It could be seen, therefore, that the growth of the Nigerian
public debt over the period under discussion was explained largely by
the growth of internal debt. The reason for this is attributable to
Government deliberate policy to rely on domestic sources of funds to
finance its development programmes because of the failure to realise
the expected foreign resources in the various development plans. This
is why the Second National Development Plan 1970-714 stated explicitly:
The changing pattern of the world economy and the
increasing concentration of the world's economic and
political power poses a great challenge for Africa which
Nigeria cannot ignore. Nigeria will therefore quicken its
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pace of development through the use of her own resources
instead of relying unduly on external aid. This is the only
way for an inspiring nation like Nigeria to develop at a
rapid rate and in the right direction. (p.33).
Besides, external debts unlike internal debts which are loans
repayable in local ourrency and from that point of view represert a
transfer payment, are owed to non-residents and to that extent have to
be paid for from the foreign exchange resources of the country. Since
they have to be paid for by some part of exports of the country, they
consequently represent real limitation of the consumption possibility
of the residents. There is thus the need to restrict external debt to
the barest minimum.
We attempted to measure the size of the public debt in relation
to the GDP which as Okigbo (1981) argued indicates the capacity of the
economy to bear the burden of wiping out public debt. A further
examination of Table 8.7 shows that the ratio of public debt to the
GDP was increasing between 1961 and 1970. It was 6 per cent in 1961
and rose steadily to 10.8 per cent in 1966 and to 21.6 per cent in
1970. This means that the capacity of the economy to bear the burden
of paying off the debt has continued to decline. The reason that can
be offered for this situation is that the period 1961-70 represents a
period of political and economic instability in the country
culminating in the 1967-70 civil war with increased borrowing by the
Government to finance the (unproductive) war. The situation improved
significantly since 1970 with the decline in the ratio of public debt
to the GDP from 21.6 per cent to 9.9 per cent in 1975. Two factors
account for the decline: the increased government earnings from the
crude oil exports and the high rate of inflation in the economy. It
rose to 25.2 per cent in 1978 before falling to 19.9 per cent in 1980.
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3714.6
365.1
1,252.1
1,611.5
1,866.8
3, 0014. 6
5,001.1
7,235.2
8,893.8
10,085.3
25,14149
28,015
28,737
140,333
50,599
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Table 8.7
	
The size and growth of the Nigerian public debt
1961-1980
(Million naira)
Internal	 External	 Total	 GDP at
Year	 debt	 debt	 debt	 current prices Exports
1961	 72.0	 69.6	 1141.6	 2,378	 3147.0
1962	 98.8	 85.9	 1814.7	 2,516	 3314.2
1963
	
1314.8	 92.3	 227.1	 2,9146	 378.6
19614	 192.14	 81.5	 273.9	 3,1145	 1429.2
1965	 232.14	 93.1	 325.5	 3,361	 536.1
1966	 263.2
1967	 3146.8
1968	 1426.0
1969	 6148.14
1970	 1,0140.0
1971	 1,0714.8
1972	 1,000.7
1973
	
1,061.2
19714	 1,266.14
1975	 1,678.9
1976	 2,630.0
1977	 14,636.0
1978	 5,983.1
1979	 7,282.3
1980	 8,218.5
	
126.1	 389.3
	
3,6114
	
1140.5	 1487.3
	
2,950
	
170.6	 596.6	 2,878
	
171.7	 820.1	 3,851
	
175.14	 1,215.14	 5,621
	
178.5	 1,253.3	 7,098
	
263.14	 1,2614.1	 7,703
	
276.9	 1,338.1	 9,001
	
322.14	 1,588.8	 16,962
	
3149.9	 2,028.8	 20,1405
568.2
1483.6
422.2
636.11
885. 14
1,293.14
1, 14314.2
2,278.14
5,7914.8
14,925.5
6,751.1
7,630.7
6,0614.14
10,836.8
114,077.0 (1)
Note (1) : Provisional
Table 8.7	 The size and growth of the Nigerian public debt
1961-1980 (contInued)
(Percentage)
Internal debts External debt Total debt	 External debt
as percentage	 as percentage as percent-. as percentage
Year of total debt	 of total debt age of GDP
	 of exports
1961	 50.8	 149.2	 6.0	 20.1
1962	 53.5	 146.5	 7.3	 25.7
1963	 59.14	 140.6	 7.7	 214.14
196 14	 70.2	 29.8	 8.7
	
19.0
1965	 71.14	 28.6	 9.7	 17.3
1966	 67.6	 32.14	 10.8	 22 • 2
1967	 71.2	 28.8	 16.5	 29.5
1968	 71.14	 28.6	 20.7	 140.14
1969	 79.1	 20.9	 21.3	 27 • 0
1970	 85.6	 114.14	 21.6	 19.8
1971	 85.8	 114.2	 17.7	 13.8
1972	 79.2	 20.8	 16.14	 18.14
1973	 79.3	 20.7	 114.9	 12.2
19714	 79.7	 20.3	 9.14	 5.6
1975	 82.8	 17.2	 9.9	 7.1
1976	 87.5	 12.5	 11.8	 5.5
1977	 92.7	 7.3	 17.9
	 14.8
1978	 82.7	 17.3
	 25 • 2	 20.6
1979	 81.9	 18.1	 22.1	 1'4.9
1980	 81.5	 18.5	 19.9	 13.3
Sources : 1 CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years
2 Agu, C C (1981), The Financing of development plans,
the role of the financial sector, Planning in Nigeria
:Proceedings of' the Nigerian Economic SocietY
3	 Table 8.14
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The size of the external debt was separately examined in relation
to that part of the national product that will be seriously affected
at the maturity of the debt and during the servicing of the debt.
Since external debt can only be paid for by some part of the country's
exports, the proportion of external debts to the value of exports
reflects the size of the burden of external debt on the domestic
economy. The proportion was 20.1 per cent in 1961; It declined to
17.3 per cent in 1965. But because of the civil war when productivity
and exports declined and the imports increased, theratio started
rising reaching a high level of 140. per cent in 1968. However, with
increased revenue from oil exports in the 1970s, the proportion
decreased to 5.6 per cent in 19V1 and further to 4.8 per cent in 1977.
With the recent unfavourable demand in the world market for crude oil
the ratio started increasing again recording 20.6 per cent in 1978
before declining to 13.3 per cent in 1980.
We have so far seen that the increase in public debt is explained
by the growth of the internal debt, we are therefore interested in
knowing the sources of the internal borrowing of the Government.
8-k	 OWNERSHIP OF THE PUBLIC DEBT
The structure of ownership of domestic public debt is shown in
Table 8.8. It is seen that although the Government borrowed
increasingly from the banking system in the mid-1960s, the major
source of such borrowing was the CBN and the non-bank public. (See
Fig 8.3). The contribution of the commercial banks to the public debt
was very low in the period 1963-67. It was 2.7 per cent in 1963 and
increased to 9.5 per cent in 1966. This low proportion is accounted
for by the low level of commercial banks investment in Treasury bills
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in the period 1962-67, and this was because of the banks' preference
for Marketing Board bills and other bills to the other debt
instruments. As we noted in Chapter Seven, commercial banks' lending
to the Agricultural sector was highest in the period 1962-66 because
of their interest in financing the marketing end of the sector through
the Bill Market Scheme introduced in 1962 to finance the Marketing
Board.
Since these bills are fully guaranteed and secured on the
season's produce, and in addition are eligible for discounting by the
CBM at any time and therefore are part of the specified assets f r
satisfying the CBN liquidity requirements, they (Marketing Board
bills) offer more direct competition to Treasury bills (Adewumni,
19714). In addition, apart from being a comparable liquid asset to
Treasury bills, Marketing Board bills yielded higher return than
Treasury bills. For instance in 1962, when the Marketing Board bill
was introduced, commercial banks' discounting rate of the bills was
5.5 per cent while the interest rate on Treasury bills was 3.5 per
cent. In 19614 when the Treasury bill rate was increased to 14.5 per
cent, the Marketing Board bills discount rate was similarly raised to
6 per cent. Consequently during the period 1962-67 when the Marketing
Board bill was in operation commercial banks preferred the bills and
held less of Treasury bills and more of the Marketing Board bills in
their portfolios.
When the Scheme was abandoned by the banks themselves as a result
of uncertainties and increased risks created by the war and the
financing of the Marketing Board was taken over by the CBM in 1968,
the commercial banks increased their investment in Treasury bills
hence they accounted for over 1414.14 per cent of the total domestic
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public debt in 1968. Another factor accounting for' the increase in
the proportion of public debt held by commercial banks was the
introduction of Treasury certificates in December 1968. The
introduction of Treasury certificates provided an alternative
investment instrument for the banks' funds which were hitherto
invested in the Marketing Board bills. The banks were also quick to
welcome the introduction of the Treasury certificate because, although
it was not as liquid as the Treasury bills, with a maturity of 1-2
years it was short-term or medium-term enough for their needs and
besides, it carried higher yield rate than the Treasury bill.
Thus while the proportion of public debt held by non-bank public
declined from 69.9 per cent in 196k to 37.2 per cent in 1968, that
held by commercial banks increased from 2.7 per cent in 1963 to 14J4•14
per cent in 1968. In 1974 commercial banks became the main source of
internal borrowing by the Government. The Federal Government was thus
indebted to commercial banks to the tune of over 60 per cent of its
total domestic borrowing in 197k. The non-bank public accounted for
37.8 per cent of the debt in the same year which implies that the CBN
held virtually nothing that year. Although the proportion of total
domestic public debt contributed by commercial banks declined in the
subsequent years the banks continued to maintain the dominant positioi
as the major source of Government domestic borrowing between 1968 and
1977. The average annual proportion of domestic debt accounted for by
commercial banks was 37.3 per cent in the period 1968-77. There was a
drastic decline in the proportion from 36.k per cent in 1977 to 18.3
per cent in 1978; in that year (1978) the CBN became the dominant
lender to the public sector. In 1980 the proportion held by the
commercial banks was 32.5 per cent.
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Table 8.8	 Ownership of the Nigerian domestic public debt
1963-80
(Million naira)
	
Central	 Commercial	 Non-bank	 Total domestic
Year	 bank	 banks	 public	 debt
1963	 36.4	 3.4	 87.6	 127.4
196)4	 '10.6	 11.8	 121.9
	
17)4.3
1965	 63.1	 1)4.1	 139.1	 216.3
1966	 100.4	 27.3	 160.5	 288.2
1967	 155.8	 33.4	 176.2	 365.14
1968	 90.5	 218.5	 183.1	 '192.1
1969	 185.4	 31)4.6	 274.0	 77)4.0
1970	 231.7	 459.0	 380.1	 1,070.8
1971	 3)42.6	 328.0	 14)47.7	 1,118.3
1972	 194.3	 387.4	 419.0	 1,000.7
1973
	
222.4	 387.8
197)4	 22.2	 766.0
1975	 313.7	 801.3
1976	 1459.7	 1,196.8
1977	 1,683.1
	
1,685.2
1978	 3,197.3	 1,096.5
1979	 2,5149.2	 2,416.14
1980	 3,125.9
	
2,667.2
451.0
'178.14
563.9
973.5
1,267.7
1,689.3
2,316.7
2,425.14
1,061.2
1,266.6
1,678.9
2,630.0
4,636.0
5,983.1
7,282.3
8,218.5
Source : CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years
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Table 8.8	 Ownership of the Nigerian doiiestic public debt
1 963.- 1980 (continued)
(Percentages of total debt)
Central	 Commercial	 Non-bank
	
Year	 bank	 banks	 public
	1963
	
28.6	 2.7	 68.8
	
196 14	 23.3
	
6.8	 69.9
	
1965	 29.2	 6.5	 614.3
	
1966	 314.8	 9.5	 55.7
	
1967	 142.6	 9.1	 '48.2
	
1968	 18.14	 '414.14	 37.2
	
1969	 214.0	 140.6	 35.14
	
1970	 21.6	 42. 9	 35.5
	
1971	 30.6	 29.3	 140.0
	
1972	 19.14	 38.7	 J41.9
	
1973
	
21.0	 36.5	 '42.5
	
19714	 1.8	 60.5	 37.8
	
1975	 18.7	 '47.7	 33.6
	
1976	 17.5	 145.5	 37.0
	
1977
	
36.3	 36.14	 27.3
	
1978	 53.14	 18.3	 28.2
	
1979	 35.0	 33.2	 31.8
	
1980	 38.0	 32.5	 29.5
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Thus it is seen that apart from the CBN which was the dominant source
of funds to the Government in 1978-80, commercial banks were the most
important single lender to the public sector in the period under
discussion.
Among the non-bank public, the major investors in Government debt
are the savings institutions. Individuals held practically no
Government paper. This is hardly surprising given the factors which
condition the investment attitude of the private individuals in
Nigeria. They are usually interested in investment in real property.
As Obinna (1973, p.180) put it, 'they either hold land assets where
investments are traditionally safe in the form of elaborately
constructed residences or indulge in the consumption of imported
luxuries'.
The above analysis emphasises the Nigerian commercial banks'
insistence on the traditional short-term self-liquidating commercial
loans even when opportunities to lend long are available.
Consequently, the banks have not played any significant role in
providing the long-term financial needs of the public sector. For
example, as shown in Table 8.9, commercial banks' investment in
Government development stocks was negligible. The average annual
proportion for the period 1962-7 14 was 1.9 per cent, and in no year
within the period except in 1966 was the proportion more than 2.7 per
cent. The proportion, however, rose from 1.8 per cent in 19714 to 7.3
per cent in 1975 and was 10 per cent and 13.14 per cent in 1976 and
1977 respectively. The commercial banks' holdings of development
stocks reached the highest proportion of 17.1 per cent in 1980.
It is seen from Fig 8.14 and Table 8.9 that the national provident
fund, pension funds and savings type institutions were the major
310
holders of long-term public debt instruments. The proportion of their
holdings averaged 55.4 per cent for the years 1962714. Although their
holdings of development stocks declined from 56.7 per cent in 19714 to
38.8 per cent in 1975 and to 27.8 per cent in 1980, the proportion was
never below 27.3 per cent. Central Bank's holdings of development
stocks increased significantly in 1975 with a ratio of 30.2 per cent
and in 1979 when it recorded 50.7 per cent. It was 45 per cent in
1980.
Table 8.9	 Holdings of outstanding developiient stocks 1962-1980
(Percentages)
National provident fund,
Year Central Commercial Insurance pension funds and savings
	
bank	 banks	 companies type institutions
	
1962	 -	 2.4	 1.2	 66.4
	
963
	
7.5	 1.6	 0.8	 61.8
	
1964	 25.8	 1.0	 1.1	 53.0
	
1965	 27.9	 0.8	 1.6	 51.3
	
1966	 26.5	 3.0	 1.8	 53.5
1967	 30.9	 2.4
1968	 35.3	 1.14
1969	 29.6	 1.5
1970	 25.4	 2.14
1971	 28.6	 2.5
1972	 29.6	 2.7
1973	 13.3	 1.1
1974	 0.01	 1.8
1975	 30.2	 7.3
1976	 141.8	 10.0
1977
	 47.8	 13.4
	 3.2	 31.6
1978
	 37.6
	 6.5	 3.2
	 31.0
1979	 50.7	 9.8
	 2.6	 27.3
1980	 45.0	 17.1	 2.7
	 27.8
Sources : CBN i Economic and Financial Review - various years
ii Annual Report and Statement of Accounts,
December 1980.
	
1.5	 52.1
	
1.4	 52.2
	
1.3	 55.0
	
3.3	 55.8
	
3.0	 56.1
	
3.1	 55.0
	
2.7	 51.2
	
3.2	 56.7
	
2.9	 38.8
	
2.7	 34.6
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The level of Government dependence on the banking system for its
financial needs can further be measured by examining the percentage of
commercial banks' holdings of Government outstanding instruments
(Treasury bills and Treasury certificates) to internal public debt,
and to Government expenditure. This is shown in Table 8.10. The
proportion of Government total current expenditure financed through
Treasury bills and Treasury certificates increased from 18.6 per cent
in 1961 to 72.2 per cent in 1966. The proportion was highest in the
years 1967-71 with an average share of lOk.6 per cent. This is the
war years period. The average proportion for the pre-war period 1961-
66 was Z7.7 per cent and for the post-war years up to 1980 the average
annual proportion was k8.7 per cent. The high proportion for the war
period was due to increased war time financial needs of the
Government. With the end of the war and the increased revenue from
the crude oil exports, the public sector became less dependent on the
banking system. Hence the proportion of Government borrowing through
Treasury bills and Treasury certificates declined drastically from
914.9 per cent in 1971 to 17.8 per cent in 1975. As noted earlier,
this was the year the Government refused to issue new Treasury bills
and discouraged their holdings by reducing the interest rate on them;
it also stopped the issue of Treasury certificates. On the whole the
proportion of public sector borrowing from the commercial banks
through Treasury bills and Treasury certificates has shown an upward
trend as is clearly shown in Fig 8.5.
However, with a drathatic decline in oil revenue the expected
Government surplus turned into deficit and there was a frantic search
for new revenue sources as lack of funds once again posed a major
constraint to the implementation of the Third National Development
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Plan, 1975-80. There was thus increased borrowing from the banking
system, hence the proportion of Government debt instrument to current
expenditure rose from 17.8 per cent in 1975 to 73.5 per cent in 1979.
It however, declined to l3.5 per cent in 1980.
It could be seen from the Table that most of the indebtedness of
the public sector to the banking system was financed by the commercial
banks. Although not very important in the early 1960s because of the
reasons noted earlier, the banks became an important lender to the
Government since 1967. For instance in 1968, 1969 and 1970, the
proportion of Government debt instrument holdings by commercial banks
to Government current expenditure was 98.4 per cent, 77.2 per cent,
and 55 per cent respectively. When the proportionate holdings of the
entire banking system (CBN and commercial banks) fell to 17.8 per cent
in 1975 that of the commercial banks alone was 15.3 per cent. It was
35.6 per cent in 1979 and declined to 20.6 per cent in 1980.
Table 8.10 further indicates that a larger proportion of total
internal debt is financed through the banking system than through
other avenues. This is shown by the ratio of' Government instruments
to total internal debt. This ratio increased from 25 per cent in 1961
to 76.2 per cent in 1970 and the proportion was highest in the period
1968-75 when it recorded an average annual share of 73.7 per cent.
The average internal debt financed by the banking system through
Treasury bills and Treasury certificates for the period 1976-80 was
9.9 per cent.
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1966
1967
1968
969
1970
128.0
168.0
260.0
1482.0
792.0
22.5
28.5
215.1
3314.5
500.2
177.3
166.8
218.7
1433.14
909.1
263.2
3146.8
1426.0
6148.14
1, 0140.0
290.9
376.3
382.0
755.14
726.9
1, 0514.7
1, 1014.6
953.2
2,11414.0
2, 14314. 8
Table 8.10	 Comnercial banks' holdings of Government instruments
as a proportion of Government expenditure and internal
debt 1961-1980
Total Government
Year outstanding
(Dee) instruments
(Million naira)
Commercial banks
holdings of
Government
instruments
Total current Total
expenditure	 internal
1961	 18.0	 -	 96.8	 72.0
1962	 148.0	 6.7	 103.6	 98.8
1963
	
60.0	 2.14	 119.6	 134.8
196 14	 68.0	 10.7	 1142.6	 192.14
1965	 80.0	 12.9	 156.9	 232.14
1971	 872.0
1972	 902.0
1973
	
902.0
19714	 902.0
1975	 81414.0
1976	 1,268.0
1977	 1,591.0
1978	 2,616.0
1979	 14,1429.0
1980	 5,1146.6
Sources : 1 CBN
ii
iii
	9 8 6	 1,07)4.8
	
1,1412.14	 1,000.7
	
1,213.1
	
1,061.2
	
2,710.9
	
1,266.14
	
14,740.1	 1,678.9
5, 1459 .6
6,253.0
7, 1140. 1
6,027.2
11,820.9
2,630.0
14,636.0
5,983.1
7,282.3
8,218.5
Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
- various years
Economic and Financial Review - various
years
Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial
Indicators, 1970-79.
2 Tables 8.14 and 8.7
Notes	 Government instruments refer only to Treasury bills and
Treasury certificates.
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8.5
8.2
50.5
51.6
148.1
12.7
17.1
98.14
77.2
55.0
27. 1
37.6
36.0
59.6
43.3
31.7
26.6
31.5
27.9
15.3
140.1
23.8
15.9
29.14
29.6
19.3
17.7
13.3
35.6
20.6
1966	 17.6
1967	 17.0
1968	 82.7
1969	 69.14
1970	 63.2
1971	 33.4
1972	 141.7
1973
	
142.14
1974	 83.7
1975	 86.1
1976	 83.2
1977	 69.14
1978	 36.14
1979	 48.14
1980	 147.3
	
72.2	 148.6
	
100.7
	
48.14
	
119.3	 61.0
	
111.2	 74.3
	
87.1	 76.2
	
914.9
	
81.1
	
63.9	 90.1
	
74.4	 85.0
	
33.3	 71.2
	
17.8	 50.3
	
23.2	 148.2
	
25.4	 314.3
	
36.6	 143.7
	
73.5	 60.8
	
143.5	 62.6
Table 8.10	 Coiwnercia]. banks' holdings of Government instrnments
as a proportion of Government expenditure and internal
debt 1961-1980 (continued)
(Percentages)
Connnercial Commercial Government Government Commercial
Year banks	 banks	 instruments instruments banks
(Dee) holdings!
	
holdings!	 /current	 /internal	 holdings
Government internal
	 expenditure debt	 !current
instruments debt	 expenditure
1961	 -	 -	 18.6	 25.0	 -
1962	 1.14.0	 6.8	 146.3
	
48.6	 6.5
1963	 14.0	 1.8	 50.2	 1414.5	 2.0
19614	 15.7	 5.6	 147.7	 353	 7•5
1965	 16.1	 5.6	 51.0	 3)4.4	 8.2
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Commercial banks' role in financing public internal debt has been
significant. The proportion of commercial banks' holdings of
outstanding Government debt instruments increased over the period.
The increase was, however, sluggish in the early 1960s, but there was
a dramatic rise in 1968 from 8.2 per cent in 1967 to 50.5 per cent in
1968. In the 1968-76 period, the proportion of internal public debt
financed by commercial. banks through holdings of Treasury bills and
Treasury certificates was never below 36 per cent except in 1971 when
the ratio was 27.1 per cent. The proportion was as high as 59.6 per
cent in 197k. It declined from kO.1 per cent in 1976 to 29.6 per cent
in 1980.
Table 8.11 shows commercial banks' credit to the public sector.
A cursory look at the Table reveals that the same pattern as examined
above emerges. The banks' credit to the public sector has been
increasing over the period 1963-70, rising from 7.6 million naira in
1963 to 509 million naira in 1970. It declined to 2914.k million naira
i-i 1971. Thereafter, it fluctuated recording 819.6 million naira in
1976 and by 1980 it was 2632.k million naira. Proportionately
commercial banks credit to the public sector was kO per cent of the
total banking system's credit to the public sector. This proportion
declined to 17.7 per cent in 1967 but rose to 63.k per cent in 1968.
From then the proportion fluctuated, but apart from 197k, 1975 and
1978 years when the CBN's credit to the sector were negative, it never
declined below 55.9 per cent. In 1976 almost all credit to the public
sector were from the commercial banks. A pairwise examination of
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 points to great similarities in the growth pattern
of commercial banks' credit to the public sector and the banks'
holdings of government debt instruments. The conclusion therefrom is
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that almost all commercial banks credit to the public sector consists
of banks' holdings of outstanding Treasury bills and Treasury
certificates.
Table 8.11	 Banking system' s credit to the public sector 1963-80
(Million naira)	 By Commercial Banks
	
Year	 Total	 (Million naira)	 (Percentage)
	
1963	 18.6	 7.6	 140.9
	
196 )4	 38.8	 13.6	 35.1
	
1965	 59.6	 11.0	 18.5
	
966	 914.14	 25.6	 27.1
	
967	 160.6
	
28.14
	
17.7
	
1968	 311.14
	
197.4
	
63.14
	
1969	 1495.2
	
337.14
	
68.1
	
970	 657.14
	
509.0
	 77.14
	
1971	 526.8
	
294.k
	
55.9
	
1972	 514.6
	 390.4	 75.9
	
1973
	
1492.5	 377.2
	
76.6
	
19714	
-1,538.8
	
650.9	 142.3
	
1975	 -1,287.6
	
571.1
	
4)4.14
	
1976	 192.7
	
819.6
	
1425.5
	
1977	 2,086.14
	
1,071.2
	 51.3
	
1978	 3,230.5	 9)43.9	 29.2
	
1979	 3,1438.5	 2,358.8
	
68.6
	
1980	 3,589.2	 2,632.4	 73.3
Source : CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts - various years
8-5	 C0NLUSI0NS
The analysis has shown that the commercial banks have performed
their role of financing the public sector creditably. It is observed
that the amount of credit advanced to the public sector is dictated by
the sector's demand for funds which since the 1970s has become a
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function of revenues from crude oil exports, and the reliance of
the sector on the banking system. Of the sources of finance for
financing interal public debt commercial banks provided the most
important and reliable source. Most of the advances to the public
sector by the commercial banks were through Government short-term debt
instruments. The banks have virtually rejected holding the long-term
debt instruments and therefore contributed practically nothing to the
long-term financial needs of the public sector.
With the extension of the right to borrow from the public to the
state and local Governments, commercial banks will have a crucial role
to play when the states and local Governments start issuing their
securities. As a mobilizer of savings, the banks could ensure that
the economy is always in a desired state of liquidity necessary for
absorbing new issues of the state and local Governments securities
Commercial banks are also in a privileged position to assist in the
maintenance of' a ready resale market for such securities. Although,
as observed by Ejiofor and Okafor (1980) the state and local
Government securities issue will not make the banks hold "long
positions" in long-term securities, commercial banks could provide
some meaningful market support if the issues have serial maturities,
high coupon rates and are of medium-term securities.
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CHAPTER NINE
ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING SYSTEM'S
PROFITABILITY AND LENDING PERFORMANCE
9-1	 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to discuss and analyse one of
the subsets of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One : the economic
performance of a banking system is a function of its market structure
policy and demand variables.
The research task here is simple in concept but difficult ir
practice. This is due to lack of adequate data and information. The
information at hand is flawed and incomplete. These imperfections are
more severe in the early years of the period covered by the present
study, but even for recent years, they are serious. The present
chapter is undertaken because to wait for perfect data and informatior
would be futile, and the research itself might stimulate the interest
of the monetary authorities and the institutions concerned to pa
greater attention than hitherto to systematically publishing detailed
information. Besides, this study is considered a framework froff
which, it is hoped, will spring more sophisticated techniques for
handling the conceptual difficulties encountered here.
The main hypothesis of this chapter is that bank market structure
has a significant influence on bank performance after holding other
determinants constant. This hypothesis is consIstent with and based
on the acceptance of the relevance of the 'structure-conduct..
performance hypothesis' (S-C-P) to the commercial banking industry
The S-C-P hypothesis states that the structure of the market wil]
influence the conduct or behaviour of the firms in the market and that
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the resulting behaviour will be reflected in the price and profit
performance of the firms in the market. More explicitly, the smaller
the number of firms and more concentrated the market structure, the
greater is the probability that firms in the market will achieve a
joint price-output configuration that approaches the monopoly
situation. Monopoly, therefore, is the ability of firms to control
the market outcomes, particularly prices, profits and product
attributes and innovation (Kaysen and Turner 1959, Scherer 1980,
Shepherd 1975). A market is competitive when the leading firms lack
the ability to control it; they are instead themselves controlled by
the market (Shepherd, 1982).
Specifically, microeconomic theory holds that competitive
economic structure results in allocationally efficient use of
resources by competitive firms through cost minimization, and an
efficient level of output by firms at the point of average revenue
(AR) - marginal cost (Mc) equality. An industry with an imperfectly
competitive structure may, all things being equal, achieve cost
minimization, but not efficient level of output and it may require
regulations to achieve maximum efficiency (Leland, 197k). Thus as
shown in standard microeconomic text, the output under monopoly market
conditions (XM) (See Fig 9.1) in an industry will be less than
competitive output (XC), ceteris paribus, with a resultant loss of
consumer surplus of RST. (See Henderson and Quant, 1958, p.161-198).
Conventional neoclassical theories of the firm would, therefore,
predict that the monopolist firm would produce lower quantity at a
higher price and operate at the lowest possible cost, just like the
competitive firm. Consequently following economic theory a banking
industry with a competitive structure is the banking system consisting
323
Fig 9.1	 Output under imperfect and competitive market conditions
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of many competing banks, and therefore, such a banking system will
perform better in terms of output and prices than a banking system
consisting of only a few banks.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The next section is
concerned with the literature review. Most of the studies in this
area were on the United States banking system and some of the major
ones are reviewed. A few related studies done on the Nigerian banking
system are also reviewed in this section. In section three, the
factors determining the profitability performance of the banks are
analysed. The fourth section discusses the determinants of the
lending activity of the Nigerian banks. The last section is
the conclusion.
9-2	 LITERATURE REVIEW
The S-C-P hypothesis has been tested extensively with data
obtained from the industrial sector. The results of this body of
empirical work provide substantial evidence that market structure does
seem to influence firm behaviour in the hypothesised manner. As in
the industrial sector, the relevance of the S-C-P hypothesis to
commercial bank behaviour has been the subject of a large number of
empirical studies.
9-2.1	 Studies on the US Banld.ng System
The unique and paradoxIcal structure of, and the intensively
regulated banking industry as well as public concern in the United
States have aroused greater interest in the structure-performance of
commercial banks in the United States than in the United Kingdom or
any other developed industrial country. There has been quite a number
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of studies (over k0 published studies; see Heggestad 1979, Rhoades
1977 for reviews) of the impact of market structure on the performance
of the commercial banking industry. These studies generally fall into
two groups. One group has focused on the examination of the operating
efficiency of the commercial banks as reflected in the economies of
scale and their implications for the banking industry. For example
the studies by Aihadeff (195k), Guttentag and Herman (1967), Benston
(1965), Daniel, Longbrake and Murphy (1973), Bell and Murphy (1968),
Murphy (1972), Millineaux (1978), Murray and White (1980), Benston,
Hanweck and Humphrey (1982) have consequently utilized the theory and
estimation of cost function as an analytical framework.
The consensus of these studies is that there exists a U-shaped
average cost curve for the United States' banks, and that the
economies of scale are statistically significant and are constant
across different sizes of banks. As Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey
(1982) observed, with 1960s data a scale economy value of 0.93 to 0.95
would be representative of the best known studies. • These studies
suggest the need for promoting economic efficiency in banking. This
is because the production function for all banks is characterised by
increasing return to scale, and atomistic competition forces firms to
operate at the lowest point of their average cost curves in the long-
run where operating efficiency is highest.
It is important, however, to note that without the assumption of
"cost minimization" behaviour, the average cost curves estimated by
these studies do not reflect potential firm efficiency (Bhatia, 1978).
Generally speaking, larger banks stand the chance of achieving greater
economies of' scale than smaller banks mainly because of the greater
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disability of the latter to spread overhead costs, pool risks and
specialise among employees, as well as their higher transaction costs
of moving funds in smaller amounts than in the former. However, if
the managers of larger banks are risk avoiders rather than profit
maximizers as Heggestad (1977) and Caves (1970) have shown in their
studies, and as, we have noted in Chapter Seven, seems to be the case
of the Nigerian banking system, or if the managers maximize their own
utility rather than attempting to maximize profits (See Williamson's
(197 14) expense-preference theory and L.eibenstein's (1976) X..
inefficiency theory), the cost and output data reported by the firms
cannot be used to measure economies of scale and economic efficien y
Some of the banks because of their size may be leading a quiet life
rather than minimizing their operating costs (Edward and Heggestad,
1973).
Furthermore, most of the studies suffer form a common
shortcoming, namely the failure to take account of the influence of
technology on economies of scale. Input-output relationship in an
industry does not only depend on the proportions to which the factors
of production are employed and the scale of production but also upon
the level of technology. Changes in technology may, consequently,
make earlier studies irrelevant for present concern. Only few recent
studies such as those of Daniel, L.ongbrake and Murphy (1973), Murray
and White (1980), Millineaux (1978) and Bell and Murphy (1967)
explicitly examined the influence of technology on bank costs and
economies of scale. These studies noted that significant economies of
scale were sensitive to the technology employed as well as the size of
the firm. Daniel, Longbrake and Murphy (1973), for instance, found
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that the cost advantage of small banks vis-a-vis large banks is
reduced by adoption of computer technology. However, for the Nigerian
banking system, which continues to be labour-intensive in the present
computer age, technological change is not significant, but for the US
banking system, where the computer and electronic funds transfer
system are in use, their impact on costs and economies of scale must
be significant.
A second set of the studies on the structure performance in the
US banking system has attempted to isolate the concentration dimension
of the market structure and determine its impact on prices and
profits. These studies are concerned with the effects of the banking
structure as presented by the number of bank offices and the
concentration ratio on the performance of commercial banks. Principal
works in this area include Edwards (196k and 1973), Kaufman (1966),
Brucker (1970), Vernon (1971), Emery (1971), Bryan (1972), Fraser,
Phillips and Rose (197 14), Yeats (197 14 ), Fraser and Alvis (1975), Mingo
(1976), Scott (1977), Heggestad (1977) to name but a few. A few of
these studies are summarized in Table 9.1.
These studies have evaluated performance of the banks by
employing cross-sectional data drawn from many sets of markets and
carrying many time periods. In general, these studies found a
statistically significant relationship between some measures of
performance but the effect was generally small in magnitude.
Specifically the concentration var.iable was found to be not an
important determinant of performance since the impact was less
predictable than other variables.
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In a number of these studies the unit of observation is the
individual bank as opposed to the entire banking system. The use of
the banking market is consistent with a priori reasoning and
theoretical framework. Theory provides support for a direct
relationship between market structure and performance while the
relationship between market structure and a firm's performance is
more inferential in nature and as Rhoades (1977) contends, focusing on
the firm creates measurement problems since a firm's performance may
reflect unique policies or circumstances.
The overall results of these studies indicate that the banking
market structure influences prices and profit performance of the
banks, but for practical policy purposes, this influence is
quantitatively small, and the conclusions are not by any means
unanimous. Thus unlike the supportive results obtained from the
industrial sector where a positive and statistically significant
relationship between market concentration and profits has been
consistently found, the empirical results from banking studies have
been rather heterogenous. It is because of the inconclusive and, to a
substantial degree, contradictory results that aufman (1966, p.139)
pointed out in his study that 'the experiment should be replicated for
other states and other types of bank organisations before the results
may be considered sufficiently persuasive for determining policy'.
This view was supported by Fraser, Phillips and Rose (197 14) who
observed that it would be of great interest to see results of similar
studies conducted in state-wide branch banking and limited branch
banking states.
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The study attempted in this chapter differs from these studies ir
a number of ways. First, as noted in the introduction to thi
chapter, the dearth of reliable data and information has made it
iff'icult and unnecessary to replicate the experiment using the sam
iethodology. Consequently a simplified methodology of discussior
and analysis of the factors that influence the performance of th€
Ligerian banking system is undertaken. Second, the unit of
oDservation is the entire Nigerian banking system and thus the
conomy-wide branch banking system of Nigeria provides a different
dnd of setting from the unit and limited branch banking of the Unitec
hates. Third, some of the studies have examined the issue of
hieving economies of scale relative to branch versus unit bankin
systems with conflicting results. The issue does not apply to this
udy because in the economy-wide branch banking system of Nigeria
tlere does not exist any legal restriction on branching between or
within states. Fourth, in the United States where most of the studies
were conducted the concentration problem is not significant enough tc
warrant the study of the kind attempted here. If, for instance, ban1
deposits outstanding are taken as a universe, then large banks do not
dominate the banking system in the United States as they do ir
Nigeria. As Bhatia (1978) noted, the top ten banks in the United
States held around 18 per cent of all deposits while the top 183 banks
accounted for less than 50 per cent of deposits in 1971. In Nigeria
on the other hand, by 1973 the top three banks controlled about 70 per
cent of the aggregate deposits of the banking system. However, the
differences notwithstanding, the studies reviewed form the antecedents
of some of the determining factors discussed in this study.
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9-2.2	 Studies on the Nigerian Banking System
Studies of the factors that influence the operating performance
of the Nigerian banking system have received very scanty attention arid
in particular studies on the impact of structure on performance of the
banks are virtually non-existent.
A start in this area has been made by Ojo (1979). In his study
he discovered the possibility of the existence of economies of scale
for the Nigerian banks. He compared rates of return on investment or
profit earnings of individual banks and came up with the following
conclusions:
(i)	 Commercial banks in Nigeria have been performing
satisfactorily well in terms of their profitability and growth,
however, most of the banks are still far from realising the great
potential scale economies and therefore are yet to bring about the
greatly desired improvements in their services and performance.
(2) Although the effect of size on profitability is not yet
defined in any precise manner in favour of large or small banks, the
possibility of greater certainty of profits of large banks may make
greater size more attractive than smaller size.
(3) There has been no conclusive finding about the extent to
which scale economies are present in banks of different sizes because
the optimum bank size could be relatively small or large. The
difficulty of obtaining details of costs of the banks' operations has
imposed a limitation on the study.
Another important effort in this branch of study was made by
Soyode and Oyejide (1975).
	
Their study touched on structure-
performance of the Nigerian banks. The study was, however, restricted
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to the impact of the branch network on bank profitability. With cross
sectional data on the 1 commercial banks then in existence in Nigeria
for the year 1973/7i the impact of the branch network on bank
profitability was estimated using standard regression technique. The
estimates were of three types. One measures the general relationshi
between bank profitability and the size of the branch network
(measured in a number of ways). The second type of estimate examined
the rural urban pattern of branch locations and the third made
distinction between expatriate and indigenous banks. These estimates
are shown in Table 9.2.
The number of observations is not stated, nevertheless,
regression results (1) and (2) confirmed a positive and statistical
significant relationship between average net profit and absolute as
well as relative size of banks' branch network, implying that it pays
for commercial banks to have a wide branch network. Similarly
regression results (3), (4) and (5) indicated that profitability
tended to increase with the number as well as the proportion of large
city branch offices operated by banks.
The limitation of' the study is that from planning perspective
the desired size of' branch networks cannot be deduced from the
results. Depending upon how banks compete with each other, some of
the potential economies and benefits often associated with branch
network expansion could be frittered away through competitive
duplication of branches.
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0. 0122
(2.8625)
Table 9.2
	
Regre5sion re3ults
Pro fit
measure	 X0	 X3	 X5	 Dummy	 R2
1 ANP	 0.0182 0.0661	 0.6078
(3.8598)
0. 1271
(2.5871)
2 ANP	 0.06014
3 ANP -0.01471
14 ANP	 1.3173
5 ANP -0.0516
0. 2160
(3.39149)
0. 21 35
(14.8625)
0. 6076
0. 58146
0. 10142
0. 21413
6 ANP	 0.7663	 -0.8831 0.6260
(3.145 10)
7 ANP	 0.58143
	
0. 0779	 -0.5921 0.6590
	
(2.2633)	 (2.2393)
Source : Soyode, A and Oyejide, T A. 'Branch network and economic
performance - a case study of Nigeria's commercial banks'
The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 1975
Notes	 : 1 The number of observation was not stated
2 ANP is the average net profit
3 X0 is the constant
14	 is each bank's number of offices
5 X2 is each bank's percentage share of total number of
branch offices for all banks
6 X3 is each bank's number of large city branch offices
7 X14 is each bank's large city branch offices as a
percentage of its total number of offices
8 X is each bank's percentage share of the total number
o large city offices for all banks
9 The dummy equals 1 for indigenous banks and zero for
expatriate banks
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9-3	 FACTORS DETERMINING THE NIGERIAN BANKING SYSTFI('S PROFITS AND
PROFITABILITY PERFORMANCE
Data availability and the hypothesis of this chapter dictate that
the following factors be considered as determinants of bank profit and
profitability performance.
1 Market structure variables which comprise total
assets, deposits concentration ratio and number of
bank offices
2 Policy variables which include time plus savings
deposits to total deposits ratio, loans and
advances to total deposits ratio
3	 Demand variable which is proxied by per capita
income
Before discussing these factors it is pertinent to question the profit
maximization assumption of banks. In fact it has been argued that one
possible explanation for the weakness of the S-C-P relationship is the
identification of the rational behaviour of banks with profit
maximization (Clark, 1980, p.8). A profit objective is only one of a
potentially large number of objectives which might reasonably be
pursued by bank management. Thus the assumption that banks behave as
if they are profit maximizers may be an inappropriate or inadequate
explanation or description of commercial bank behaviour. Bank
management reasonably pursue multiple objectives some of which may be
in conflict with the goal of maximum profit. Should any number of
multiple objectives conflict with profit maximization, bank profits
will probably be less than the maximum the bank could potentially earn
(Clark, 1980).
In fact recent studies have begun to view banks as entities which
maximize utility rather than profits. One approach which has received
considerable attention is the expense-preference theory which
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envisages banks as maximising utility through the pursuit of non
profit maximising policy. (See Rees, 197k for theoretical •discussion
and Edwards, 1977 for empirical results).
9-3.1	 ProfIt-Asset Relationship
Total assets represent an important and generally used dimension
in which the size of a bank is measured and is also a very important
factor in the operational efficiency of any economic unit. There is
no doubt that large banks enjoy an advantage in market power compared
to small banks. This is because of the theoretical possible and often
available economies of scale. Their size, for example, permits them
to bargain more effectively, "administer" prices and in the end
realise significantly hig1er prices for a particular product. More
importantly the size of total assets should, to some extent, indicate
the ability or capacity to assume risk. A bigger bank, because of the
sheer size of its assets is better cushioned for, and can better
absorb "shocks" resulting from the risks inherent in portfolio
management. This confidence-giving attribute should make the big bank
more risk-accepting and less risk-averting than small banks
(Adewunmi, 1981, p.3149).
Another important advantage of economies of scale which is
relevant here is that because of large size big banks will invariably
be more disposed to employ and maintain well-informed and experienced
management staff. At the same time it is just as true that to
management and other personnel large banks are more attractive in many
regards. Higher salaries, better training opportunity domestically
and abroad, many fringe benefits and last but not least the perceived
high social prestige of large banks are reasons for this. Crosse and
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Hampel (1980, p.105) have observed that high productivity reflects
among other things the effectiveness of personnel training and that
both big and relatively small banks have demonstrated that the
greatest savings in cost are to be found not in machinery alone but in
more efficient procedures and more efficient management organisation.
An examination of Tables 9.3 and 9. shows that the total assets
of the Nigerian banks and bank profitability maintained upward trends.
While the annual average growth rate of assets was 27.8 per cent for
the period 1970-81 that of profits was 28.3 per cent for the same
period. For the two variables, the rate of increase was highest in
the period 197t-77; an explanation being the increased monetization
of oil exports during this period. The influence of inflation on
these variables was also very high. The growth of total assets and
profits of the Nigerian banks during this period (197'-77) avex4aged
1 8.0 per cent and k6.2 per cent respectively. In 1978 when the total
asset growth rate dropped to 6.7 per cent from 33.9 per cent in 1977
that of profits declined similarly from 89.9 per cent in 1977 to a low
of 7 per cent.
When the relationship in the growth trend between total deposits
and loans and advances on one hand, and bank profits on the other is
examined, the picture remains the same. Both loans and advances and
total deposits of the banks maintained similar upward trends with
banks' profits. The annual average growth rate of 314.5 per cent for
loans and advances is higher than that of 28.3 per cent and 29.3 per
cent for profits and total deposits respectively. Furthermore, in
1978 when the growth rate of loans and advances declined slightly from
45.3 per cent to 33.4 per cent, profits declined substantially from
89.9 per cent to 7 per cent. An explanation may, perhaps, be that the
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banks were not earning as much as they should from their loans and
advances. It seems rather that the banks earn more from their
investment in government securities (which, because of their risk
averse attitude, most of them prefer to lending to agricultural
services) and services charges.
Table 9.3
	
Profits, number of banks offices, assets an deposits of
the Nigerian banking system 1970-81
(Million naira)
Net	 Time	 Number
Profits	 and	 Loans	 GDP	 of -
(current Total
	
Total	 savings and	 (current bank
Year prices) assets
	
deposits deposits advances prices) offices
1970	 114.6	 1,152.0	 625.8	 336.8	 351.3
	
5,621.0 318
1971	 18.9	 1,275.9	 657.2	 371.8	 502.0	 7,098.0 3140
1972	 27.8	 1,1437.5	 776.2	 1461.2	 619.5	 7,703.0 358
1973	 35.6	 1,772.0
1974	 143.5	 2,811.2
1975	 67.0	 14,308.0
1976	 79.5	 6,371.14
	
1977 151.0	 8,530.9
	
1978 161.6	 9,105.7
	
1,013.0	 582.3
	
753.14
	
1,693.9	 973.2	 938.1
	
2,839.1	 1,302.3
	
1,121.5
	
14,16 14.2	 1,979.1	 2,122.9
	
5,235.2	 2,255.1	 3,0714.6
	
5,302.6	 2,601.7	 4,109.7
9.001.0 383
16,962.0 1403
20,1405.0 1433
25,14149.0 45O
28,015.0 508
28,737.0 585
	
1979 156.1	 11,238.6	 6,967.8	 3,702.1	 4,618.7
	
30,862.0 672
	
1980 157.2	 13,717.14	 8,8142.7
	
5,111.9	 6,379.1	 51,156.0 740
	
1981 18 14.1	 15,5148.1	 10,677.0	 5,796.1	 8,582.9	 57,567.0 740
Sources : Tables 6.2, 6.5, 6.8 and 14.7
The problem, however, is that the CBN specifies the rates to be
charged on loans and advances to the preferred sectors of the economy
such as agriculture and manufacturing. This, nevertheless, does not
mean that the banks cannot adopt a policy that will enable them make
more as well as profitable loans. Banks do not charge the maximum
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rate of interest. Once the loan demand seems risky the application is
rejected. Banks' loan policy should stress the importance of changing
interest rates that reflect the risks involved and this could be done
within the administered interest rate structure. But first this
requires accurate evaluation of the business and financial risks
present (Haslem, 1968).
Table 9.4
	
Annual changes in profits, assets, GDP, branches and
deposits of the Nigerian baTiking systen 1970-81
(Percentages)
Time and Loans	 Number
Net	 Total	 Total	 Savings and	 of bank
Year profits assets deposits deposits advances GDP offices
1970
1971	 29.5	 10.8	 5.0	 10.14	 142.9
	
26.3	 6.9
1972	 147.0	 12.7	 18.1	 214.0	 23.14	 8.5	 5.3
1973	 28.1	 23.3	 30.5	 26.3	 21.6	 16.9	 7.0
19714	 22.2	 58.6	 148.7	 67.1	 214.5	 88.14	 5.2
1975	 514.0	 53.2	 67.2	 33.8	 19.6	 20.3	 7.14
1976	 18.7	 147.9	 146.7
	
52.0	 89.3	 214.7	 3.9
1977	 89.9	 33.9	 25.7	 13.9	 1414.8	 10.0	 12.9
1978	 7.0	 6.7	 1.2	 15.14	 33.7	 2.6	 15.2
1979	 _3.14	 23.14	 31.14	 142.3	 12.14	 7.14	 114.9
1980	 0.7	 22.1	 26.9	 38.0	 38.1	 65.8	 10.1
1981	 17.1	 13.3	 20.7	 13.14	 314.5	 2.6	 0.0
Average
annual 28.3
	
27.8	 29.3
	
30.6	 314.5	 23.5	 8.1
growth
rate
Source : Table 9.3
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Like total assets and profits total deposits' growth rate was
highest in the period 197-77. The average annual growth rate for
this period was 7.1 per cent compared to L 6.2 per cent for profits.
Banks' profits reacted also to the decline in the growth rate of
deposits in 1975 to 1.2 per cent from 25.7 per cent in 1977 by a
similar fall in their growth rate to 7.0 per cent in 1978 from 89.9
per cent in 1977.
9-3.2	 Profit-Bank Branches Relationship
Another measure of structure of the Nigerian banking system used
in this analysis which is of particular concern to the regulatory
authorities is the number of bank offices. Economic theory implies
that a banking system consisting of numerous competing banks will
perform better in terms of output and prices than a banking system
dominated by a few banks. This is based o the assumption that
financial services do not differ from other commodities as far as the
desirability of satisfying the marginal criteria of welfare economics
is concerned. Barnes (1982), however, noted that because of problems
of control or co-ordination, as well as to fixed costs at the branch
level, high costs result if a given level of assets is split up among
more and more branches. Nevertheless, a banking system in the process
of expanding its branch network appears to attract more new business
than might otherwise be expected (Wilson Committee, 1980).
As can be gauged from Table U.? the number of bank offices in
Nigeria had increased 289.5 per cent in absolute terms over the period
1960-78. Annual growth rate for the entire period was 7 per cent and
between 1970 and 1980 the annual average increase was 8.6 per cent. A
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close examination of Table 9.3 and 9.k indicates that bank profit
increased with increase in bank branches up to 1977. Between 1970 anc
1977 the highest rate of increase in banks' profits was recorded ir
1977 arid the highest growth rate in bank branches of 12.9 per cent wa
recorded in the same year. The implication derived is that the brand
expansion between 1970-77 might have been accompanied by significant
expansion in the deposit base hence a positive contribution to banks
profits is made through the expansion in the average size of asset
holdings. In addition it may be presumed that the increased service
and convenience resulting from a large number of bank offices durin
this period increased customer satisfaction and the spread of bankin
habit particularly in the rural areas and that the earning ability oi
the Nigerian banks was enhanced.
The situation was a bit different in the period 1978-80. While
the average annual growth rate of bank offices during this period wa
13.4 per cent that of banks' profits was as low as 1.k per cent. It
1979 when the rate of increase in bank offices was V4.9 per cent that
of banks' profits was negative, —3.k per cent. An explanation whic
could be offered might be that the expansion in bank offices instea
of being accompanied by a significant expansion in deposit base becamE
a source of decreasing return due to problems of control or co-
ordination as well as high input prices at the branch level. ThE
branch banking literature suggests that any economies of scale whic
accrue through branch banking expansion will be offset by the greater
cost of operating multiple facilities.
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Overall Table 9.6 shows that there is a statistical positive
association between the banking system's profitability and the
number of bank offices. A high and significant statistical
correlation of 0.53 implies that more branches are desirable to
increase bank profitability.
9-3.3	 Profitability-Concentration Relationship
One of the most tested relationships in industrial organisation
literature is the profitability-concentration hypothesis. Economic
theory suggests that other things being equal firms having significant
market positions in a highly concentrated market will tend to restrict
output, charge higher prices, earn higher rates of return and use
their entrenched position to retard the competitive efforts of other
firms (Allardice and Erdevig, 1981, p .14 ). Since the Nigerian banking
system consists of many competing banks and yet a few large ones exert
a great deal of' influence on the market, there is the need for an
index that measures the relationship between the number of firms
and their share of the market. The index used in this study is the
four bank concentration ratio calculated as:
14
CR=	 Di
i=1
D
where	 CR = concentration ratio
Di = deposits of the leading ith bank
D = total deposits outstanding of the banking system
The four bank concentration is considered an appropriate index because
it encompassed banks from the two groups of banks in Nigeria: foreign
banks (now mixed ownership banks) and indigenous banks (now state
government-owned banks).
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One summary measure of concentration that takes into account the
total number of firms in a market and their' market share is the
Herfindahi index. The index is constructed by summing the squares of
the market share of all firms in the market. That is:
N
Herfindah]. index 	 (Xi/s)2
i= 1
where	 N	 the number of firms
Xi the absolute size of each of the firms
S	 the total size of the market
One limitation to using the Herfindahi index is the frequent lack of
information on the market share of individual firms, and this
is particularly manifest in the Nigerian banking system where such
necessary information on individual banks is not available. As
Shepherd (1979a, p.165) put it 'Herfindahl "summary" indexes require
far more information and their weighting among firms is
controversial'. Because of this limitation it was not possible to use
the Herfindahi index in this analysis.
No single measure, however, adequately describes market
concentration. No satisfactory explanation of the size distribution
of firms has yet been derived from economic theory (Curry and George,
19 8 3). The concentration ratio, for example, can only suggest that
the small number of large firms makes restrictive pricing and output
decisions more possible than if there were many firms of equal size.
It does not mean that large firms are actually engaging in
anti-competitive conduct. The existence of a few firms may simply
reflect economies of large scale (Salley, 1972, p.72). The
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shortcoming notwithstanding, the concentration ratio is regarded as
one of the few general measures of structure available to the
economist (Bain, 1959). Shepherd (196 l , p.200) contends that 'for
all its shortcomings the homely concentration ratio is a direct and
fairly clear indication of industry structure'.
Traditionally the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis would
suggest a positive relationship between market concentration and the
profitability of a firm or bank. However, firms or banks in a more
highly concentrated market where potential profits are high are in
a position to forego some potential profits in the pursuit of
potentially conflicting goals (two examples of which are sales and
sales revenue maximisation (Clark, 1980).
On an a priori basis, therefore, the relationship between bank
profitability and the degree of market concentration is less clear.
It depends very much on the objectives the bank management wants to
pursue. From Table 9.5 there is no clear relationship between bank
profitability and market concentration in the Nigerian banking system.
For instance, the sharp increase in market concentration in 1972 was
not proportionately reflected in bank profitability in the same year.
Similarly the gradual decrease in market concentration between 1977
and 1981 did not reflect negatively or positively in the behaviour of
banks' profitability performance. However, from Table 9.6 it is seen
that there is a negative and weak statistical relationship between the
banking system's market concentration and its profitability
performance. The statistical relationship of -0.278 implies that
market structure has no apparent effect on the Nigerian banking
system's profitability performance.
3!5
There has been a continual reduction since 1970 in the importance
of large-scale banks in the Nigerian banking system. The market share
of the few large banks has dropped from over 98 per cent in 1972,to
35.8 per cent in 1981. (See Table 9.5). From 1977 there has also
been a fall, although a much smaller and a more gradual one.
Table 9.5
	
	
Profitability of the Nigerian banking system and its
deter.innts
(Percentages)	 (Million
Time and Loans	 naira)
Net	 Net	 Deposit	 savings and	 Per	 Number
profits profits concentra- deposits advances capita of
Year Capital Assets tion 	 Total	 Total	 income bank
deposits deposit	 offices
1970
	
25.5
	
1.3
	
145.8
	
53.8
	
56.1
	 814.9	 318
1971
	
26.9
	
1.5
	
514.14
	
56.6
	
76.14
	
1014.7
	
3140
1972
	
36.2
	
1.9
	
98.9
	 59.14	 78.0
	
110.8
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1973
	
'41.14
	
2.0
	
73.1
	
57.5
	
714.14
	
126.3
	
383
19714
	
143.5
	
1.5
	
'49.9
	
57.5
	
55.14
	
232.0
	
403
1975
	
52.6
	
1.6
	
147.5
	
J45.9
	
54.1
	
272.14
	
1433
1976
	
50.6
	
1.2
	
'45.0
	
147.5
	
51.0
	
331.14
	
1450
1977
	
7k. 9
	
1.8
	
53.1
	
143.1
	
58.7
	
356.0
	
508
1978
	
60.5
	
1.8
	
50.8
	
'49.0
	
77.5
	 356.5	 585
1979
	
'47. 6
	
1q14
	
'45.3
	
53.1
	
66.14
	
373.6
	
672
1980
	
'41.6
	
1.1
	
147.9
	
57.8
	
69.6
	
6014.0
	
7'40
1981
	
56.2
	
1.2
	
35.8
	
35.6
	
52.8
	
662.5
	
740
Sources : Tables 6.5 and 9.3
If from this point of view, it can, therefore, be affirmed that
the degree of market concentration of the Nigerian banking has for
some time been falling, it must imply that at the same time there has
been a substantial growth in the importance of smaller banks and that
346
there has been a continual increase over the years in the total
number of banks and bank offices operating in the system. (See
Chapter Four). On the whole, it can be said that the dimension of
banking structure is becoming more balanced partly because of the
controls exercised by the authorities on entry and the encouragement
given by the CBN to the banks to open new offices in the rural areas.
The smaller banks have benefited from the rural expansion because they
have the local advantage (most of them are indigenous banks) and
protected as they were by, among other things, the criteria adopted by
the CBN for the opening of new offices. The biggest banks, on the
contrary, which own most of the bank offices in the large cities and
by the fact of operating in an environment where industrial and
commercial activities are already flourishing, have scaled down their
desire to grow and have therefore increased deposits less quickly.
The possibility cannot be excluded that the negative and weak
association between market concentration and bank profitability and
the more sluggish growth of the large banks partly reflect the
centralisation and rigidity of the banks' management, particularly
that of the big banks, which deprive them of the flexibility needed to
exploit their geographical structure (for example the big banks
refused to expand to the rural areas by the simple device of refusing
to open new urban branches) and to meet the ever increasing demand for
bank services. Implied, therefore, is that the Nigerian banking
system is non-competitive and banks therefore operate under conditions
of less risk than their counterparts in more competitive markets.
Thus Nigerian banks tend to restrict output not by charging high
prices f or their services but by fixing low prices and avoiding risk
and consequently they do not earn as high rates of return on their
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equity as they would otherwise have. In his study Caves (1970, p.28k)
in examining Gaibraith's The New Industrial State, has suggested that
one of the most important of Gaibraith's arguments is the 'oft-ignored
aspect of the large firm's behaviour: that a significant portion of
the potential profits latent in its position of market power is taken
in the form of avoiding uncertainty'. If, therefore, as this study
and our analysis suggest that the degree of risk aversion is greater
for banks in more highly concentrated markets, that further provides
at least a partial explanation for the weak and negative statistical
relationship between the bank market structure and profitability
performance of the Nigerian banking system.
Table 9.6	 Correlation between the Nigerian banking system's
profitability and its detenninant3
Time and Loans and
Deposit	 savings	 advances	 Number	 Per
concentration deposits total 	 of bank capita
ratio	 total	 deposits	 offices income
deposits
Net profits	 -0.27	 -0.77	 -0.16	 0.53	 0.55
capital
Net profits	 0.11	 -0.13
	
-0.28	 -0.'2
assets
Source : Computer print out
Profitability and Policy Variables
According to the portfolio balance model of asset
diversification, the optimum holding of each asset in a wealth
3148
holder's portfolio is a function of policy decisions determined by a
number of factors such as a vector of rates of return on all assets
held in the portfolio, a vector of risks associated with the ownership
of each financial asset, the size of the portfolio (Bryant 1975, Yang
and Grehrmánn 1982). Consequently portfolio diversification and the
desired portfolio composition of commercial banks are the result of
policy decision of the management. The desired portfolio composition
involves the exact mix of business which is necessary not only to
ensure that the banks maintain their respective desired market profile
but also because the relative profitability of their different
services changes with interest rate movements.
On a priori grounds, therefore, the deposit mix i.e. time and
savings deposits to total deposits ratio and the level of
intermediation indicated by loans-deposits ratio are considered
appropriate policy variables influencing a banking system's
performance. In a study of medium size banks Bryan (1972) found that
the most important single factor explaining profitability was the
ratio of time plus savings deposits to total deposits.- The deposit-
mix by determining the liquidity needs of the banking system affects
the volume of earning assets - the proxy variable for output (See
Chapter Six). The intermediation ratio reflects the credit policy
formulated by the banking system.
The relationship between time plus savings deposits to total
deposits ratio and bank profitability seems uncertain. There are two
sides to the argument. The first is that the ratio of time and
savings deposits to total deposits may be expected to exhibit a
negative relationship with bank profitability. An increase in the
proportion of time and savings deposits to total deposits implies a
3 1 9
low level of real output of the banking system. Besides time anc
savings deposits require explicit interest cost to attract. Because
they are a more costly source of banks deposits, the greater thE
proportion of time and savings deposits to total deposits, the greater
the interest cost of funds and thus the lower the profit rate. It i
further argued that the stability in the banks' deposit base i
accounted for mainly by total demand deposits. This may be due to the
often observed fact that in Nigeria the small savers who are the main
holders of savings deposits display a more erratic deposit and
withdrawal behaviour than firms which are the principal holder of
demand deposits. Therefore, the more the banks have a higher
proportion of more erratic time and savings deposits in their deposit
portfolio, the higher will be the cost and thus the lower will b the
profits.
On the contrary, the ratio of time and savings deposits to total
deposits might be expected to be positively related to bank's rate of
profits. Clark (1980, p.92) has argued that time and savings
deposits represent a much more stable source of funds than do demand
deposits. (See also Morrison and Selden, 1965, p .13). As a result,
bank primary and secondary reserves may be reduced the greater the
bank's proportion of time and savings deposits to total deposits
(since with a stable source of funds the bank can meet unexpected cash
withdrawals and also does not need to keep reserves as a hedge against
penalty rate that would otherwise be incurred for a cash shortfall
necessitating borrowing from the central bank) thereby leading to
increased investment of bank funds and thus increased profitability.
As pointed out in Table 6.2, the absolute amount of time and
savings deposits as well as their proportion in total deposits of the
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Nigerian banks increased steadily during the period 1960-81. In
absolute amount time plus savings deposits increased from 5 1L8 million
naira in 1960 to 5,796.1 million naira in 1981. The ratio of time and
savings deposits to total deposits increased from kO per cent in 1960
to 5 per cent in 1970 and to 57.8 per cent in 1981. Although bank
profitability increased from 25.5 per cent in 1970 to 56.2 per cent in
1981, (See Table 9.5) there seems to be no indication of any clear
relationship between bank profitability and the proportion of time and
savings deposits to total deposits.
Table 9.6, however, indicates that there is a negative
statistical association between the deposit mix and bank -
prâfitability. The inverse significant statistical relationship of -
0.77 between time and savings deposits to total deposits ratio and
bank profitability implies that the banks have not been able to
minimise their total resource costs by a clever combination of cost-
effective sources of deposits.
Surprisingly, the loan-deposit ratio has a negative and weak
statistical association with the profitability performance of the
Nigerian banking system. The weak and inverse statistical
relationship of -0.16 and -0.28 for both measures of profitability may
imply that the banking system increased loans and advances by reducing
interest charges. A further explanation may be in terms of the
capital budgeting process used by firms. An increase in interest
rate, an important element of the cost of capital, adversely effects
the net present value of a project being considered for funding, and
thereby, the demand of a firm for funds (Weston and Brigham, 1977,
p.257-308).
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9-3.5	 ProfItability and Dnand Factor
Economic conditions within a market may be expected to influence
bank behaviour through the demand for banking services. The demand
for banking services should be greater, the greater the relative
influence of the market. Per capita income is used here to provide an
index for the demand factor for bank services. Thus higher per capita
income might ordinarily be identified with a higher rate of return on
equity. In addition to the effect of per capita income on the bank's
rate of return on equity, market demand also has a direct effect on
bank revenue and the size of bank earning assets. The greater the
market demand for bank services (as captured by high per capita
income), the greater one might expect the bank revenue on earning
assets and bank earning asset size to be, hence the better the
profitability performance of the banks.
Table 9.6 indicates that there is a positive significant
statistical association between the demand for bank services and the
bank profitability. However, given the CBN's ceilings on loan rates
particularly to the preferred sectors of the economy, it is expected
that returns to commercial banking assets will be inversely related to
the level of economic development. This explains the negative
statistical association of -O.5 between per capita income and the
yield rate on assets.
9I	 LENDING PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The lending performance measure to be discussed here is the ratio
of total loans to total assets. A priori, the greater the proportion
of bank's resources placed in loans the better the bank's performance
(Brucker, 1970). The ratio of total loans to total assets measures
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broadly the ability and the willingness of banks to convert their idle
cash deposits into productive resources. It is in this way that the
banks act as effective agents of capital formation (Moulton, 1981,
p,869). For a developing economy there can hardly be rendered a
better service by a financial intermediary than that of helping to
organise capital resources internally. In addition the loans-assets
ratio can be used as a proxy variable for the output performance of
the Nigerian banking system.
As shown in Table 6.8, the ratio of total loans and advances to
total assets of the Nigerian banking system fluctuated greatly during
the period 1960-81. The proportion increased from 0.7 per cent in
1961 to 62.2 per cent in 1965. There was a noticeable decline in the
proportion of loans and advances in the total assets between 1968,
when it dropped from 61.2 per cent in 1967 to 0.3 per cent, and
1970, when it registered only 30.5 per cent. The ratio picked up
again between 1971, when it rose to 39.3 per cent, and 1973, when it
recorded I 2.5 per cent. A second phase of decline in the loans-assets
ratio started in 1971 with 33.k per cent, reaching a low of 26.0 per
cent in 1975 before picking up in 1976.
A number of reasons can be offered for these fluctuations in the
proportion of banks' assets devoted to loans and advances. The first
period 1960-67 was the period when the banks had few domestic
investment outlets for their temporary surplus funds. The banks had
to hold such funds as idle balances with the consequent opportunity
cost in terms of interest income lost. This is because of the
underdeveloped money market which could have provided investment
opportunities for the banks. To avoid holding much idle balances,
most of the funds available to the banks were devoted to loans and
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advances. The second period, 1968-7 0, was marked by uncertainty and
greater risks arising from unstable political and economic conditions
- a consequence of the 1967-70 civil war. The banks, consequently,
were not prepared to direct their assets to loans and advances. An
alternative investment opportunity was offered by the increased
borrowing from the banks by the government in order to have resources
to prosecute the war. Banks, therefore, diverted a greater proportion
of their assets to investment in government securities. (See Chapter
Four). The next period is 197-76 - a period of economic boom in
Nigeria because of the new-found oil wealth. The increased earnings
and the consequent expenditures in the face of low productivity within
the economy led to an unprecedented inflationary pressure. To deal
with the rising prices, the CBN in its monetary circulars placed a
limit on the margin by which loans and advances of one year should not
exceed that of the previous year, thus reducing the proportion of bank
assets devoted to loans and advances.
On the basis of the above analysis, it is correct to say that the
Nigerian banking system has not performed efficiently in its lending
activity. An excuse for the poor performance could be sort in the so-
called financial repression policies of the regulatory authorities
which manifest their effects on limited loan resources because of
loan rate ceiling, limited financial asset portfolio diversification
because of portfolio regulation and oligopolistic financial market.
In addition the conservative banking operations in Nigeria, for
example the inability of the banks to adopt innovations which have
eased bank services elsewhere in the world help to explain the
inefficient lending performance of the banking system.
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9-14.1	 Determinants of the Lending Performance of the Nigerian
Banking System
The supply of credit made available by the Nigerian banks depends
on the following factors:
- ratio of time plus savings deposits to total deposits
- number of bank offices
- ratio of interest received on loans to total loans
1	 Ratio of Time plus Savings Deposits to total Deposits
The volume of bank loans and investments depends on the volume of
deposits available to the banks. The deposit mix, therefore, is of'
particular interest in determining the lending capability of the
banks. This is because some components of the total deposits seem to
be more stable than others. It has been argued that the time and
savings deposits to total deposits ratio, to some extent, in 'normal'
times measures the volatility of the bank's deposit base (Morrison
and Selden, 1965). Since banks grant loans on the strength of their
deposits, the more volatile or unstable the deposits, the less
confidence the bank will have in employing them on a long-term basis.
Since in Nigeria, time and savings deposits constituted over 50 per
cent of the total banks' deposits in 13 of the 21 years of the period
covered by this study (See Table 6.2), it may be correct to argue that
time and savings deposits not only represent the more stable and
reliable portion of bank deposits but also constitute the core
deposits of the banks.
Another advantage of the time and savings deposits is that they
are relatively long-term deposits. Therefore, the longer the term of
deposits, the more the banks should be confident and willing to
part with them by way of loans. Since a large part of time and
savings deposits represents the resources that can, in crisis-free
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business periods, be lent on a long-term basis, the bigger these
deposits are as a proportion of total deposits, the better placed are
the banks to make loans.
The ratio of time and savings deposits to total deposits is
therefore expected to bear a positive correlation with the loan-asset
ratio, our measure of bank lending performance. However, as shown in
Table 9.7 the degree and sign of their statistical association is not
as expected. The ratio of time and savings deposits to total deposits
is statistically negatively associated with loan-asset ratio. The
correlation coefficient is -0.37. The only reason which could be
offered for this is as explained earlier that time and savings
deposits require explicit interest cost to attract. Therefore the
greater the proportion of time and savings deposits to total deposits,
the greater the interest cost of funds and thus the less willing the
banks are to put such funds into what they consider risky loans
particularly to the preferred sectors of the economy such as
agriculture and manufacturing.
2	 The Number of Bank Offices
The dispersal of bank branches all over the country is bound to
make a significant improvement in the lending performance of the
banks. Branches are not only avenues for the mobilization of funds
(particularly in the Nigerian rural communities, where large volumes
of funds lie idle or underutilized because of lack of channels for
their mobilization and investment), but they are also the outlets for
the majority of bank loans in value and number (Adewunmi, 1981,
p.325). This implies therefore that the greater the number of bank
offices, the more loans the banks will be prepared to make since more
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financial resources will have been made available. Besides, the large
number of bank offices will facilitate access to bank services thereby
increasing demand for bank services. To the vast majority of bank
customers, the most important single reason for patronising the banks
is the hope of receiving financial assistance from the bank to take
care of their difficulties and promote their business (Wadiri, 1981,
p.16 L1). Banks, on the other hand, thrive on the interest income
derived from loans and facilities granted to their customers. It is
to their mutual benefit, therefore, that the process of obtaining and
granting loans should be smooth and prompt. A large number of bank
branches provides this convenience. Therefore, the greater the
number of bank offices, the more efficient will the bank lending be.
Table 9.7
	
Correlation between the Nigerian banking system's
lending performance and its determinants
Time and	 Interest	 Loans and
savings	 Number	 received	 advances
deposits	 of bank	 on loans	 total
total	 offices	 total	 deposits
deposits	 loans
Loans and advances	 -0.37
	
0.72	 -0.'8	 0.3'
total assets
Loans and advances	 0.52
	
0.12	 -0.16
total assets
Source : Computer print-out
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On a priori reasoning, there should be a positive relationshi
between the amount of bank financial resources devoted to lending anc
the number of bank branches. As shown in Table 9.7, the statistica]
association between the number of bank offices and the loan-asset
ratio is positive. The significantly high correlation of O.7
supports the generally accepted hypothesis that the output performance
of a bank is significantly affected by the bank market structure.
3	 Ratio of Interest Received on Loans to Total Loans
As noted above, banks thrive, among other things, on the interest
income derived from their lending activities. Therefore, the higher
the loan rate, the more willing the banks will be to advance more
loans. However, while the loan rate is an important source of income
for banks, it could influence negatively the demand for loans. The
higher the loan rate the less prepared will the bank customers be to
demand loans. In Nigeria, however, because of the great unsatisfied
demand for bank loans and because of the fact that banks exploit the
situation by charging rates quite unrelated to the volume of and risk
involved in loans, the monetary authorities specify for the banks the
interest rate structure. Maximum rates to be charged for various
loans are specified.
While the institutionally administered interest rates structure
acts as a constraint to bank lending, it does not mean that the banks
are entirely in a strait-jacket. Nigerian banks could and should
stimulate demand for their loans by adopting loan rate policies that
allow them to take risks. The more available the loan facilities and
the more articulate the loan rate to cover the volume of loans and
risks involved, the more efficient the banks are likely to be in their
lending performance.
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Table 9.7 indicates that the statistical association between
loan rate and loan-asset ratio is negative, _O. 248. This implies that
the Nigerian banks are risk avoiders. They restrict output by
'pegging' the loan rate at a low level in order to avoid risks. Loans
are not granted to sectors or projects that involve some reasonable
risks. It requires the regulatory authorities to 'force' the bank to
grant a specified proportion of their loans to such sectors. On this
basis it may be correct to say that the Nigerian banking system has
not performed efficiently in their lending activities.
9-5	 CONCLUSIONS
As a background to the analysis of the hypothesis that bank
market structure, policy and demand variables affect to a significant
degree the economic performance of the Nigerian banking system, some
major previous studies of the banking 'structure-performance
hypothesis' (mainly of the US banking system) were reviewed.
The evidence from our discussion and analysis indicates that
market structure as measured by concentration ratio had no significant
and statistical association with bank profitability performance.
However, market structure as measured by the number of bank branches
was found to be statistically significantly correlated with bank
profitability performance and bank lending performance respectively.
The implication of this, therefore, is that a relatively simple
description of structure such as the number of bank offices matters.
Expansion of bank brandhes is desirable for increased bank
performance. There is, however, a limit to such expansion. The
expansion will be tolerated as long as it leads to greater incremental
revenue to the banking system than incremental expenses.
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The significant statistical association of the number of ban1
offices with the bank profitability and lending performance
notwithstanding, on balance, the impact of market structure on the
Nigerian banking system's performance is not strong. There is,
herefore, no strong evidence to accept 'the structure-performance
hjpothesis' in the experience of' the Nigerian banking system. The
hey and demand factors were important determinants of profitability
id lending performance of the Nigerian banking system.
The implications of these findings for the banks and the
r gulatory authorities are clear. For the banks there is the need to
inimise its total resources cost by a clever combination of cost-
fective source of deposits. This is necessary because expense
ntrol is the most important factor in achieving high bank
p ofitability and lending efficiency. In addition banks in a
d veloping economy like Nigeria must stimulate demand for their loans
bj deliberate policies on core factors of demand for their services,
a ch as the interest rates.
The regulatory authorities, on the other hand, should continue
with the policy of expansion of bank offices particularly in the rural
areas. Furthermore, regulators should, at least, be as wary of
mergers in relatively unconcentrated markets as in relatively
concentrated markets. This is particularly important since there have
been suggestions from some scholars for bank mergers in the country.
More generally, as Stigler (1950) and Hart (1975) have argued, mergers
between firms of intermediate size may lead to increased competition
for the larger existing firms. This is certainly a possible outcome,
though not the only one. Mergers between firms of intermediate size
could also lead to a more cohesive oligopoly group and thus more
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effective collusive behaviour. The analysis, while it does not
confirm, certainly lends support to the argument that small shifts in
the structure of the banking market such as through the merger of two
competing institutions will not have any appreciable impact on
performance. Because the banking system in Nigeria is more or less
liopolistic, conventional bank regulation may be incapable of
thieving a measurable gain in operating efficiency or performance.
Furthermore, regulatory emphasis should be more on policy
t'actors. To regulate the policy variable optimally, the monetary
authorities should create an encouraging environment to enable the
anks to adopt policies that will enhance their performance,
articularly in their lending activity. The monetary authorities
hould, to a great degree release their firm control on interest rates
cructure. Such a measure will lead to positive loan rate policy as
11 as positive and dynamic portfolio policy decisions by the banks.
Finally, the findings here are suggestive of the fruitfulness of
this analysis, the handicaps notwithstanding; but clearly the need f or
additional research in this area is substantial.
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CHAPTER TEN
SU)1ARI, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
10_i	 SUI1PLR!
The main trend of thought in this study is that the structure of
the financial system and in particular the banking system and the way
in which it performs its diverse functions will affect, for better or
worse, the progress of economic development. Basically, it has been
argued and attempts have been made to demonstrate that within the
context of Nigeria's development effort financial development with
respect to the banking system has quickened in recent years and that
the banking system has aided investment and economic development to a
greater extent than is generally recognised.
Discussion of financial markets and institutions often raises the
question whether there is an optimum path for financial development in
a country's progress towards rapid industrialisation and sustained
economic growth. The problem, of course, is that the financial
theorists have different criteria of optimality. Quite possibly they
have not specified a general set of criteria of optimality because as
Boreham (1980, p.8-12) contends, 'they cannot do so since it is
conceivable that economies in different stages of development - or
differing in other respects - will impose different requirements on
their financial systems and hence will involve different standards of
optimality'. Besides in a changing competitive environment there is
no fixed blue print even within a country for a best or optimal bank
structure. But whatever may be the status of a country, the
mobilization of savings for productive investment is still one of the
most important preconditions for accelerated economic growth.
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The structure of the banking system in Nigeria and it
contribution to overa]J. economic development of the economy have beer
very much influenced by the country's economic, historical anc
political developments as well as its geographical features. II
hardly needs to be said that banking is a service industry closel3
linked to the social, political and economic needs of the rural anc
urban communities. Nigeria's vast geographical extent and its widel3
dispersed population have posed a particular challenge for thE
economy-wide branch banlopment of the economy have been very muc1
influenced by the country's economic, historical and politica]
developments as well as its geographical features. It hardly needs tc
be said that banking is a service industry closely linked to thE
social, political and economic needs of the rural and urban
communities. Nigeria's vast geographical extent and its widel
dispersed population have posed a particular challenge for the
economy-wide branch bant. These aspects of the banking structure were
discussed fully in Chapters Two and Three. It has also been shown
that ownership structure of the Nigerian banking system does matter in
its progress towards optimum pattern of institutional behaviour in
terms of the kinds of loans offered, kinds of credit and deposit
instruments used, particularly since the indigenisation of the banking
system. Except, however, that the state governments' take over of
indigenous banks, while it helped these banks to weather through the
initial problems imposed by the 1952 Banking Ordinance requirements,
unhealthy competition from the expatriate banks, and their internal
problem of mismanagement, is likely to constitute a hinderance to the
banks' efforts to improve their performance. These banks are now
involved actively in the politics of the respective owner state
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government, and while this may make good politics it makes bad bankin
because it narrows their scope of operation in terms of attractin
deposits from all the segments of the economy, and attracting the best
indigenous skilled manpower.
The Nigerian banking system has experienced tremendous growth anc
development during the period covered by this study. It has in it
process of' growth and development contributed significantly to capitaa
formation. This was shown by examining the trends in bank deposits
relative to money supply and the total banking system's assets
relative to GDP as indicators of effectiveness of mobilization of
financial savings; increases in bank credit to the public and private
sectors as a percentage of gross domestic investment - a measure of
the contribution of the banking system to the financing of capital
formation; and the expansion of bank offices as an indicator of the
problem and prospects of mobilization of savings by banks; and the
density of banks in relation to population and therefore the banking
habit attained in the economy. (See Chapter Four).
It is further shown that the Nigerian banking system has attained
a higher degree of financial intermediation than is generally
realised. The degree of financial intermediation attained by the
banking system is usually obscured by comparing it with developed
countries' banking systems. Such comparison can mislead. It may
indicate, however, that the Nigerian banking system is still at the
rudimentary stage of development, but since the development of the
financial system should be seen in relation to the stage of the
economic development of the economy, the inter-system comparison was
limited to selected developing countries in comparable stage of
economic development.
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In analysing development finance, it is convenient to recall that
the need to develop the banking system and indeed the domestic
financial institutions and patterns of behaviour necessary to
generate and mobilize scarce capital funds as a key condition for
economic development originated in the classic work of Schumpeter in
the 1930s and has since been unfolding in the studies of a small but
growing band of economists such as Gurley and Shaw (1973),
Gerschenkron (1962), Cameron (1967) and McKinnori (1973, 1976). This
aspect of the analysis was undertaken in Chapter five because it is
difficult to undertake this type of study satisfactorily without
attempting to understand various theories to explain the behaviour of
the financial institutions and the relationship between financial
development and economic growth. Unfortunately, however, inspite of a
vast literature on monetary theory and monetary policy, and inspite of
the recent deluge of scholarly publications on various aspects of
capital formation in the developing countries, economists are still
wrestling with the formidable task of providing "a general theory" of
financial institutions (Boreham, 1980).
Evidence available indicates complementary relationship between
money balances, capital accumulation and economic development in
Nigeria. While it is difficult to demonstrate unequivocally that
there is a direct statistical relationship between financial and
monetary development on one hand and economic development on the
other, there is a strong indication that economic growth in Nigeria
has been rapid to the extent that monetary and financial resources
have expanded in real terms.
365
In discussing the performance of the banking system, it is argued
that while the usual problem of specifying any industry performance
characteristics is well known, banking adds a twist or two thus making
it difficult to measure its output performance. However, using a
series of surrogates such as volume of deposits, earning assets and
the number of cheques processed, it was shown that the long-run output
performance of the Nigerian banking system exhibited an upward trend
in the period under review. The profitability performance of the
banking system was examined with profitability ratios such as profits
after taxes to capital and profits after taxes to assets. These
ratios showed a long-run upward trend during the period 1960-80. (See
Chapter Six).
Based on the analysis in Chapters Seven and Eight among others,
few would dispute that the banking system played an important role in
financing the growth of the Nigerian economy during 1960-80. But, it
is equally clear that the banking system has not fully responded to
the credit needs of the priority or preferred sectors of the economy,
particularly the agriculture and manufacturing subsectors of the
production sector. Indisputably, a comparatively small proportion of
bank accommodation went to agriculture and manufacturing.
Nevertheless, it is observed that the amount of loans and advances to
these sectors has been increasing. It is important to realise that
the nature of agriculture in Nigeria has not encouraged banks to
extend loans and advances to it. Agriculture in Nigeria is
traditionally carried out for the most part on a very small scale and
its production is strongly influenced by uncontrollable natural
conditions. Compared with modern manufacturing industries,
agriculture is very inferior in terms of productivity and income.
366
These features of the sector are reflected as a matter of course ix
their finance. It is thus difficult for the agricultural sector tc
obtain credit from the banking system.
Most of the advances of the banking system are secured either b3
a pledge or hypothecation of goods, real estate and securities (stock
arid bonds and life in3urance policies). The reluctance of the bankin
system to stimulate demand for loans and to lend to the priorit3
sectors has been attributed to their unwillingness to relax their
traditional criteria of security 'rather than to the inherent
unprofitability or deficient capacity of these groups to repay loans'
(Borehani, 1980, p.9-i). Critics of the so called "banking collaterai
syndrome" point out that rigid insistence on approved securities a
collateral inhibits the extension of credit to many legitimate small
borrowers and also favours the affluent. In addition most of the
loans and advances of the banking system to the private and public
sectors are of short-term nature. The bankers, however, contend that
while they restrict their activities mainly on short-term financing,
in the legal sense, in reality the loans are renewed at the end of the
contract and the credit is rolled over in many cases. In essence, the
distinction between short-term and long-term is only theoretical.
Even so, a formal term loan which has the advantage of regular
repayment of instalments and current cash inflow into a bank appears
to be a more appropriate method of financing for both lender and
borrower than credit which though short-term in form is in effect
medium- or long-term. It is argued that considering the composition
of deposits with the banking system, the Nigerian banking system
should not be in any way handicapped in its important role of
transformation of short-term funds into medium-term and longer-term
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financial assets. Since the banking system finance the working
capital requirements of industry and trade and since a certain core of
funds always remains with the bank over long periods of time, a
moderate amount of medium- and long-term lending constitutes no threat
to the stability of the banking system. In brief there is no sound
reason why the banking system should refrain from financing fixed
capital formation. A recent study by Khatkhate and Riechel (1980) on
the stability of the demand, time and savings deposits for a selected
number of developing countries suggests that a surprisingly high
percentage of such nominally short-term funds as demand deposits can
be relied upon to remain available over more than one period. The
percentage core is even higher for the average measure of future
periods. This view was corroborated by the Radcliffe Report which
concluded that 'individual balances go up and down, depositors come
and depositors go, but the total on current account goes on for ever'
(See CLCB, 1977).
To further complete the analysis on the performance of the
banking system, an analysis of the determinants of the profitability
and lending performance of the banks was undertaken in Chapter Nine.
The basic hypothesis is that structure, demand and policy variables
influence to a significant degree the economic performance of the
banking system. As this relates to the "structure-performance
hypothesis and since it has been variously tested in many studies of
other countries particularly the United States, some of the major
studies were reviewed as a background to the study.
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Policy variables used are the loans to deposits ratio and time
and savings deposits to total deposits ratio while the structure
variables include deposit concentration ratio and the number of bank
offices. The demand variable is proxied by per capita income.
The evidence of the analysis indicates that structure variable as
measured by the number of bank offices rather than the concentration
ratio is important in explaining the lending and profitability
performance of the Nigerian banking system. On the whole, therefore,
the impact of the market structure on the Nigerian banking system's
performance is weak and unstable. It was suggested that the apparent
weakness of the "structure-performance hypothesis" might be at least
partly a result of the pursuit of multiple bank objectives such as
increasing bank size and revenue and reducing bank risk exposure. If
more highly concentrated and less competitive bank markets more easily
enabled banks to satisfy the goal of satisfactory rate of return on
equity, then banks in more highly concentrated markets would be more
likely to pursue other objectives. Thus it was argued that the
pursuit of such satisficing objectives could at least, in part, help
to explain the absence of strong and significant positive relationship
between market concentration and bank profit rates.
The policy variables, deposit-mix (time and savings deposits to
total deposits ratio) and intermediation level (loans-deposits ratio),
and the demand variable as proxied by per capita income were important
determinants of profitability and lending performance of the Nigerian
banking system. Loan rate has not influenced very significantly the
lending performance of the Nigerian banks. The above evidence,
however, does not suggest the acceptance of the structure-performance
hypothesis in the experience of the Nigerian banking system.
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10-2	 REVIEW OF 0BJECiivi AND HYP0THES
The hypotheses of the present study were derived from the general
objective of the study. The general objective of the present study
states that within the context of Nigeria's development effort,
financial development with respect to the banking system has quickened
in recent years and that the banking system has aided investment and
economic development to a greater extent than is generally recognised.
On this basis the study was approached by a detailed examination of
the historical pattern of growth, structure and operations of the
Nigerian banking system as a service producing industry, the analysis
of the determinants of the economic performance of the Nigerian
banking system, and the investigation of the banking system's specific
contributions to the process of general economic development. In
addition the hypothesis which was stated in broad terms is examined
under five manageable hypotheses as stated in Chapter One.
Hypothesis 1 is accepted. Generally the banking system's credit
to the economy has shown a long-term increasing trend. It rose trots
125. 1 million naira in 1963 to 9,066.9 million naira in 1980. (See
also Fig .7). Furthermore, the loans/deposits ratio which gives an
impression of the extent to which the banking system used the
resources available to it, maintained an annual average of 73 per cent
for the period 1960-80. The proportion was as high as 113.8 per cent
in 1967. It is also shown that the proportion of bank resources
devoted to investment has been increasing over time. To further
support the acceptance of hypothesis 1, the measurement of the banking
system's output as a service producing industry indicates that the
earning assets of the commercial banks have shown an increasing trend;
and the number of cheques processed by the banking system exhibited an
370
upward trend with an average annual increase of 14.5 per cent. The
average clearing efficiency of the banks recorded an increasing trend
too.
The volume of deposits held by the banking system recorded a
sixty-four-fold increase during the period covered by this study. It
recorded an average annual growth rate of 20.5 per cent. Even wei
deflated for price increase to take account of the effect of
inflationary induced increase in deposits, there was a ten-fe d
increase in the deposits during the period 1960-80, with an average
annual growth rate of 12.5 per cent. On the basis of these findings
and available evidence, hypothesis 2 is accepted.
Hypothesis 3 has not been conclusively proved or disproved. 1'
credit and advances to the economy have shown an increasing trend nd
an inter-system comparison of the degree of financial deepening ha
indicated that with an average demand deposit to money supply ratio of
53.2 per cent and time plus savings deposits to money supply ratio of
60 per cent, the Nigerian banking system has a higher degree of
financial intermediation than the other selected countries of
Tanzania, Ghana and Kenya which share similar economic development
characteristics with Nigeria. On the basis of these results, the
hypothesis might be accepted. But the fact that the loans and
advances particularly to the private sector are not suited or
appropriate to the needs of the sector makes it difficult to justify
the acceptance of the hypothesis. The loans and advances are short-
term in nature as opposed to the greater demand for medium- and long-
term credit by the private sector. Besides, by their strict adherence
to the traditional criteria of loan security the banks discriminated
in the loan accommodations against many legitimate small borrowers
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(particularly in agriculture and small scale industries) who have no
"acceptable" securities to offer in favour of the big and affluent
borrowers who, in any case do not need the "acceptable" securities in
order to borrow from the banks since their "names" alone are enough
acceptable securities by the banks.
Although the banking system has not fully complied with the CBM
directives on loans and advances extension to the preferred sectors,
there is absolute evidence as shown in Chapters Seven and Eight that
the banking system's loans arid advances to these priority sectors have
increased more than it would have without the directives. In fact,
the banking system's advances to the public sector is primarily
dictated by the government's needs for funds which the banks have
always been willing to accommodate albeit as far as short-term credit
needs are concerned. Hypothesis 5 is, therefore, upheld. In
investigating the "structure-performance" related hypothesis it
is shown that there is no strong conclusive evidence to accept
hypothesis .
10-3
	
REOI41ENDATI0NS
A spirit of vigorous, restless innovation in the
financial system - of devising new ways to do new things
rather than of justifying why they should never be done at
all - can ordinarily best be achieved in conditions under
which the participants are not prevented from responding to
changed opportunities, in which there is relative ease of'
entry for honest men with ideas and imagination and in which
different classes of institution can compete with each
other on an equitable and open basis.
(Report of' the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance: The
Porter Report, Canada, 1964, p.8-9).
Guided by the above philosophy, the objective in this section is
to suggest recommendations which would further the existence in
Nigeria of "a creative banking system" - a sytem which would not
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passively accommodate the usual but rather one in which active and
inventive efforts are constantly being made to meet the sound
requirements of lenders and borrowers regardless of how untried and
unusual such needs may be. (See Porter Report 1960, Green 1971).
Recommendations put forward here are based on three main areas in
an attempt to deal with the problems of:
(i) financial depending and/or repression;
(ii) greater risk averse-than-is-worthwhile attitude of
the Nigerian banks;
(iii) credit to the agricultural sector and small scale
enterprises and the rural banks.
1	 Financial Deepening/Repression
It is observed that Nigeria is still under-banked because of the
vast geographical extent and its widely dispersed population. It is,
however, encouraging that the government and the commercial banks
through the rural banking scheme are making commendable efforts to get
the banks to expand to the rural areas. The government should in
addition establish its own rural banks to speed up the expansion. The
necessity of this cannot be overemphasized. It is usually argued that
the problem of promotion and mobilization of savings in the developing
countries is caused by inadequacies in the financial structure and the
density of' financial intermediaries (Lewis, 1955). Support for this
contention has come form some empirical evidence that has shown
savings to be responsive to the number, availability and efficiency of
financial markets (Wai, 1972). In other words the available evidence
suggests that saving is "institution elastic" and therefore a higher
density of financial institutions evokes a greater volume of savings
(iiitiris and Wiseman, 1981).
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With reference to the financial activities of commercial banks,
it is rightly asserted that whereas the increase in productivity in
the economy determines the potential rate of growth of saving, the
existence of an appropriate and adequate financial network determines
the actual flow of such funds (Antonin Basch, 196 L , p.72). Besides,
it hardly needs to be said that banking is a service industry closely
linked to the social and economic needs of rural, urban and 'even
wilderness communities' (Papadopoulos, 1981). Thus government-owned
rural banks should be tailored to the needs of each rural community
and should serve as a model for the other more or less privately-owned
rural bank branches.
It is however evident that the more basic causal link between
savings and financial institutions is not so much through the number
and variety of financial institutions and instruments as in the
adoption of appropriate economic policies. This leads to another
recommendation and that is: that interest rate which is
institutionally determined and administered should be free of all
strict controls. Commercial banks can play a more active role in the
task of economic development if they are free from the "repressive"
measures of rigid interest rate controls. Although the positive
relationship between saving and rate of interest which classical
theory assumed to exist has not been established by empirical
research, the lessons of history are remarkably clear on this point:
anti-market measures usually breed more controls, not more
responsiveness on the part of those controlled.
It is not surprising therefore to find that major analytic
studies of financial markets have clearly established that the
consequences of regulation of interest rates in the developed
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countries have been to foster and sustain monopolistic profit making
positions rather than to protect the financial system and the users
(Boreham, 1980). Experience in developing countries shows that when
interest rate is regulated the banks resort to non-price rationing of
credit and the easiest criteria available to the bank managers for
credit rationing are the quality of collateral, political pressures
(as happens with the state government-owned banks) "nam&' and loan
size and credit standing of the borrowers. These criteria not only
tend to favour the affluent but also discriminate inefficiently
between investment opportunities (Fry, 1979). In short, government
intervention and regulation should not distort the working of the
market mechanism too much.
It is significant that official inquiries into the financial
systems of developed countries over the past 15 years - the Porter
Commission in Canada (Report, 196 14); the Hunt Commission in the United
States (Report, 1971), the Bank of England document on competition and
credit control (June , 1971) and the more recent Report on the Italian
Credit and Financial System (June 1983) - have all emphasised the need
for a more competitive financial order to promote efficient allocation
of resources. In this respect, at least the experience of the
developed countries is highly pertinent to the present day Nigerian
banking system.
Implied therefore, is that the monetary authorities should adopt
appropriate banking policies concerning depositors. The present
policy whereby banks pay very low rate of about 14 per cent, for
interest bearing deposits and at the same time charge as high as 11
per cent on their loans and advances is bound to be discouraging to
savers. Even if Hitiris' and Wiseman's (1981) contention that the net
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impact of the real rate of interest on aggregate saving was found to
be insignificant is accepted, one thing is not in doubt, that is that
interest rates are at least as significant in determining where
savings will be directed as in determining how much will be saved. It
is also believed that the lack of simple intelligible arid convenient
financial instruments yielding a positive real return, has frustrated
potential saving and rather encouraged consumption.
The wholly indigenous-owned banks will be better disposed to
perform their functions more efficiently if they are insulated from
the respective owner state government's politics. The banks will be
able to compete in the labour market for skilled staff and broaden
their operational base in attracting deposits and.investments.
Generally, banks should be provided with greater autonomy in
management so that they might be able to develop a variety of savings
instruments and enjoy greater freedom in the determination of interest
rates and in investment of deposits, and the provision of credit.
2	 Greater-Risk-Averse-than-is-Necessary Behaviour
The prevalence of greater-risk-averse-attitude than is necessary
of the banks is responsible for the banks' refusal to lend on medium-
and long-term basis and their inability and unwillingness to undertake
innovative ventures. Medium- and long-term lending by the banks
usually take the form of roll over credits which are however,
generally inefficient from the point of view of allocation of
resources, since the banks favour larger well established borrowers
over new and smaller borrowers. There is a great need for more term
transformation by banks. A number of measures can be undertaken to
help the banking system re-shape and re-define its "canons of good
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banking" to reflect a dynamic banking system and be prepared to accept
risk in its operations. These measures are examined below:
(i) Loan Guarantee and Discounting : The CBN and the government
can do more than they are currently doing by broadening the credit
guarantee scheme (ACGS) to meet the greater needs of the banks as well
as bank customers. Re-discounting by the CBN can offer ample
possibilities for encouraging commercial banks to gain experience in
medium- and long-term lending operations and to channel savings into
productive activities. A number of procedures can be adopted such as
preferential discount rates, multiple discount rates or quotas
favouring certain sectors or purposes. For example in some Latin
American countries, the government or the central banks re-discount
paper it the purpose of the operation is to finance a project
included in the development plan or to promote the exportation of
certain non-traditional products. Ordinarily the banks are requested
to assume part of the non-payment in the re-discount operation,
although in some cases a government guarantee may be justified, for
example in financing of agricultural development plans.
(ii) Technical and Managerial Assistance. The banks themselves
can ensure minimum risk of loan losses by providing technical and
managerial assistance facilities of various kinds to their customers
and not by shying away from innovative banking. With the CBN re-
discount and guarantee scheme, the banks should emulate the experience
of German banks and attempt to accompany industrial and/or
agricultural enterprises "from cradle to grave, from establishment to
liquidation, throughout all the vicissitudes of its existence'
(Gerschenkron 1962, p.14; Pollard 196 L ). This would embrace direct
assistance in project preparation and financing as well as management.
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(iii)Personnel Training. For the banks to assume a dynamic and
innovative role, they require special expertise. In fact in no
economic activity is the use of personnel as important as in banking.
Unlike industrial firms which are capital intensive, banking
operations depend essentially on the quality of the staff.
Furthermore, there can be no doubt in theory and practice about the
truth of the prediction that in future the competition between banks
will be carried out mainly in the personnel field. For these reasons
there must be continued emphasis on providing the banks with all the
resources and support that will foster the training and development of
skilled banking staff. Both the banks and the government should join
efforts to see that the training programme in banking is expanded in
the short-, medium-. and long-term to meet the demand for skilled
manpower in the banking industry. In this regard,' the Nigerian
Institute of Bankers School should be equipped to take up the
extensive manpower training for the banks. Training should not be
limited to increasing the expertise of the personnel; it should embody
the philosophy of modern firm and its social responsibility in the
light of development requirements. This is where co-ordination
between the expanded role of the Institute of Bankers as a bank
personnel training centre and the universities and other high
institutions responsible for training students of banking and finance
is necessary.
(iv)Co-ordination of Monetary policy and Financial policy. The
banking system must operate in a social and political framework that
is regulated; it would not be able to play a dynamic role in the
absence of a monetary and fiscal policy that is consistent and
compatible with development and a monetary authority that tries to
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provide stability. The greatest contribution that a central bank can
make to development process is throug1 the maintenance of monetary and
financial stability on agreeable climate in which savers and investors
can continue supplying the economy with its basic development
material. A high rate of inflation, for instance, discourages long-
term bank lending. Beckhart (1965, p.86) has pointed out 'The basic
test of a well-functioning financial system ... is its ability to
finance credit needs, which contribute to economic growth, and to
finance those needs in such a fashion that inflation and economic
instability are not engendered'.
Furthermore, selective and innovative use of traditional monetary
policy instruments can afford a suitable technique that will help the
banks to play a more dynamic role in the national economic
development. For example, legal reserve requirements can serve as a
means of influencing the structure of bank lending in terms of
maturity pattern, the conditions for which the loans are made, and the
economic sectors to which the loans are directed. The aims of this
policy would be to increase the proportion of lending to the basic
productive sectors with longer maturities and to serve agriculture,
small scale industry and other sectors not offering a high rate of
return.
(v) Interbank Lending Market. Apart from the readiness to re-
discount and guarantee bank loans and advances, the monetary
authorities should assist in broadening the interbank lending market
which can be used to offset potentially disruptive shifts of deposits
among banks.
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3	 Credit to Agriculture and Small-scale Enterprises and the
Rural Banks
A number of recommendations f or improving bank loans and advances
to agriculture and small-scale enterprises is necessary.
Ci) Since the government with the co-operation of the banking
system is vigorously embarking on a rural banking programmes, it is
necessary that these banks are made to specialise in providing the
special credit needs of the respective communities they are meant to
serve. To do this effectively, there is the need for the existing and
future banks to decentralise their control. Given the decentralised
decision-making, local branches can provide credit of many different
types with relative speed based on personal contact and on local
management's knowledge of area, industries and business as well as
farm conditions. This approach involves a more intimate link with the
managements of small enterprises; the banks should not only provide
much needed information about facilities but act more as management
consultants, identifying problems and suggesting solutions (Revell,
1983). Thus like the unit banks in the United States, the branch bank
offices in the rural communities should provide the individual
knbwledge and community "feel" of local management. If, for instance,
a bank lends to members of the same economic and social group to which
the savers belong, it thereby creates a constructive image of banking
as an institution, and so helps to develop a more advanced economic
behaviourpattern by making people directly aware of the role of
saving in economic development (Masini, 1977).
(ii) One of the reasons banks are not keen in lending to the
rural community is that their customers constitute one special
category of borrowers: that of small enterprises in farming, industry,
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LftS and trade who are scattered all over the economy. It is not
y impractical to meet their financial needs individually but also
administrative costs and risks may be very high. The bank can
oh them easily only through co-operative societies. By operating
ough co-operative movements banks can reduce the cost of processing
supervision since group lenders and co-operative officers could
1st in preparing the loan application and farm planning. Besides,
formation of the units into co-operative organisations with larger
urces and increased creditworthiness will reduce the risk of loan
es to the banks. The various state governments should, therefore,
w greater interest than hitherto in encouraging the formation of
operative societies. Evidently this is one of the easiest ways of
ilizing rural savings f or capital investment in agriculture and
er small enterprises because the banks will be in a position to
mand resources and thus strengthen the resource position of the oo-
ratives.
(iii) There seems to be much emphasis on extending credit to the
mers with little recognition of the vital need to promote savings
small enterprises. Existing and future rural banks should combine
rings schemes for farmers with their credit programme. Such a
eme would provide further means for financing the banks and create
;achment of the farmer to the banks. This should involve ease of
osit and withdrawal, and attractive interest rates should be paid.
erience shows that small family enterprises are more willing than
;t to save and more responsive to incentives to do so. To the
ent that the banking system helps families to undertake a
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productive project, it tends to alter the pattern of income use in thE
direction away from consumption and hoarding and towards strengthenin
the enterprise.
Revell (1983, p.155) notes that in most developed countries,
banks in their desire to attract new customers in sections of thE
community not previously involved with banks have moved towards "free
banking for persona], customers with no charge for payment services tc
those who maintain balances of a specified level. This policy if
tried in the Nigerian rural sector is likely to encourage saving and
investment in the sector. The banks ? profit level has been so high
that the banks can afford to adopt the policy of "free" banking as
well as that of "bundling" services to the small enterprises with a
range of subsidies from the affluent and the large scale enterprises
of the urban areas to the rural farmers and small scale industries
'none of which is necessarily contributing to the recovery of bank
costs in proportion to the use made of services or necessarily
receiving the correct price for the raw material, deposits, that it
makes available to the bank' (Revell, 1983, p.155).
(iv) The CBN credit guidelines should be sufficiently
articulated to show a more detailed classification of subsectors. As
noted in Chapter Seven, a commendable beginning has been made by
separating real estate from construction in 1975 and the removal of
bills discounted as a subsector of genera]. commerce in 1980, but this
did not go far enough particularly in the agricultural sector.
Agriculture should be broken down into a finer group to separate
direct production from indirect financing. Processing should be
separated from direct production and from food procurement. The
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industrial aspect of agriculture while important in stimulating ra
material production stands apart from agricultural production proper.
Furthermore, in manufacturing which is an omnibus category
there is a great difference in credit needs of large- and medium-scale
industries on the one hand and the small-scale industries on the
other. Each of these categories requires a different orientation in
terms of credit policy.
(v) The CBN should prepare a manual for guidance of ban1
managers in classifying loans and advances for the purpose of
completing the returns to their head offices. More often than not,
the bank managers use their discretion but without any further aid in
deciding how to classify a particular transaction. For example, an
advance for the importation of fish may be classified as an advance to
the fisheries subsector of agriculture whereas it belongs properly to
the import subsector of general commerce. The CBN manual should be
available to all banks in sufficient quantity to be given to all
branch management staff of' each bank.
The results of this study raise some interesting questions for
additional investigation. First is whether the bank's function in
Nigeria for bank credit to the private sector is supply or demand
constrained or' determined by both? Whichever, what are the relevant
determinant factors? Second is the need for more exhaustive
investigation of the objective functions of' bank management and the
role of the pursuit of multiple objectives by bank management in
helping to explain observed bank behaviour. The results presented in
Chapter Mine suggest that the need for additional research in this
area is substantial.
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